The Campaign of Alexander the Great in Thrace and Illyria (335 BC): Strategic Aims, Tactics and Logistics.

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SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES
A thesis submitted for the degree of
Master of Arts (MA) in Classical Archaeology and Ancient History of Macedonia.

February 2018
Thessaloniki – Greece
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I hereby declare that the work submitted is mine and that where I have made use of another’s work, I have attributed the source(s) according to the Regulations set in the Student’s Handbook.

February 2018
Thessaloniki – Greece
Abstract

This dissertation was written as part of the MSc at the Classical Archaeology and Ancient History at the International Hellenic University.

Alexander the Great is the key figure that concentrates around his personality many aspects of the ancient world. Here in this study, we will estimate how a Macedonian state and the army, which were effected under the strong influence and perception of the ex-monarch Philip II, operated under the rule of a new heir, Alexander III. The aim of this survey is to examine Alexander’s Balkan campaign of 335 BC, from various sides. Many ancient writers wrote for Alexander although for this first campaign we have only one significant testimony that of Arrian; other ancient authors abridged a lot their accounts. Moreover, at some points vague remains of a Ptolemaic papyri can help.

Firstly, the strategic aims will be analyzed, by revealing to us deeper causes, reasons and aims of the realization of the Balkan campaign, apart from the traditional view and reason that Arrian accounts. Then, the multiple successful tactics will follow, which would enlighten us on the ability of “young” Alexander in the military field. This fact is significant due to the fact that we already all know how charismatic Alexander was in the military affairs, although here at his first steps we will see many prototypes and differences at his command. Finally, this study will offer the opportunity to the reader to be familiar with the logistics of a campaign. The field of logistics is dark because of the few evidence that the ancient authors left behind, while every knowledge focuses on the Asian campaign. Here, the logistics of the Balkan campaign will be presented, and how they functioned in the concept of a campaign.

Keywords: Alexander, Balkan campaign, tactics, logistics

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February 2018
Preface-Acknowledgments

From the time I can remember myself, I have always been a passionate individual with history, more specifically with the history of ancient Hellas. I was very impressed by the poems of Homer and the mysterious olden world they presented to us. This love increased when I started to read more and more about the world of ancient Hellenes. Moreover, I have always had a preference for Macedonia. From all of Hellenes since my youth, I admired the Macedonians the most, and with great pleasure I spent time reading about the achievements of Philip II and his son Alexander. My personal admiration about Alexander was always huge as I have always considered him a military genius figure. So, in this survey it was difficult for me to eliminate my fondness towards him and to judge him with the objectivity of a historian. Let alone, I never thought that in my paper I would minimize his triumph. All in all, for me it was a great pleasure, when I discovered this master at International Hellenic University, which concentrates on the Macedonian culture.

For this beautiful journey, I would like to thank my family, which has always supported and believed in me. Furthermore, I would like to thank Aikaterini Nouli for all the aid and encouragement to that effort. I would also like to offer my gratitude to my dissertation adviser prof. Nikos Giannakopoulos for the time he offered, the aid and his guidance for the completion of this Thesis. To Dr. Nikos Akamatis, who patiently listened to all my questions and thoughts and always replied to my concerns. Finally, I would like to thank my fellow students for this exciting year and especially Natassa Gkika for all the time we passed together during these months in the library, discussing and writing our Thesis.
## CONTENTS

1) ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................. 3  
2) PREFACE-ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................ 4  
3) CONTENTS ............................................................................................................. 5  
4) INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 6-11  
5) CHAPTER I: STRATEGIC AIMS AND REASONS FOR THE BALKAN CAMPAIGN OF 335 BC .................................................................................................................. 12-20  
6) CHAPTER II: ALEXANDER’S TACTICS AT THRACE ........................................ 21-46  
   a. MOUNT HAEMUS ............................................................................................... 21-30  
   b. LYGINUS ............................................................................................................ 31-36  
   c. DANUBE ........................................................................................................... 37-46  
5) CHAPTER III: THE ILLYRIAN THREAT ................................................................ 47-82  
   a. CLEITUS AND GLAUKIAS ............................................................................... 47-73  
   b. FORMIDABLE ILLYRIANS? THE EVENTS OF PELLION FROM ANOTHER FACET ................................................................................................................... 74-82  
6) CHAPTER IV: THE LOGISTICS OF THE CAMPAIGN ........................................ 83-105  
   a. MACEDONIAN LOGISTICS vs HELLENIC LOGISTICS: DIFFERENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS ........................................................................................................ 83-90  
   b. MEN AND ANIMALS IN THE LOGISTIC MACHINE ........................................... 91-93  
   c. THE CAMPAIGN ............................................................................................... 94-105  
7) CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................... 106-109  
8) IMAGES ............................................................................................................... 110-121  
9) BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................... 122-128
Introduction

No respectable study for Alexander the Great can be written, without referring first to the contribution of Alexander’s father, Philip II, in its introduction. As Errington once said: «No Philip, No Alexander». About the Balkan campaign of Alexander, it is important to be aware about who was the man who offered ascendancy to the Macedonian kingdom to the Balkan vast regions. I would like to emphasize that in this essay, when I refer to the Balkan campaign, I mean the route of Alexander until Danube and the war with Cleitus and Glaukias in Pellion. In this introduction, we will shortly mention the contribution of Philip towards Macedonia and especially to the regions of Balkans.

To begin with, Philip received a decadent state and raised it to the leading authority in the Mediterranean world. Some paradigms of his achievements are that, Philip systematically eliminated the menace from the neighbors of Macedonia and from south Hellenes, he created a consolidated and centralized kingdom, he transmuted the royal iconography and dynastic perception, he created a professional unique army, and finally he reinforced the economy of Macedonia by creating an era of firmness and welfare, a condition that Macedon had never felt before.

Philip expanded his kingdom and made Macedonia great and vast. Pertaining to Philip’s action and the subjugation of Thrace, we can add Fox’s comment: “Philip had played one Thracian king against another beyond Macedonia’s north-east borders and settled an impressive network of new towns through modern Bulgaria as far north as the river Danube and the Black sea. He had controlled most of the huge rough hinterland of his road to Asia and enjoyed the rich rewards of its royal tithes”.

In fact, Philip subjugated the Odrysian kingdom at 341 B.C. when he crushed the

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1Errington 1990,99.
2Muller 2010,183.
3Muller 2010,183, Errington 1990, 100-101
4Muller 2010,183.
6Muller 2010,184.
7Fox 2004,81.
Thracian king Cersobleptes.\(^8\) Philip was dominant in Thrace from the great Balkan range in the north, to the Aegean Sea in the south and from the Nestus River east to the Black Sea.\(^9\) Diodorus informed us about the reason of the campaign. Philip desired to put an end to belligerence of the Thracians against the Hellenic cities, and led his vast army against the Cersobleptes. After two years of continuous fighting, Philip achieved his goal. He forced barbarians to pay a tithe to him, and he established many cities in special points, with the aim of reducing the aggressiveness of the barbarians forever.\(^10\)

Moreover, more important reasons, discovered behind the final campaign of 342 B.C. At this Campaign, there were special strategy plans, which Philip knew and needed. To begin with, the danger of Persia was alive. Persia used to invade Hellas by crossing the Hellespont and moving its armies by land through Thrace. Thus, Philip needed eastern Thrace as a necessary occupation to block and defend any attempt of Persia against him. Secondly, with Thrace in his occupation, Philip would have the chance to meet Persian forces early and perhaps to hinder their landing. Even if he failed to act like this, it was better to fight in Thrace rather than meet the enemy on Macedonian land. All in all, if Philip aimed at a future invasion of Persia via Ionia, he would lead that attack from Eastern Thrace, because this area would serve as a strategic point for the invasion. We must not ignore that the size of his army supported his desire of the ultimate conquest of all Thrace.\(^11\)

In general, concerning Philip’s action in Thrace, we can add that he conquered the Odrysian kingdom after the surrender of Cersobleptes as I already mentioned and subjected Thrace beyond the Strymon and along the mountains to Macedonian rule. The Odrysian kingdom which ruled Central Thrace, was a part of the Hellenic political history from the late of 430s to the middle of the fourth century, had fallen victim to its internal dynastic rivalries and to the increasing Macedonian expansionism under Philip. For the actualization of this achievement, Philip perpetrated several campaigns across southeaster Thrace (353-352, 346, and 342-340 BC) and further north to the land of Getae and beyond the Danube to the

\(^8\)Xy dopoulos 2010,213.
\(^9\)Gabriel 2010,186.
\(^10\)Diod. 16.71, Xy dopoulos 2010, 213.
\(^11\)Gabriel 2010,182.
remote stranger land of Scythians (339). Philip knew that Thrace could provide him with vast natural and human resources.\textsuperscript{12}

Nonetheless, he also experienced the unstable territorial conquests to the north of Mt. Rhodope and the weak point of the northern border of Thrace. His own campaigns, north of Mt. Haemus and of Alexander against Maedi (340), Triballians and Getae (335) aimed at securing parts of the borders from dangerous neighbors, more specifically in the north and the northwest of Thrace.\textsuperscript{13} The most significant development was that Macedonian hegemony created the new phenomenon of colonization to Thracian land. Almost four centuries after the settlement of the first wave of Hellenes colonists on the Thracian coast, the Macedonians started a second wave, due to the fact that they had established a network of fortified military colonies which were inhabited by mix populations, along with special strategic places, e.g. Philippopolis on the Hebro and Kabyle on the river Tonzos.\textsuperscript{14} These towns introduced civic institutions into inland Thrace and developed into new trading centers and maybe served as garrison towns. Nonetheless, Thrace was never incorporated into Macedonia, for administrative purposes there was the office of strategos of Thrace, to command the new conquered area. A tithe was necessary to paid\textsuperscript{15} by the Thracians and some Thracians would be recruited by the Macedonian army.\textsuperscript{16} The area that Philip subjugated in twenty years from the moment he became the Macedonian monarch, was considered the first land empire in Europe.\textsuperscript{17}

However, except for this great accomplishment of Philip, we must mention some conflicts with some tribes, which had an impact on later events i.e. the campaign of Alexander at 335 B.C. Philip crushed the Scythians, at the campaign of 339 BC. In this campaign, the eighteen-year-old prince Alexander, accompanied his father.\textsuperscript{18} The Casus Belli was an insult of the Scythian king Atheas to Philip and the necessity of Philip for loot, according to Justin.\textsuperscript{19} Philip accepted the behavior of Atheas as hostile and he believed that the expansionism of Scythian king would create hazard to his

\textsuperscript{12}Loukopoulou 2015, 467.
\textsuperscript{13} Loukopoulou 2015, 467-469.
\textsuperscript{14}Ibid, 467-469.
\textsuperscript{15}Loukopoulou 2015, 467-469, Fox 2004, 81, Diod. 16.71.
\textsuperscript{16}Loukopoulou 2015, 467-469.
\textsuperscript{17} Hammond 2007, 422 Gabriel 2010, 203.
\textsuperscript{18}Justin 9.1.8, Hammond 2007, 303.
\textsuperscript{19}Justin 9.1-9.2.
ambitions in Thrace. Hence, it was this reason that lead Philip to deal with Scythians at 339 BC. Philip tried to hide his intentions by sending a delegation requesting safe passage in order to erect a statue, but it was refused.²⁰ So, as it was logical, a great battle had to happen. Scythians were superior in courage and numbers, but they were defeated by the charismatic commander Philip, who gained a great booty.²¹ Hence, Philip incorporated Athea’s kingdom, which extended from south of the Danube to the Sea of Azov, to his kingdom.²² This campaign against Scythians maybe was a great lesson for Alexander, which proved valuable in the future in Asia.²³

However, on his way back to Macedonia, Phillip passed from the territory of Triballians, a harsh tribal people, known for their cavalry and the utilization of the long cavalry lance. The Triballians refused to let Philip pass, unless he offered them a part of the Scythian booty. A battle began whereby Philip injured and his horse was killed while the Triballians ripped off a part of the giant loot.²⁴ As Justin said: Ita Scythica uelut devota spolia paene luctuosa Macedonibus fuere.²⁵

Regarding the Illyrians, Philip defeated them many times, with most important the clash with Bardylis for the security of Macedonia in 358 BC. at the early reign of Philip.²⁶ Two years later, Parmenio defeated the Illyrian Grabus.²⁷ Demosthenes referred that in 350 BC, Philip took his army and marched against Illyria, Paeonian and Molossia, but we have no other accounts to support that this occurred.²⁸ However in the events of 344/343 according to Diodorus: κατὰ δὲ τὴν Μακεδονίαν Φίλιππος πατρικὴν ἔχθραν διαδεδεμένος πρὸς Ἰλλυρίους καὶ τὴν διαφοράν ἀμετάθετον ἔχων ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα μετὰ πολλῆς δυνάμεως. πορθήσας δὲ τὴν χώραν καὶ πολλὰ τῶν πολισμάτων χειρωσάμενος μετὰ πολλῶν λαφύρων ἐπανήλθεν εἰς τὴν Μακεδονίαν.²⁹

²⁰ Worthington 2008,139.
²¹ Ibid.
²² Worthington 2008,139.
²³ Hammond 2007,305.
²⁴ Gabriel 2010,203.
²⁵ Justin 9.3.
²⁶ Diod. 16.4.3-4.7.
²⁸ Gabriel 2010,146.
²⁹ Diod. 16.69.7.
These Illyrians were the Dardanians. The hatred that Philip inherited from his father was towards the heir of Bardylis. The year that Philip started the campaign was maybe in 345 BC. Philip campaigned against Dardanians with great forces. He defeated them with war or with deceit but the result of the campaign was that Philip was recognized as being dominant over their king who was maybe Cleitus the son of Bardylis. Philip continued, with the aim of conquering the neighbors of Macedonians, who were the Ardiaioi at 344/3 BC. Pleuratus was the king of this tribe. During the pursuit of the Illyrians, Philip and 150 hetairoi were injured. It is possible that Ardiaioi were subjugated and their king become subject to Philip. Of course, these conquests supported the economy of Macedonia since he had incorporated into his kingdom the most productive part of modern Albania. In 337 BC Philip would come back again to Illyria, to fight with a tribal king whose name was Pleurias.

Concerning Illyria, Philip managed to force the tribal aristocrats to accept his hegemony. However, he left them to handle their internal tribal affairs and left their kings in office e.g. Cleitus. Philip just wanted peace among the tribes, acceptance of his foreign policy, to receive payment especially in precious metals and to use the elite troops when he demanded. There is no sign that he revolutionized the Illyrian way of life by establishing cities or encouraging native towns something that was done in Thrace.

The end of the mighty Macedonian king came in 336 BC during the great wedding of his daughter with Olympias, Cleopatra, with king Alexander of Epirus at Aiges, in front of important Hellenes and Macedonian nobles, Philip was assassinated by Pausanias who was one of his bodyguard of him. Alexander came to the throne after the death of his father. Immediately he was proclaimed king by nobles in the palace in Aegae and by commons in an assembly at Aegae. A solemn assembly occurred some days later, where Alexander was presented as king and promised to

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30 Hammond 2007,253-255.
33 Hammond 1994,439.
34 Diod. 16.91-94.3, Grainger 2007,66.
continue his father’s policy. Afterwards, a bloodshed followed in the Macedonian court where dangerous individuals for the brand-new authority of Alexander were neutralized. The restless turmoil in Hellas was eliminated with a whirlwind campaign with the result that Alexander received the authority and the leadership of Hellenes for the Persian war. Before he set out for Asia, he went against the aggressive neighbor tribes.

Chapter I

Strategy Aims and Reasons for the Balkan Campaign

Ἀμα δὲ τῷ ἦρι ἐλαύνειν ἐπὶ Θράκης, ἔς Τριβάλλιοὺς καὶ Ἰλλυριοὺς (Arr. 1.1.4)

After Alexander finished with the affairs of Hellas, as he believed, he returned to Macedonia. Alexander remained in Macedonia for the winter 336/5 by giving to his soldiery a good training routine in mountain warfare. Thusly, Alexander prepared his troops for the upcoming campaign that would take place, when the passes would be relieved of the snow.\(^{37}\) Arrian informed us that with the inception of spring, he marched against Triballians and Illyrians, since he had learned that they were restless.\(^ {38}\)

From Macedonia, two paths lead to the Triballians, one up the Axius (Vardar) valley, and through the Paeonian and Agrianian country. The second path was from Amphipolis northward through the region of the independent Thracians and across the Haemus mountains. The reason that Alexander selected the path from Amphipolis is because the Agrianians were friendly, in contrast to the free Thracians. With an advance to the eastern path, he would entrench his authority and to free Thracians, while he would pass and from the equivocal Odrysae.\(^ {39}\) Alexander’s aim was to subjugate the belligerent mountain tribes who frequently sortied the flatlands in the past. This is the major reason why Alexander advanced through the mountains of Rila, Pirin and then Haemus.\(^ {40}\) In fact, the king exploited this campaign, with the aim of confronting the Thracian tribes who had revolted and desired their

\(^{38}\) Arr. An. 1.1.4.
\(^{40}\) Hammond 1989,56.
independence.\textsuperscript{41} The region of the free Thracians was the first movement of this operation.\textsuperscript{42}

Hammond–Walbank refer that when the intelligence reached Alexander that the Triballians and Illyrians were ready to revolt, he started from Amphipolis with the spring and did not aim to go towards the Morava valley where the Triballians were nearby the Illyrian Autariatae, nevertheless in the norther slopes of Mt. Haemus, beyond which located the most eastern subjection of the Triballians. In the next chapter we see the path that he followed more detailed. It seems that the specific route served his plan for the separation of Thrace in two, so that the tribes of south-eastern Thrace and in fact the Odrysians, who were the most powerful, had no choice to unite forces with the Triballians.\textsuperscript{43}

Alexander had already accumulated experience fighting the Balkan tribes. In 340 BC, Philip was preparing to leave Pella for a campaign against Byzantium. He left the 16-year-old Alexander as regent and Antipater as adviser. After the absence of Philip, the Maedians revolted, a Paeonian tribe on the Upper Strymon River close to Thrace. Alexander marched north and ended the revolt. The victorious adolescent, in order to keep the people in check, he transferred people from Macedon, Hellas and Thrace, to go and reside in his new town, which received his name, Ἀλεξανδρόπολις.\textsuperscript{44} Of course his military up growth, continued with the north campaigns of his father’s in the 339 BC against Scythians and afterwards Triballians as I mentioned.\textsuperscript{45} Moreover, Droysen states that Alexander defeated Illyrian Pleurias in the war of 337 B.C.\textsuperscript{46} This conflict is unknown, unknown if truly occurred and versus who Illyrian enemy? While Greenwalt dates this campaign at 336.\textsuperscript{47} Droysen and Greenwalt are based on the passage of Curtius 8.1.25 where there is a mention of this incident.\textsuperscript{48} Moreover, it is important to note that, when Alexander abandoned Macedonia with his mother and went to Molossia, he then went towards the Illyrian courts. He possibly visited the subordinate kings of Gravani, Taulantians, and of

\textsuperscript{41} Worthington 2004,53-54.
\textsuperscript{42} English 2011,22.
\textsuperscript{43} Hammond, Walbank 1988,34.
\textsuperscript{44} Worthington 2004,36., Plut. Alex.9.1.
\textsuperscript{45} Bosworth 1988,21.
\textsuperscript{46} Droysen 2012, 65.
\textsuperscript{47} Greenwalt 2010,293.
\textsuperscript{48} See : Curt. 8.1.25
Dardanians and for sure gained knowledge of the northwest boundaries that would be very precious for the future in 335. These movements could only have happened with the permission of Philip and with the permission of Philip, Alexander came back to Pella in 337 BC.\textsuperscript{49}

Subsequently, Alexander was now king, and he believed that he must give a lesson to the barbarians, due to the fact that the Asian campaign was near and he couldn’t let them free.\textsuperscript{50} This action was logical and necessary. Except for the difficulties with the southern Hellenes, Philip’s death had brought similar turmoil to the northern border of Macedon. Alexander could not start his eastern campaign until his kingdom was secure from the south and the north.\textsuperscript{51} As Plutarch stated about the attitude of the Balkan tribes: “οὔε γὰρ τὰ βάρβαρα καὶ πρόσοικα γένη τήν δούλωσιν ἔφερε, ποδοῦντα τὰς πατρίους βασιλείας”.\textsuperscript{52}

In fact, the Thracians that were in the vast realm of the Odrysian kingdom were not the only tribes in Thrace. There were other ethne too, that were autonomous due to the fact that they were not subject to Odrysian kingdom and were searching to escape from the chaotic political situation, which resulted from the decay of the Odrysian power.\textsuperscript{53} These tribes i.e. Getae, Triballians, Scythians attempted to profit from the Macedonian conquest, as they believed that the anarchy and the fall of Cersobleptes, would be to their advantage. The Triballians, as long as the father of Alexander was alive, were independent after the known battle of 339 BC. It was logical to be the first ones to create problems just after King’s death.\textsuperscript{54} Papazoglou refers, that it is difficult to know the grade of Triballian dependency on Macedon after their subjugation to Philip, and she supposes that is highly possibly that Triballians either denied to pay tribute to the king or they wanted to invade Macedonia.\textsuperscript{55} However, there is no evidence to indicate that the Triballians offered a tribute to Macedonia. In fact, the Triballians who were the strongest among the

\textsuperscript{49}Hammond 2007,386-387.  
\textsuperscript{50} Arr. An. 1.1.4.  
\textsuperscript{51} English 2011,21.  
\textsuperscript{52} Plut.Alex.11.1.  
\textsuperscript{53} Xydopoulos 2010, 213.  
\textsuperscript{54} Xydopoulos 2010,214.  
\textsuperscript{55} Papazoglou 1978, 25, Xydopoulos 2010,214.
Thracians, according to Strabo,\textsuperscript{56} were not under the authority of Philip, they were independent.\textsuperscript{57}

Droysen, marks out that Thracians, Getae, Triballians and Illyrians which bordered with Macedonia in three sides were subjects of Macedonia or allies with Macedonia without their will, in the era of Philip. Furthermore, the Illyrians had suffered many defeats from the Macedonian troops. Therefore, now that Philip was deceased, they had the opportunity to flee from the Macedonian control and to invade Macedonia, through pillage and destruction, following the steps of their forefathers.\textsuperscript{58}

Alexander was aware that the submission of these tribes was not enough; his northern frontier could be safe only if he pushed it far away until the Danube. This was the main strategic aim that urged him northwards. It was an act of conquest and this view can be reinforced by the fact that a fleet appeared in the Danube, at the specific point that was arranged.\textsuperscript{59} Alexander knew that in these regions there was always great turmoil from the era of Philip’s campaigns. A simple strike would not achieve significant security during his absence, and that it would just delay the danger. The Danube could be the final defensive boundary that would protect Macedonia from the Balkan neighbors. A diplomatic solution would not be the perfect choice for Alexander. The Balkan tribes had fought each other for centuries with the aim of obtaining booty and slaves. As it is logical, they had little desire to make peace with neighbors, when they preferred to be at war.\textsuperscript{60}

In general, we can detect many reasons for the realization of the Balkan campaign. To begin with, it would maintain the borders and it would leave Antipater as regent with full liability for the untrustworthy Hellenes, while the King was far away. Antipater would not need to divide his forces to watch the northern tribes because Alexander would be there.\textsuperscript{61} That Alexander didn’t trust the south Hellenes is revealed by Arrian, who clearly informed us that when Alexander was informed

\textsuperscript{56} Strab. 7.5.6
\textsuperscript{57} Errington 1990,56.
\textsuperscript{58} Droysen 2012, 77. (Again there is no evidence for the subjection of Triballians. Moreover, we cannot claim that they were allies of Philip.)
\textsuperscript{60} Ashley 1998,167.
about the revolt of Thebes, he decided to act immediately, because for a long time he was suspicious of the Athenians, and this threat of Thebes was considered serious if the Spartans and others Peloponnesians along with the Thebans and with the unstable Aitolians renegaded together.\textsuperscript{62} Secondly, it would make it clear for the Thracians and Illyrians that Alexander was not weak and not different from his father, that he was a worthy heir. Thirdly, it would serve as tactical training for the troops, as preparation for the long journey to Persia.\textsuperscript{63}

Another significant incentive, can be found in revenge. Whether Philip prepared a revenge campaign against Triballians is unknown. Nevertheless, Alexander would surely take his revenge.\textsuperscript{64} Droysen refers that, the wounded Philip returned to Macedonia without punishing the Triballians. Afterwards, necessary circumstances forced him to go towards Hellas and later to a war with Illyrian Pleurias, which required his concern and before he could advance again on the Triballians, he died. Droysen continues by saying that Alexander resolved to fight against the Triballians who had not yet been punished.\textsuperscript{65} Fox adds that Alexander started in 335 his northern campaign with the aim of taking revenge for his father and to safeguard the flanks of the route between the Macedonian and Asian incursion.\textsuperscript{66} While, Hamilton rightly says that although Alexander had a personal rivalry with the Triballians to solve, going back to 339, he aimed towards a larger expedition reaching the Danube.\textsuperscript{67}The idea of revenge is peculiar , although it seems very common to the Macedonian world. Pausanias murdered Philip for purposes of revenge.\textsuperscript{68} Hermolaus, a royal page plotted to kill Alexander for revenge, because he was flogged by Alexander, when he first struck a wild boar that Alexander intended to strike during a hunt. Because of this action, Alexander removed him off his horse, which was a symbol of elite representing his elite status.\textsuperscript{69} Moreover, the death of Archelaus, and of Amyntas the little at 394 BC occurred maybe for reasons of

\textsuperscript{62}Arr. An. 1.7.4
\textsuperscript{63}Green 2013,124-125, also Worthington 2004,53 ( for the final reason).
\textsuperscript{64}Worthington 2004,53.
\textsuperscript{65}Droysen date, 78-79.( Contrariwise , Ashley vaguely reports that Philip, after the calamity of 339 BC, he invade Triballian territory and force the Triballians to accept his authority. Ashley 1998,115.)
\textsuperscript{66}Fox 2004,81.
\textsuperscript{67}Hamilton 1973,46.
\textsuperscript{68}Aristot. Pol. 5.1311b.
\textsuperscript{69}Muller 2010,27-30, Sawada 2010,403.
revenge. There are many paradigms of such actions in Macedonia that arise out of the thirst for revenge. The Macedonian world especially for the elite, was an agonistic society that was characterized by Homeric values. In fact, the ardor for the achievement of personal power, was a specific characteristic of the kings and elite. Alexander was raised by believing in Homeric perception for the personal success, for the sake of honor and glory, as he had a great love for Iliad, when he slept he had Aristotle’s copy of Iliad under his pillow. So, it’s not illogical that Alexander wanted to punish the Triballians, who with their action at 339 assaulted the pride and honor of the Macedonian throne. As Bosworth says, there was reputation to be restored. The Triballian unpunished presence was already an insult, let alone now that they rebelled.

Worthington supports that one more urgent reason for Alexander, was to win the trust of his men in battle. At the age of 16, he had defeated the Maedians on the Upper Strymon. Nevertheless, at the Balkan campaign, he was a king and there was likely objection to his authority. So, this campaign would secure his authority as king, before the dawning of the Persian campaign. English suggests that since Alexander was accompanied by a large part of his field army for this reason, Macedonia’s western frontier was undefended. He claims that Alexander acted like this, because the Balkan campaign was the first of the king and he need it to forge a large army for the conquest of the Balkans. Secondly, his authority as king was not secure and Alexander kept the army with him, with the aim of preventing some rivals of his sway, that were alive in Macedonia, to convince a part of the army that Alexander was not the legitimate heir to the throne. This opinion is convincing, if we accept the view that the Macedonians i.e. the assembly, was the institution whereby some of their duties were to declare or dethrone kings, and judge cases for treason. These armed Macedonians seemed to be the state.

70 Aristot.Pol.5.1311b, Hammond 1990, 263.
71 Sawada 2010,402.
73 Bosworth 1994,795.
74 Worthington 2004,53.
75 English 2009,26.
One important fact is that Alexander did not demand that the most capable generals of Macedonia, i.e. Parmenio and Antipater should accompany him in this campaign. In fact, Antipater was a specialist in Illyrian matters.\textsuperscript{77} The answer to this is simple. First of all, Alexander needed Antipater in Macedon as regent while he was absent, while Parmenio was sent to Asia with forces.\textsuperscript{78} Secondly and most importantly was that Alexander was already popular among his soldiers for his achievements against Maedians and for the battle of Chaeronea. He wanted to show that he was a capable king and true heir of Philip, as we mention. In my opinion, this is the main reason that he didn’t had with him his experienced generals as Parmenio and Antipater. He desired to show to his army that he could achieve glory in war alone, without the advice of the eldest noble Macedonian men of his father’s. Moreover, the best audience to show your power is your own men. If we exclude the Agrianians that followed him in the Balkan campaign, the majority of men were Macedonians.\textsuperscript{79} The king had to demonstrate his leadership.

Another important strategic reason for Alexander was the financial reinforcement of the kingdom, via a successful campaign to the Balkans. Alexander had ensured the throne but Philip had left Macedonia without money in the public treasure, while Alexander’s generosity at his succession, with the payment of the taxation, resulted in a huge economic problem.\textsuperscript{80} Alexander had received a practically bankrupt state while his own preparations left him with no money. Any treasury would be necessary for the state.\textsuperscript{81} When Alexander went back to Macedonia, after the league of Corinth (336), he offered 150 gold Philips to the temple funds of Delphi when he received a satisfaction reply by Pythia. As Green refers “\textit{Not a princely sum, but by now the captain-general was embarrassingly short of ready cash}”.\textsuperscript{82} It is generally known, that a campaign has some costs, for the supplies and equipment of the men, albeit a campaign can provide an army with wealth. During the wars, the armies always found wealth in the loot of the defeated

\textsuperscript{77}Hammond 1997,32, Hammond 1989,54. 
\textsuperscript{78}Wilcken 1967,67. (Contrariwise to this traditional view, Dodge claims that during Alexander’s absence, Parmenio was recalled to Macedonia to protect her against Illyrian invasion, while Antipater was in charge of the civil government of Pella. Dodge 2004,189.) 
\textsuperscript{79}Arrian 1.1.4.-1.6.12. 
\textsuperscript{80}English 2009,24. 
\textsuperscript{81}Fox 2004,81,English 2011,25. 
\textsuperscript{82}Green 2013,124.
people. Balkan campaign is not an exception to this rule, since during the campaign Alexander always sent booty back to Macedonia. The fact that Alexander orders for the return of the spoils of war back to Macedon indicates that there was a substantial wealth. The latter indicates that the Balkan campaign, amongst others, worked also as a financial aid to the kingdom.

In addition, Diodorus inform us, that 7,000 Odrysians, Triballians and Illyrians accompanied Alexander at the campaign of Asia. The Balkan troops that served in Asia, were operating as hostages for the continuation of peaceful behavior of their fatherland tribes. These tribes would not have the opportunity to revolt during Alexander’s absence, because many of their people would serve in the Macedonian army. Alexander from the beginning of the Balkan campaign, desired to establish the Macedonian authority in these regions and to succeed to receive some troops from his neighbors, with the aim of reinforcing his great expedition to the east. By that I mean that, his father had created a Balkan empire as I mention, hence with Alexander’s campaign and with the reassurance of Macedonian sway to these regions, Macedonia becomes great and powerful again. A fact that would help Alexander to undertake his Asia campaign. So, if he restored his control over Thrace and Illyria, he had a Macedonian empire which had under its influence many nations and people which would offer aid to the war against Darius III. Hence, Alexander aimed to lead a Macedonian empire against the Persian Empire, and not a Macedonia, smaller than the era of Philip II.

Finally, if we judge from Philip’s desire to conquest Thrace with the aim to serve its goals for the Asia campaign, we can detect a similar reason for Alexander’s will to reassure the Macedonian authority over Thrace. Hammond-Walbank state that Central Thrace intended to be transformed into a significant source of replenishment for the offensive Macedonian force during its advance along the south coast and its early action in north-west Asia, and afterwards for the guard troops which would protect the Hellespont region as a strategic point in Alexander’s line of

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83 Papazoglou 1978,38.
84Arrian’s account after the battle of Mt. Haemus 1.2.1 and after the battle with Getae 1.4.5.
85Diod. 17.17.4.
87Droysen 2012,79.
communication.\textsuperscript{88} Alexander was cognizant about how important the lines of communication could be.\textsuperscript{89} This settlement occurred during his peace with the defeated Balkan tribe leaders after the successful war with Getae.\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{88}Hammond, Walbank 1988,39.
\textsuperscript{89}Fox 2004,81.
\textsuperscript{90}Hammond, Walbank 1988,39.
Chapter II

The Tactics of Alexander the Great at Thrace.

καὶ οὕτω ξυνέβη ὅ πως παρήνεσέ τε Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ εἶκασεν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ διέσχον τὴν φάλαγγα, αἱ δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀσπιδῶν ἐπικυλισθεῖσαι ὀλίγα ἐξελαφαν. (Ar.An 1.1.9-10)

a. Mount Haemus

With the inception of spring, when the conditions were appropriate for mountainous military expeditions,91 Alexander advanced forward against the Triballians and Illyrians for the reasons already mentioned in Chapter 2.92 He avoid the Morava Valley because the Triballians were neighbors to the Illyrian Autariatae, but he moved to the southern slopes of Mt. Haemus, beyond the further eastern conquests of the Triballians. Furthermore, Alexander selected a quirky route with the aim of destroying the autonomous Thracian and entering the central plain before the enemy expected him to be there.93 He started with his army from Amphipolis, north through the Rupel pass next to the Strymon just south of Simitli, and from that place he possibly turned east into the thick wooded mountains of the republican Thracians, and reached the Upper River Nestus by Razlog.94 (Image 1) Hammond and Walbank suggest that Arrian doesn’t refer to some fighting in these regions that maybe occurred. It seems that Alexander maybe reduced some of the enemies and chased others who advanced at Mt. Haemus.95 Alexander passed the Nestus in Spring and his army covered 240 kilometers in ten days, through the highlands of Mt. Rhodope and then across the central flatland of Marica. By choosing this unique path, Alexander achieved his aim of separating Thrace in two parts, so the tribes of south-eastern Thrace and in fact the strongest i.e. the Odrysae, had no opportunity

91Dodge 2004,189.
92 Arr. An. 1.1.4.
93Hammond,Walbank 1988,34.
94Ibid,34.
to unite their forces with Triballi, as we already mention. Hammond-Walbank supports that when Alexander reached the Mt. Haemus he could have chosen a low pass at either end of the range, but Alexander pursued the republican Thracians, who ran to save themselves with their wives, children and with their belongings. Here as they suggest, Alexander followed the Shipka pass and found the pass on the top, occupied not only by those Thracians but also by mountaineers of Haemus.

At this point we must make a short citation about a problematic affair i.e. the number of soldiers in the Macedonian army. This case is surrounded by hypothetic suggestions because Arrian didn’t refer to anything about the number of troops that followed Alexander at the campaign of 335 B.C. This matter provokes a turmoil, since many suggested numbers are offered from various scholars. To begin with, (some paradigms) Hammond suggests 25.000 men and 5000 horses. On the other hand, Bosworth refers to a “moderate –sized army” of 15.000 troops. Ashley and Loizos follow the opinion of Bosworth and refer to the same number of men. Next, is Worthington who states that Alexander took 20.000 troops including 5000 cavalry. Strauss argues that Alexander marched from Thrace to Thebes at 335 BC, with 30.000 infantry and 3.000 cavalry. Finally, Sarantis says that Alexander began from Pella with 20.000 troops, and later this power was reinforced by the ally king of Agrianians Laggarus. Whatever the number was, the authorities seems to agree, that this force was an original Macedonian force.

The first campaign against the Triballians started with a detailed route from Amphipolis to the crossing of the Nestus. However, we have the march of ten days from Nestus to Mt. Haemus, and there is no citation as to which path was chosen. This is a result of the strong interest of Arrian in Alexander’s stratagem against the

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96 Hammond 1997, 34; also see: Hammond 1974, 80. Hammond 1989, 49 In volume III of history of Macedonia he refers 3000 cavalry, 12,000 heavy infantry and 8000 specialized light infantry. Total 23,000. p.32.
97 Bosworth 1988,29.
98 Bosworth 1988,29.
99 Hamm 97,34.
100 Worthington 2004, 53.
101 Strauss 2003, 137.
102 Sarantis 1977,254.
autonomous Thracians, who defended the passes. It seems that it was not the most interesting concern regarding how Alexander arrived on the field of the battle.\textsuperscript{105} Interest arises from the view of English, who underlines that the ten days route of Alexander from Nestus to Mt. Haemus was a slow march that occurred on purpose. Alexander wanted to connect the military land force with the fleet on the Danube, before he advanced against the Illyrians. English says that the ancient fleets were not rapid vessels, hence Alexander marched at a slow rate in the rival territory with the goal of arriving at the correct time to the meeting point with the fleet. Otherwise, he would have to wait on the banks of the Danube for a long time and the food supplies of the region would be depleted by the troops.\textsuperscript{106} This view can be reinforced by the fact that the fleet possibly transferred supplies for the Macedonian soldiery. So, Alexander was forced to meet with the warships at the appropriate time.\textsuperscript{107}

The most difficult part of this research is to find the topographical area of the route of Alexander. The majority of scholars seem to believe that Alexander followed the Shipka pass.\textsuperscript{108} Moreover, English strengthens this argument by supporting that Thracians chose to protect the Shipka pass due to the fact this was a strategic point. It was in higher position at 2437 m. in contrast with 1051m. of the Trojan Pass and it was narrower in contrast with the latter. So, why didn’t the Thracians defend both passages? Because they were not many soldiers and had no strong equipment which would offer them a chance to face a large superior force on both passes at the same time.\textsuperscript{109}

On the contrary, there are some scholars who tend to believe that Alexander followed the Trojan Pass.\textsuperscript{110} Bosworth suggests the Trojan Pass due to the fact that it seems to have been used more frequently in antiquity. He argues that there was the Roman road from Philippopolis to Oescus in Triballian region. According to the Tabula Peutingeriana there was a bulwark, \textit{Montemno} apparently on the pass itself.

\textsuperscript{105}Bosworth 1982,75.
\textsuperscript{107}Check final chapter.
\textsuperscript{109}English 2011, 22-23.
Bosworth says, The Trojan Pass was more directly approachable from Philippopolis, and it is more possible to have been used by the Macedonian king.\textsuperscript{111}

Whatever the path that Alexander followed, he found his enemy prepared to prevent his advance. They had occupied the narrow paths, while they had put their wagons in front as a stockade, to fight from there if they were pressured. Moreover, they had also thought to throw them to the phalanx when it would march against them from the most precipitous point.\textsuperscript{112} Dodge and Droysen refer that the rivals of Alexander, were armed only with daggers and with some hunting spears. Their heads were covered with fox or wolf hides rather than helmets. Hence, with this equipment they were not equal to Macedonian soldiery.\textsuperscript{113} In fact, this kind of equipment can be confirmed by paintings of Hellenic vases, as one bell crater of the 5th century; which correctly connects it to the description of dress and armor by Herodotus.\textsuperscript{114} (Image 2)

There is ambiguity as to who the enemies of Alexander were in this phase of the campaign, except for the autonomous Thracians that was referred to by the ancient author. The word that is missing and was replaced by ἐμπόρων seems to create a turmoil among the scholars, and many theories have emerged. Bosworth’s opinion is interesting, he suggests that the original reading of Arrian is τῶν τῶν Τρηρῶν. The Treres were Thracian inhabitants to the north-west of the Odrysian kingdom and in Thucydides’ time, they were located in the Triballian frontier. Theopompus referred to them (FGrH 115 F378) and presumably they were under the sphere of influence of Philip’s reign. The Treres were neighbors of the Tetrachoritae and probably sent troops to prevent Alexander’s march across the Haemus.\textsuperscript{115}

Now who were the Ὀρᾶκες οἱ αὐτόνομοι? In the time of Thucydides, the autonomous Thracians were located in the range of Rhodope. The Thracians attacked by Alexander, appear to have lived in the Haemus, the northern range of Bulgarian mountains, which in Thucydides’ period they had divided the Getic people of the Danube from the Odrysian kingdom in the Hebrus valley. These Thracians

\textsuperscript{111} Bosworth 1980,54.
\textsuperscript{112} Arr.An.1.1.6-7.
\textsuperscript{113} Dogde 2004, 190-191, Droysen 2012,80.
\textsuperscript{114} Casson 1977, 4.
\textsuperscript{115} Bosworth 1980,54-55, Thuc.2.96.4.
might be the Tetrachoritae, a people that were subsumed under the Bessi according to Strabo. The Bessi were the strongest tribe of the Haemus. The Tetrachoritae, it appears to be the last Thracian people to fall under the sway of Philip. When Philip besieged Perinthus and Byzantium, the significant strategists of Philip i.e. Parmenio and Antipater were fought the Tetrachoritae. This campaign should be dated to 340 BC. Since this people are in the recesses of the Haemus, they escaped from the total subjugation of the conquest of the Hebrus valley in 342/341 BC and a separate campaign was necessary for their conquest. Because Arrian calls them autonomous, we can say that maybe they were not vassals and their conquest was Philip’s unfinished job.\textsuperscript{116}

Now Arrian and Polyaenus, presents us with a full account of the fighting that took place. Alexander examined how he could most safely cross the ridge, he understood that there was no other road to pass the path. He had to fight, and he came there with the aim to clash. He soon realized the intentions of the Thracians and gave his intelligent command to his troops. This meant that when the wagons tumbled down the slope, those who had space to break the formation and to separate to right and left, leaving an avenue for the wagons. Those who had no room, were to crouch close together; and some were actually to lie down, to link their shields closely together so the wagons would pass over them. In this way, the Macedonians avoided the wagons by following the advice of Alexander and not one Macedonian perished. The Macedonians attacked with courage and frightening shouts.\textsuperscript{117} Shouting their war-cry “\textit{alalai}”.\textsuperscript{118}(Image 3)

Anyone else would have estimated that the Thracians aimed to use their stockade in a defensive way and to fight behind them. The Thracians wanted to trick Macedonians with this ruse and to throw their wagons when their rivals would march from the most precipitous point of the mountain. (Ar. An. 1.1.7). However, Alexander knew that their main tactic was a feral attack and immediately realized what his rivals were prepared to execute.\textsuperscript{119} Alexander’s tactic needed his men to act quickly as they saw the wagons descend. The rapid response of the phalanx was not

\textsuperscript{116}Bosworth 1980, 53-54, Thuc. 2.96,Strab 7.5.12.
\textsuperscript{117}Ar. An 1.1.8-10, Polyan. 4. 3.11.
\textsuperscript{118}Hammond,Walbank 1988,35.
\textsuperscript{119}Green 2013,125; also see : Ashley 1998,168-169.
only a result of their training and of great courage, but also because of the huge trust they had for their commander.\textsuperscript{120} The same tactic used some years later at Gaugamela, against Darius scythed chariots.\textsuperscript{121} Important commanders remember stratagems that worked well before and Alexander would soon show that he memorized from reading and from experience.\textsuperscript{122} By that, we can say that this experiment worked in 335 B.C. during the Balkan campaign and adopted by Alexander as a main tactic against the chariots. Therefore, this tactic may have been used for the first time in the Balkan campaign.

Afterwards, Alexander put the archers from the right wing in front of the infantry to fire to the Thracians who would attack.\textsuperscript{123} Of course this was a protective measure, if the Thracians had intended to attack after the cathode of the wagons.\textsuperscript{124} Alexander took his Hypaspists, Agrianians and agema and led them from the left. The arrows of the archers which were effective, in combination with the efficient Macedonian phalanx drove out the Thracians, who were light clad and ill–armed. The attack of the Macedonians was so effective and rapid that Alexander and his forces didn’t engage in battle in time. The Thracians threw their weapons and ran, while they left 1,500 deceased people on the battlefield. Few were captured alive due to the fact that they were brisk, they knew the terrain well and they could escape.\textsuperscript{125} (Image 4)

Arrian informed us, that the strategic orders of Alexander, were given after the cathode of the wagons. Though, this might not be true, because these movements needed some time and if they had ordered the cathode of the wagons during all this disorder, the army would have faced some difficulties of organization. It is most possible that Alexander, as far as he has realized the intentions of the Thracians, organized the whole plan and the movements of his troops. He directly understood that the greatest jeopardy for his troops was not the wagons, but what would follow them, when his troops were disorganized.\textsuperscript{126}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120} Worthington 2004,54.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Worthington 2004,54, English 2011, 23.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Fox, 2004,82.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Arr An. 1.1.11.
\item \textsuperscript{124} English 2011,24.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Ar. An. 1.1.12-13.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Fuller 1960,221, Ashley 1998,168-169.
\end{itemize}
Here, another interesting debate starts pertaining to the maneuver of the infantry. To give a small idea, can a heavy Macedonian infantry act like this when it holds the *sarissa*? A weapon like the sarissa has some unique characteristics. To begin with, for the length of the *sarissa* there are many different testimonies of the ancient writers, nevertheless, it appears to be gradually increasing from 4, 5 to circa 6 m. About its weight we can see that it is calculated at 3,3-6,2 kg. The Macedonian phalanx of Alexander, used sarissae that have shown to have been as long as eighteen feet and no shorter than fifteen feet, weighing circa fifteen pounds. This weapon was held with both hands by the Macedonian soldier due to its size.

Let’s examine the case. Beginning with Bosworth, who appears to believe that the Macedonians were armed with small shield and sarissa. He suggests that: “The Macedonians were therefore forced to form a double shield-wall, a line of men lying on the ground and a second rank standing over them, their shields interlocking. The effect would have been an inclined ramp, composed of several successive tiers of shields. It is hard to see how the maneuver could have been carried out as effectively as described”. Fuller supports the idea that the slope, though steep, must have been flat, otherwise Alexander would not have arrayed in the battle formation of the phalanx. According to my survey, few scholars had analyzed this battle by concentrating in details and many seem to always connect the phalanx with the *sarissa*. It is significant for us to realize the limitations of this weapon because of its sheer size and weight. These limitations make clear how this offensive weapon could operate in the battlefield. If we connect the *sarissa* with the Macedonian phalanx in each mission or campaign, then we fail to realize the true operations of the Macedonians soldiers and the true function and their military training.

127 Faklaris 2011,361.  
128 Markle 1977,331.  
130 Bosworth 1980,56.  
131 Fuller 1960,220.  
132 Markle 1977,323.
The word phalanx was first used by Homer\textsuperscript{133} to characterize any line of battle and more specifically the hoplite formation, but also the front formed by cavalry. Markle argues that “\textit{Hence in the ancient writers the designation Macedonian phalanx may legitimately refer to the whole Macedonian infantry, including archers, light infantry, hoplites with spears and sarissa-armed infantry, or bodies of both the latter deployed on the same line of battle}”.\textsuperscript{134}

Concerning the battle of the Mt. Haemus, Sekunda believes that this tactic proved successful because of the existence of large hoplite shields, while he doubts how this incident would be otherwise successful without large shields.\textsuperscript{135} Markle is of the same opinion, who supports that only the larger and strong hoplite shield could be appropriate to protect the bodies of the Macedonians from the wagons. He goes on that in the early reign of Alexander his troops were not always armed with \textit{sarissa} and his examples are from the Balkan campaign.\textsuperscript{136} Fox argues that the soldiers with the appropriate shields were ordered to lie down.\textsuperscript{137} English postulates that it is difficult for a Macedonian shield which is only 61 cm in diameter, in contrast with the hoplite shield of 100 cm diameter to protect the soldier. He continues by saying that either Arrian is wrong or this is a case whereby the heavy infantry is equipped with a hoplite panoply. He gave a counter argument by supporting that it would be difficult to use the \textit{sarissa} in a narrow pass like this. Moreover, English claims that is not difficult to believe that in such conditions, hoplites shields would also be commandeered from the mercenary and allied forces, which were armed as the traditional heavy infantry.\textsuperscript{138}

Another interesting view indicates, that the pezhetairoi which were not so mobile were stationed in places where they had the opportunity to create some space and that these were the troops that avoided the cathode of the wagon. The troops that lied down were the Hypaspists, who were not equipped with sarissa and were armed with large shields. It would be difficult for the pezhetairoi with smaller

\textsuperscript{133}Markle 1978,484; see also: Snodgrass 2003,196.
\textsuperscript{134}Markle 1978,484.
\textsuperscript{135}Sekunda 1984,27.
\textsuperscript{136}Markle 1978,491-492.
\textsuperscript{137}Fox 2004,82.
\textsuperscript{138}English 2011, 25 (In this comment of English I cannot understand with accuracy to what troops he referred? The Agrianians or maybe the archers that we can say that maybe were from Crete because of the death of their commander Eurybotas at 335 at Thebes. Sekunda 1984,36.)
and less concave shields to protect themselves in that way, while it would be equally
difficult to ground the sarissae by the whole phalanx.\textsuperscript{139} Doubts for this incident
were also expressed by Snyder, who says that it’s not plausible to prevent the
destruction of the carts with the shields. “\textit{Stones or a shallow embankment just
above the positions, to make them bound outward would be more believable}” he
refers.\textsuperscript{140}

I would personally rely on the passage of Polybius, who shows the topographical
limitations of the Macedonian phalanx. The strongest argument is that the phalanx
needed a flat terrain to work efficiently.\textsuperscript{141} Moreover, if we judge from the disastrous
defeats of Philip V (Cynoscephalae 197 BC) and Perseus (Pydna 168 BC) we can
recognize the strong disadvantage of the phalanx, on uneven ground.\textsuperscript{142} Here in the
narrow uphill passage of Mt. Haemus, as it seems the \textit{sarissa-phalanx} would have
had some difficulties. It is illogical to think that Alexander would not be aware of
the disadvantages of the phalanx. It seems more feasible that normal hoplite spears and
shields were utilized.

All in all, this major battle presents Alexander, a very young man, with his first
war tactical problem as king. He relied on his own capacity, because his most
experience generals were on other missions.\textsuperscript{143} One of the features that characterize
Alexander and differentiates him from other generals, is his talent to predict enemy
plans in advance. Maybe it is the result of his great cleverness, but at times it
appears as terribly intuitive.\textsuperscript{144} In his first leading to battle, Alexander presented not
only his abilities as a military figure, but at the same time the supremacy of trained
forces against brave but not so well-equipped troops which were numerous. A
similar supremacy which Brasidas had shown with his forces at 424 BC.\textsuperscript{145}

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\textsuperscript{139}Shepard 2011,73.
\textsuperscript{140}Snyder 1966,32-33.( However I have my doubts about Snyder, I have to refer that I cannot
understand for what reason Snyder believes that the Triballians had screened their positions with the
line of carts, or why he didn’t mention the battle of Lyginus and king Syrmus. Moreover, Snyder
supports that the ships from Byzantium that Alexander found were used against the Getae and failed,
instead to authenticate that they used them against the people that were in the Peuce.)
\textsuperscript{141}Plb. 18.31.
\textsuperscript{142}Hammond 1984,46, Hammond 1988,75.
\textsuperscript{143}Hammond,Walbank 1988,35.
\textsuperscript{144}Green 2013,125.
\textsuperscript{145}Hammond,Walbank 1988,35.
Arrian inform us that with this stratagem, not one man perished, but we can surely imagine how many headaches had been created for the soldiers that had their heads under the wagons¹⁴⁶ and how many broken bones, by the violent cathode of the wagons.¹⁴⁷ I believe Arrian that Macedonians were “ἀβλαβεῖς” due to the fact that he is precise in the losses if we judge by the Lyginus battle testimony, but certainly some northern Hellenes may have suffered serious injuries. If this occurred, it not referred to, due to the fact that is not so important in contrast with the smartness of the tactic, which saved the army of Alexander and of course it would steal some of the glory of the young commander.

After the battle, Alexander sent the booty back to the cities on the coast, and he appointed Lysania and Philota¹⁴⁸ to this task. Here Bosworth refers that neither of them can be identified, as Lysanias never spoke again of the Asian campaign, while the name Philotas is very common to the Macedonian. Hence, this man is not the popular son of Parmenio.¹⁴⁹ Here, we see that Alexander didn’t repeat the mistake of Philip who kept his booty and lost it. Alexander was present, back then in 339 B.C. and had learned a lesson. He sent the booty to the coast cities, from which they moved to Macedonia.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ Worthington 2004,54.
¹⁴⁸ Ar. An. 1.2.1.

b. Lyginus.

After his brilliant victory, Alexander marched over Haemus against the Triballians and he arrived to the river Lyginus. As you reach Haemus, it is only three days march from the Ister (Danube).\textsuperscript{151} The Lyginus is not a frequently noted location, in fact it is only referred to concerning the battle of Alexander against the Triballians. In addition, it cannot be located with certainty.\textsuperscript{152} When the king of Triballians, Syrmus learn about the march of Alexander, immediately he dispatched the women and the children of his people to an island on the Danube, called Peuce. There, some neighbors Thracians found shelter and Syrmus joined them while the fighting force of Triballians, were dispatched back to Lyginus river to face Alexander.\textsuperscript{153}

About the island Peuce, Strabo also mentioned this incident in his account, information that was received from Ptolemy, while Arrian doesn’t enlighten us about the location. There was an island name Peuce on the Danube mouth as described by Eratosthenes and is mentioned frequently in later prose writing and verse. There are plenty of theories about the location of the island, although without definitive solution to this problem. For the sake of convenience, we can conclude that we cannot identity the island with any present islands of the Danube, due to the fact that the river has changed course in the last centuries, let alone millennia and many places have changed side of it.\textsuperscript{154}

When Alexander was informed about the maneuver of the Triballians, he rapidly turned back and found them encamping. There, they formed lines near the glen by the river.\textsuperscript{155} The movement of the Triballians was smart enough. Syrmus knew that he had no advantage to face Alexander in front of his advance. So, he allowed his troops to hide in the woods, which they knew perfectly as the whole territory, while

\textsuperscript{151} Arr. An. 1.2.1.
\textsuperscript{152} Bosworth 1980,56 English 2011,25.
\textsuperscript{153} Arr. An. 1.2.2-3.
\textsuperscript{154} Bosworth 1980,57, Strab.7.3.8 ( The debate is huge and interesting , but it’s out of my concern for this survey.)
\textsuperscript{155} Arr. An. 1.2.4.
the Macedonian army moved north unsuspectingly. Once the Macedonians had passed, the Triballians made a camp in the defensive position of the Lyginus River, directly across the Macedonians’ lines of supply and communication with the fatherland. With that maneuver, the Triballians reduced the choice of retreat for Alexander.

The most interesting point is the reaction of Macedonians. The idea that the enemy was behind them and they were maybe trapped in a hostile region, created no panic or bustle in the troops. They just followed the command of their king and turned back to meet the enemy. The same maneuver occurred before the battle of Issus, and the reaction of Macedonians was exactly the same. So, from the early reign of Alexander we see the strong faith of the army towards the brand-new ruler and its strict discipline.

Furthermore, I would like to add that the composure of the north Hellenes is not only based on their trust in Alexander, but also indicates that after the successful progress of Macedonia under Philip II, the several victorious battles, conquests and of course the achievements in the narrow passes of Haemus with Alexander, had as a result the creation of strong confidence in Macedonians, who recognized the superiority of their weapons and tactics. Their toils had dominated the entire Hellas and had won the rest of Hellenes in a significant battle (Chaeronea 338 BC). They had fought several times with Thracians, Illyrians, Triballians and Scythians and they had passed through crisis and panic with great kings just as Philip in 358 BC against Bardylis. All in all, this case seems that this was not enough to create agitation within the troops.

When Alexander turned back and found the enemy in a strong position, Arrian give us a testimony of battle, which emulates a game of chess. As we see the Triballians were protected in a wooden glen near the river. Alexander wanted to draw them out in the open, where the main part of his army could act. An attack in their defensive position would be disadvantage to the Macedonian troops. He knew that the Triballians were masters at ambuscades, but they had no discipline and they

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156English 2011,26, Ashley 1998,169
157Green 2013,127
158English 2011, 26
could fall on an ambush. All he wanted was nice bait that would make the warlike Triballians come out.\textsuperscript{159} Alexander ordered the archers and slingers to fire the rivals, who were protected in the wooden glen. The Triballians accepted the blows and ran out of the forest glen with the aim of attacking the annoying archers and slingers who were unarmed. They fell in the trap of Alexander and they were on an open ground. When the enemy was out of its protection, Alexander ordered Philotas to lead the cavalry of Upper Macedonia and attack the right wing of the enemy when they had advanced farthest in their outward rush. Heracleides and Sopolis attacked the left wing with their cavalry from Bottiaea and Amphipolis, while the other cavalry which was deployed in front of the phalanx, along with the phalanx onslaught fought against the center.\textsuperscript{160} (Image 5)

Here we are informed about a paradox in Alexander’s military life-career. In this battle, we find him stationed in the infantry. This was too rare outside of a siege situation. We can only say according to the battles of his life, that he was not excited with the idea of fighting in the infantry due to the fact that in the future he positioned himself very frequently with the companion cavalry.\textsuperscript{161} Maybe in the Balkan campaign Alexander fought for the first time in his life in the formation of the phalanx.

Arrian informs us that the Triballians were not an easy enemy and the battle was quite equal until the moment the phalanx was engaged with the full force and the cavalry fell on them with the strength of the horses. Then, the enemy had no hope of fighting back and just retreated to save themselves in the glen of the river.\textsuperscript{162} Apparently, Triballians were not equal to confront the heavily armed and perfectly trained Macedonian soldiers.\textsuperscript{163} Three thousand Triballians perished and few were captured alive, as the wood in front of the river was thick and the nightfall blocked the Macedonian pursuit. Arrian supports that according to Ptolemy, only 11 equestrians died and 40 foot-soldiers.\textsuperscript{164} Dodge claims that the injured soldiers,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{159}Ashley 1998,169-170, English 2011,27.
\item \textsuperscript{160}Arr. An. 1.2.5-6.
\item \textsuperscript{161}English 2011,27-28.
\item \textsuperscript{162}Arr. An. 1.2.6
\item \textsuperscript{163}Papazoglou 1978,37.
\item \textsuperscript{164}Arr.An.1.2.7.
\end{itemize}
seldom referred to in ancient sources, while he says that “They averaged eight to twelve for one killed.”

English suggests that at the time that the cavalry attacked the Triballians with the phalanx, the cavalry had already shot the masses of the enemy. We can assume that the cavalry had as its goal to enclose the Triballians and to prevent them from escaping before the infantry was in the fire of battle, thusly they waited for the infantry units to finish the battle. English refers that the reference to shooting is obviously with respect to projectile weapons. By that it doesn’t mean that there were horse archers, instead this is a mention for the presence of javelins, which were thrown from the horseback. English says that the companion cavalry was rarely equipped with another weapon than the cavalry sarissa, according to the reaction of Alexander when he lost his weapon in the battle of Granicus. Some javelins were maybe utilized here but not many. The main mission of the companions was to repeatedly annoy the Triballians until Alexander and the infantry would reach the enemy and were prepared to engage, at which point the cavalry would attack as normal and the enemy would be encircled and trapped. The cavalry would have been under the command of Alexander not to engage until Alexander arrived, he would not wish for one of his first conflicts to finish before his arrival, according to English.

On the other hand, and more convincingly, Hammond suggests that the cavalry with javelins, who act like this, were the prodromoi. He supports his idea with the word ἀκοντισμῶ, i.e. these men first fought with javelins. The companion cavalry was already in the flanks of the Triballians and τὴν ἄλλην ἵππον (light cavalry) was in front of the phalanx. This cavalry fought at the start with javelins and engaged in close quarters. For every campaign it was necessary to combine the action of heavy and light cavalry. The flanks of the heavy cavalry in formation had to be guarded by light cavalry, something that happened in Gaugamela and in Hydaspes and the light cavalry had to act in hilly or rough ground as in the battle of Issus.
Whichever of the two theories which present strong arguments is the most correct or closer to the event that described by Arrian, the brilliant handling of both units i.e. infantry and cavalry, was the perfect strategy that was presented in this battle by Alexander. His great effort to push out the Triballians to open ground where he could defeat them was the smart strategy that actualized.\textsuperscript{170}

On the third day after the conflict, Alexander approached the Ister which was the greatest river of Europe, traversing the greatest expanse of country and operating as an obstruction to the warlike tribes. There Alexander, at the mouth of the Ister found his warships, which came to join him from the Byzantium through the Black Sea.\textsuperscript{171} Errington claims that Byzantium operated as a base for the Macedonians in 335 when Alexander crossed the Danube\textsuperscript{172} and maybe they offered him ships.\textsuperscript{173} On the other hand, Bosworth argues that, the ancient writer does not mean that the navy was from the Byzantines. The fleet maybe belonged to Macedonia. If this is true, the Byzantium will have served as a base for the fleet in the same manner as Chalcis in Euboea. The city had become an ally of Macedonia maybe after the Chaeronea.\textsuperscript{174} The navy must have been sent from Macedonia at the beginning of the campaign.\textsuperscript{175}

The fact that Alexander found his navy waiting for him in this place is another proof of his effective military planning. It seems that Alexander chose this place for meeting with the navy from the beginning, since the island that the Triballians and Thracians took refuge lay opposite.\textsuperscript{176} From that it is proved that Alexander’s aim was a total conquest of the enemy and an effort to push the frontier to the Danube. Before he set out, he ordered a unit of warships to meet him at this certain point as already mentioned in chapter 2.\textsuperscript{177} I tend to think, that this movement also reveals the confidence of Alexander that he would be victorious, and he will successfully

\textsuperscript{170}Ashley 1998,174.  
\textsuperscript{171}Arr. An. 1.3.1-3.  
\textsuperscript{172}Errington 1990,56.  
\textsuperscript{173}Errington 1990,56, Droysen 2012,80.  
\textsuperscript{174}Bosworth 1980,61.  
\textsuperscript{175}English 2011,28.  
\textsuperscript{176}Green 2013,127.  
\textsuperscript{177}Fuller 1960,219.
manage to reach the Danube. Another reason for the appearance of the fleet was the replenishment of the army.\textsuperscript{178}

Alexander staffed the warships with archers and hoplites and directed it against the island that the Triballians and Thracians had found hope and refuge. The Macedonian king tried to land his troops on the island but the defense of the Triballians and Thracians blocked the attack when the ships tried to land, the ships were without many men. Furthermore, the island was rigged for landing and the current of the river, as Arrian states “οἵα δῆ ἐς στενὸν συγκλεισμένον, ὅπως καὶ ἄπορον προσφέρεσθαι”\textsuperscript{179}

Alexander’s failure is due to the natural defenses of Peuce. He wouldn’t tolerate losing his men, while the Triballians were trapped in this refuge island, and Alexander could prevent their supplementation. Their surrender was a matter of time.\textsuperscript{180} Another paradox again in Balkan campaign is the defeat of Alexander by natural barrier. Here, we see Alexander giving up his effort, something unusual for the dynamics of his character. We can only assume that something like this would not happen later in Alexander’s life and of course he would not give up so easily.\textsuperscript{181}

Ashley estimates that the effort to land troops at the Peuce was a strategical mistake. There were many obstacles in this operation, although Alexander insisted on achieving his plan. Nevertheless, he recognized his error and paused this attempt.\textsuperscript{182}

\textsuperscript{178}See final chapter logistics.
\textsuperscript{179}Arr. An. 1.3.3-4.
\textsuperscript{180}Worthington 2004,55.
\textsuperscript{181}English 2011,28.
\textsuperscript{182}Ashley 1998, 174.
C. Danube

The impetuous river of Danube was for Thracians, like the Great wall for the Chinese, a significant line of protection and defense. This harsh river destroyed Alexander’s plan to sail with his warships.\(^{183}\) When Alexander withdrew his warships, he noted that an army of Getae appeared on the opposite coast. Here Arrian explains that they had gathered with the intention to prevent him, if he tried to pass the Ister. The rival army, had large numbers such as circa 4.000 horsemen and more than 10.000-foot soldiers. Soon, Alexander was captured by πόθος to advance beyond Ister.\(^{184}\)

Who were these Getae? The Getae were people of Thracian origin, who lived in the Danube valley, north of the Haemus range. According to Strabo the Getae lived on both sides of the lower Danube. Here in Arrian’s testimony we can see that on the north shore they overlapped with the Triballian region. Their fatherland was the central Walachian plain, in the main part of later Dacia.\(^{185}\)

Alexander felt that these men were a challenge and this reflection gave him a reason for a demonstration, to display to Getae his capable army.\(^{186}\) Hammond believes that these Getae were a menace for the plan of Alexander to defeat the Triballians, due to the fact that the Getae would reinforce and supply the Triballians and Thracians of the island.\(^{187}\) Worthington supports that since it was harvest time, there were many corps and Alexander feared that these Getae would try to feed the population in Peuce.\(^{188}\) However, Worthington continues by saying that Getae in reality were not a true threat to Alexander as the Triballians in this situation and that there was a lot of distance between them and the men of Alexander. In addition, it would be difficult for them to support them with supplies on the Peuce.\(^{189}\) So why did Alexander attack? Maybe he was so active, but Philip’s memory seems to hunt

\(^{183}\) Martin, Blackwell 2012,45. \\
\(^{184}\) Arr. An. 1.3.5. \\
\(^{185}\) Bosworth 1980, 61, Strab. 7.3.2. \\
\(^{186}\) Bosworth 1988, 30, Ashley 1998, 170. \\
\(^{187}\) Hammond 1997, 34; See also: Fuller 1960, 222. \\
\(^{188}\) Worthington 2004, 55. \\
\(^{189}\) Worthington 2004, 55-56.
Alexander. Philip had been in the same region as Alexander at 335 BC, but he never crossed the Danube, Alexander here had an opportunity to outdo the achievements of his father.\footnote{Worthington 2004, 56.; see also: Hammond, Walbank 1988,36, Obrien 1994,49-50.}

In this expedition Arrian for the first time presents the word *pothos* which appears often in his literary work for Alexander. This declares the strong desire to meet the unknown, unexplored, and to search the mysterious, something that Alexander did in his life.\footnote{Fuller 1960,222.} Alexander was influenced by Heracles and Achilles, who were the prototypes of inspiration in his life, and were considered as his ancestors. However, the provocative and palpable prototype for Alexander was his father Philip. Alexander made many efforts to be equal to Philip and later in his reign even to surpass him.\footnote{Fredricksmeyer 1990, 305, Worthington 2005,18.}

In contrast with the scholars who love to write and compare Philip and Alexander, maybe there is another view about the passing of the Danube. Alexander would have known the account of Herodotus, who informs us about the failed campaign of Darius I beyond the Danube. Alexander would desire to surpass Darius I, to advance beyond Danube but with success, a crossing which would be a symbol of glory.\footnote{Martin, Blackwell 2012,47; see also: Green 2013,127-128.} However, except for desires and romantic thoughts for glory, we must think from another facet, a more realistic and pragmatic view. Alexander had no other option, besides retreating, which was impossible for him. If he would accomplish a successful invasion of the Getae land, which it would be a perfect demonstration of power, it would be closer to come to terms, with the trapped men of the Peuce and gain their surrender.\footnote{Wilcken 1967,68, Dodge 2004,194, Green 2013,128.}

Finally, we must not forget that the Getae if they appeared with the aim of preventing Alexander and since their presence was explained as a challenge, it would be a shame for the Macedonian king if he didn’t march to face them. It is true that Alexander had to appear as a dynamic expansionist leader, as the Macedonian soldiery was accustomed under Philip. The Macedonian kings rarely pass away in
deep old age or in their beds. Furthermore, he would probably be characterized as a coward who feared the Getae. It is always important to know that the king was the warlord of his kingdom.

Whatever the reasons, Alexander was steadfast on his attack on the Getae who dared to appear in front of him. He started the operation against them. He filled the leather tent covers with hay, which took them from the boats of the countryside which were made from single tree trunks, and passed across as many as he could from his forces. About 1.500 cavalry and 4.000 foot-soldiers. The passing of the soldiers happened at night and they debarked onto the rural area, with a deep cornfield and they weren’t revealed because of it, as they reached the bank. Here we have an interesting passage, we see that in the narration of the Balkan campaign Arrian for the first time refers to the *sarissa*, in the events against the Getae.

Here, Markle points out that this was the first time that the Macedonian phalanx with sarissa appeared. Accordingly in his mind, there is no true earlier evidence of this formation i.e. the infantry phalanx equipped with *sarissa*. Moreover, he argues that Arrian here cares to distinguish the new weapon from the shorter spear by referring to it. In fact it is true that Arrian referred to the weapons in the Balkan campaign. However, infrequently used the technical accurate term because he preferred the most general term of spear i.e. *dory*.

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196 Hammond, Griffith 2007,79.
197 Arr. An. 1.3.6.
198 Arr. An. 1.4.1.
199 Ibid,1.4.1.
200 Markle 1978,492. (In contrast with the Markle and the original text S. English refers that the Macedonians had spears instead of *sarissa* and he created an argument according to this false thought. This is a mistake which declares that he did not read and analyze the ancient text at this passage. However his work is brilliant and very helpful to my research.)
201 Bosworth1980,63 ; see also : Markle 1978,492(footnote 47).
The army without being revealed, disembarked from the boats and Alexander gave orders to his troops to smooth down the corn with their *sarissae* which was held obliquely and to march to uncultivated ground. At this point, English refers that this happened because Alexander wanted to create the battlefield that would be appropriate for his army to fight.\(^{202}\) The cavalry followed the phalanx that advanced, and when they get out of the arable land, Alexander led the cavalry to the right wing while he sent Nicanor to lead the phalanx in rectangular formation.\(^{203}\) Its left flank was safe because of the river. Hammond says that this formation was utilized when the forces of the infantry had to deal with a stronger force of cavalry. In this situation, it was a logical movement, since the Getae and the Scythians were popular for their cavalry tactics while at this mission, the Getae outnumbered Macedonian cavalry by more than two to one.\(^{204}\)

Nicanor was another son of Parmenio, the second one, who was the commander of the *Hypaspists* in Asia. The fact that here in the Balkan campaign he has the command of the phalanx is evidence that proves that he already occupied the office.\(^{205}\)

The Getae couldn’t afford to resist the attack of the Macedonian cavalry, and they were surprised by the courage and achievement of Alexander who crossed the Danube in one night. Moreover, the balance and strength of the phalanx was very frightening and the charge of the cavalry disastrous. The terrorized Getae took flight to seek refuge in a city, about a parasang, i.e. 5-6 km. away from Danube. There they observed Alexander who promptly brought up his infantry along the river, with the aim of eliminating the threat of an encirclement by the Getae, with the cavalry in the front of the line. The Getae again abandoned the city, which did not possess great fortification while they carried their children and women on their horses and marched far away from the river unto the desert,\(^{206}\) i.e. Northern steppes.\(^{207}\) (Image 6)

\(^{202}\)English 2011,29.
\(^{203}\)Arr. An. 1.4.1-3.
\(^{204}\)Hammond,Walbank 1988,37.
\(^{205}\)Bosworth 1980,63, Heckel 2006,176.
\(^{206}\)Arr. An.1.4.3-5.
It is not peculiar that the Getae opt to flight without giving a fight, when they saw the Macedonian army. And I’m pretty sure that we can safely support the use of the sarissa in this war against the Getae, based on Arrian. Here, I think it would be perfect to add the comment of Aemilius Paulus who was the winner of the battle of Pydna at 168 BC.

It can well be imagined that to the Triballians and other tribes it must have appeared to border on the miraculous, and in their eyes, exalt Alexander to a position little short of a god.211

Although the Getae were characterized by Herodotus as Θρηίκων ἐόντες ἀνδρηιότατοι καὶ δικαιότατοι,209 they took flight upon the spectacle of the attacking Macedonian army. If the Macedonian phalanx terrorized the professional army of the Romans, imagine what terror it caused to a war-tribe like Getae. It is true that from its first appearance, the Macedonian phalanx was a forceful physical and psychological military field instrument.210 Here Alexander’s strongest weapon was the psychological effect that destroyed the courage of the Getae. They saw a man crossing the Danube in a single night with his army while he had already subjugated Thracians and the Triballians who were desperate on an isolated island. As Fuller says: “It can well be imagined that to the Triballians and other tribes it must have appeared to border on the miraculous, and in their eyes, exalt Alexander to a position little short of a god”.211

This incident is reminiscent of a similar extraordinary achievement in Asia. In the spring of 327 BC Alexander marched ἐπὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ Σογδιανῇ πέτραν, where many of the Sogdians had found refuge and Oxyartes had sent his family there. The rock was steep from every side, while the snow made it more impregnable and could offer water to the Sogdians who had plenty of supplies for withstanding a siege. The rock was so well protected that the barbarians said to Alexander that he must find winged soldiers if he desired to capture this fort. In the end, a small Macedonian team of climbers succeeded in occupying a precipitous, unprotected hill next to the barbarians. When the Sogdians saw the Macedonians on the hill, they were amazed and because they thought that there were more troops of Alexander and fully

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208 Plb. 29.17.
209 Hdt. 4.93.
210 Gabriel 2010,65.
211 Fuller 1960,223.
armed, they surrendered. Arrian refers that they were terrorized at the view of those Macedonians on the hills. Ashley correctly refers that the Sogdians had larger forces, while the Macedonians were isolated from the rest of the army with no missile weapons, shields or armor, with no opportunity of retreat; if the Sogdians had attacked they would have killed them all. However, the Sogdians were so surprised by such daring action that they surrendered from their confusion. This incident in my opinion is identical to the one with the crossing of the Danube.

Back to the Danube, Alexander captured the city and took all the booty that the Getae left behind and sent it back to base via Meleager and Philip. These two men appeared as commanders of battalions at the Granicus and like Nicanor and Philotas may have been given their commands at the reign of Philip or short after his death. Alexander destroyed the city and made sacrifices to the Zeus Savior, Heracles and Ister himself on the shore of Danube for allowing the passage. This action characterized by Bosworth as “a gratuitous act of terrorism” to helpless people while proving that the Danube was not a safe defense for them. It seems that the crossing of Danube was a ruse that Alexander had read in military history. Xenophon, the Athenian had led the 10,000 Hellenes earlier in the fourth century through Mesopotamia, while he wrote down his march in his memoirs. From his experience from Euphrates, Xenophon presented how to cross the river on rafts of stuffed skins.

English reports that the presence of Getae in a battle array at the bank of the river, indicates that the tribes had communicated with each other about the menace of Alexander. A united opposition by the tribes would be more dangerous for Alexander, in lieu of a separate rival that would fight alone against Macedonians. Getae had concentrated with the goal of preventing a crossing and presumably to reinforce the Triballians, if there was an opportunity. The thought of the

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212 Arr. An. 4.18.4-4.19.4, also see: Curt. 7.11., Ashley 1998,301-302.
213 Ashley 1998, 302.
214 Arr. An. 1.4.5.
216 Arr. An. 1.4.5.
217 Bosworth 1988,30.
219 English 2011,28-29.
220 Fuller 1960,222.
communication of the tribes is confirmed by the fact that, although Arrian authenticates that Alexander was directed against Triballians and Illyrians (Arr. 1.1.4), from the narrative of the campaign, we see extra fighting with some Thracians in Mt. Haemus and with the Getae. These three people i.e. autonomous Thracians and the merchant Thracians (Mt. Haemus), as and the Getae were not considered as a threat by the initial account of Arrian. Taking account this facet, we can support that maybe there was a strong riot in the Thrace among many tribes, although only Triballians referred to them. I tend to think that Arrian refers only the Triballians because he omits his account or because they were the most significant enemies of Macedonia due to the enmity there was among these people, since the period that Philip was king with the unfortunate battle for the Macedonians of 339 BC.

With the total defeat of the Getae, Alexander had secured Danube as his frontier and there was no other rival tribe that would create any problem for him in the region.\textsuperscript{221} Alexander achieved his aim. Envoys came from Syrmus the king of Triballians and from other autonomous tribes, who lived near Ister and even more the Celts who lived on the Ionian Gulf. Here Alexander makes them all allies and friends. During this phase, there is a great incident according to Arrian and Strabo that is described concerning the Celts, which answers to Alexander’s question of what they feared the most? Celts replied that they feared, that the sky will fall upon them one day and not Alexander. After this reply, Alexander characterized them as \textit{ἀλαζόνες}.\textsuperscript{222}

The Celts were recognized as fearless warriors who dared to face the elements with great courage. It would be perfect if Alexander achieved a statement like this for his own propaganda i.e. that the fearless Getae, who weren’t terrorized by anything, feared Alexander.\textsuperscript{223} Personally I think that Alexander asked them because his achievements of the Balkan campaign may have been known to the vast region and Alexander gained popularity as a fearful enemy. In combination with his past victory over the Maedi at 340 B.C when he established a city in his own name, it is

\textsuperscript{221} Droysen 2012,82-83.  
\textsuperscript{222} Arr. An. 1.4.6-8, Strab. 7.3.8.  
\textsuperscript{223} Bosworth 1980,65.
perfect evidence which presents that Alexander was confident about himself, his military reputation and he desired to known whether the Celts shared the same opinion. This argument is supported by the fact that Alexander call them ἀλαζόνες because they didn’t fear his power, which Alexander was sure that he had. Maybe this high level of confidence of Alexander, was a result of some divine marks. First, the reply of Pythia at Delphi. Pythia called Alexander ἀνίκητος, this reply remained in Alexander’s thoughts.224. Secondly, in the beginning of the campaign, we hear about a sacrifice to Dionysus at the god’s sanctuary at Crestonia in northeast Macedonia, where the flames reached an unusual height. Alexander informed that this divine sign indicated that he would be victorious.225 This passage reveals the nature of Alexander being ambitious and full of confidence, even from his early reign.

The achievement and the trepidation of Alexander in Thrace and in the Danube, was so great that for half a century no Thracian or Celt dared to attack Macedonia.226 Macedonia with its great victory had gained a new role that the other Hellenes couldn’t understand during that time. Having subjugated the Balkans, Macedonia acted as a bulwark against the dangerous tribes of Europe, while a strong Macedonian state secured the Hellenic city life in the south. As Fox states “The European conquests of Philip and Alexander belonged to a wider perspective, essential to the safety, if not the freedom, of Greece”.227

Moreover, Alexander received some troops from the Triballians.228 We can estimate that the Triballians were subordinated under the Macedonians, after their defeat by Alexander, and it was necessary for them to support the Macedonian war against Darrius III, with their contribution.229 The Triballians remained allies of Alexander from then on. Alexander had proven that he was capable as an avenger of his father and as king in the battlefield and in diplomacy.230

Although, I emphasized the inferiority of the Balkan tribes; for example, the Thracian infantry troops were generally defeated when they were in close contact

224 Plut. Alex.14.4· Diod.17.93.4.
227 Fox 2004,84.
228 Diod. 17.17.4.
229 Xydopoulos 2010, 217.
230 Worthington 2004,56.
battle against a disciplined heavy infantry.\textsuperscript{231} However, we must underline the success of Alexander too. According to Herodotus, the Thracians were the biggest nation in the world, next to the Indians and if they united under one ruler, they would be the most powerful nation in the world, although they didn’t unite and for this reason they remained weak.\textsuperscript{232} This view related with the comment of Justin who attests that if the Illyrians, Thracians, Dardanians, and other barbarous nations united, it would be impossible to confront them.\textsuperscript{233} The first campaign of Alexander as king against the northern tribes, clearly presented, the old truism, already known from the antiquity, i.e. that Alexander was a strategic and tactical genius.\textsuperscript{234} Here we see, the unusual forcefulness, vitality, military charisma and ability of the young king who reached the Danube alone.\textsuperscript{235}

For four months Alexander was trying to restore the authority that his father had imposed with several campaigns in winter and summer. The kingdoms of Macedonians in the Balkans were different in contrast with that of Athens as a paradigm in the Aegean area. The conquered tribes continued to govern themselves using their own laws and customs and retained their own army. There was no attest of any kind of enforcement of a political system of rule e.g. democracy or oligarchy which would create a turmoil, whilst there is no occupation by the new rulers, such as garrisons. Instead each \textit{ethnos} retained its own traditions and the way they lived before they fought with Macedonia.\textsuperscript{236} The only demands of the Macedonians were a tribute, probably a tenth of the production, the supply of the army with troops and labor on demand and finally the acceptance of the Macedonian foreign policy. The old system of civil tribal wars and the idea of living by pillage was abandoned and replaced by peace and prosperity in which the agrarian workers would play an important role.\textsuperscript{237}

Philip had established significant cities in appropriate places and stopped the unruly manners of the Thracians. In the new towns that Philip established, with the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{231} Ashley 1998, 72.
\bibitem{232} Hdt. 5.3.
\bibitem{233} Just. 11.1.
\bibitem{234} Burke 1983, 68.
\bibitem{235} Bengtson 1991, 302.
\bibitem{236} Hammond 1997, 35.
\bibitem{237} Hammond 1997, 35.
\end{thebibliography}
largest the Philippopolis (Plovdiv) the population was mixed with Macedonians and other Hellenes and the elite of the local people. The aim of the new towns was to boost agriculture and trade and the diffusion of the Hellenic language for administrative purposes. The Hellenic city states of the Thracian coast entered the alliance of Philip and then of Alexander. Alexander ruled both sides of the Hellespont, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus. The fleet of Macedonia and the Hellenic community had achieved the sea control in these waters and in the Black sea and they could travel to the Danube. They had the chance to stop piracy and to protect the cities there, against the local peoples. The result of all this change was a quick expansion of trade exchange and maritime trade. Both kings, father and son used the rich mineral resources of Thrace as subordinate region and they issued a coinage which was released in central Europe. The Hellenic city states profited from the strengthening of the trade and from the safety of the corn route from the Black sea, on which Athens and many other cities depended.

238 Ibid, 35.
239 Hammond 1997, 36.
Chapter III

The Illyrian threat

οἱ δὲ πάλαι μὲν ἑδαύμαζον τὴν τε ὀξύτητα ὁρώντες καὶ τὸν κόσμον τῶν ὁμομένων: τότε δὲ προσάγοντας ἣδη τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀλέξανδρον οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ λείπουσι τοὺς πρώτους λόφους. (Arr. An. 1.6.3)

a. Cleitus and Glaukias

After his achievements and successes with the Thracians, Triballians and Getae, Alexander marched towards the Agrianians and Paeonians.240 This is towards the Upper Strymon valley and the terrain amid that valley and the upper Vardar (Axios) Valley.241 The Agrianians for affairs of administration were included in the north-western area which was administered by Pella and not Thrace. The Paeonians were under the dominion of Macedonia from the reign of Philip and were consolidated in Macedonia. Their king Lyppeius continued to issue his regent coinage next to the coinage of Philip and Alexander and his royal house enjoyed prestige. The squadron of Paeonian cavalry was drafted from the Paeonian elite as an ethnic group inside the kingdom.242

Here, Hammond suggests that Alexander was marching against the Illyrians and the information about their revolt had arrived.243 Moreover, Dodge seems to share the same opinion of Hammond due to the fact that he mentions “Early in the spring he (Alexander) started along the route with the purpose of settling the troubles at the

240 Arr. An. 1.5.1.
243 Hammond 1974, 78.
Danube and afterward those on the Illyrian borders once for all”. 244 If we follow this thought, we can conclude that Alexander knew from the beginning about their threat as Dodge, Hammond and Arrian suggest in contrast with Bosworth and many scholars who believe, that the Illyrians at that time revolted, declaring that Alexander had no plan to attack them from the beginning. 245 According to Bosworth, Arrian is talking about the Triballians and Illyrians, albeit there is ambiguity about which Illyrians Alexander intended to attack. Maybe they were not the people of the north-west since Alexander at the end of the Danube campaign, learned about their rebellion. Furthermore, they were not the Autariatae, an Illyrian tribe west to Triballians because Alexander did not know their existence before 335. So, Bosworth infers that, Arrian phrases ἐς Τριβαλλοὺς καὶ Ἑλλυριοὺς (Arr. An. 1.1.4) are possibly inexact. Ptolemy may have spoken about a general turmoil in the north with the Illyrians and Triballians and Arrian may have deduced wrongly that they were Illyrians and Triballians who were referenced in that revolt. 246

At this point, a Ptolemaic fragment, a papyrus which was found from Hogarth at Rifen in 1906/1907 A.D. and dated to second and first century BC, offers us a historical narrative of the Balkan campaign of Alexander from 335 BC. which can help. 247 (Image 7) In the fragment, a new face appears “Korragos” one of Alexander’s friends, conceivable Hetairos, who ordered to guard the Illyrian frontiers with some troops. This Korragos or Corrhagus is the son of Menoitas. 248

In this papyrus, there is a citation of an expedition to Eordaia and Elimeia (ll 13-14) (image 8) which could probably reveal the general turmoil in these regions during the early reign of Alexander. (Diod. 17.3.5, Plut. Alex. 11). Arrian rapidly proceeds to the main events of the campaign of Alexander against the Thracians and not one of these authors refers to the protective measures that Alexander took to control these circumstances. 249 Korragos was responsible for signaling the coming hazard by sending constant messages to the soldiery, which would march with Alexander to the Thracian expedition. This action indicates a military intelligent

244Dodge 2004, 189.
246Bosworth 1980, 52.
249Clarysse, Schepens 1985, 34.
system, which allowed him to receive messages while he was on the march. The appearance of the messengers in Arrian (1.5.1) with the news of the revolt of the Illyrian kings, indicates how this intelligent system worked. From the fragments of the papyri, it seems that his mission took place before the revolt of the Illyrians and the upcoming campaign of Alexander in Illyria. This interpretation is confirmed with the historical narrative of Arrian. On this matter Arrian maybe is truly correct by declaring that the Illyrians and the Triballians were restless. (Image 7)

So, while Alexander and his army was on the way, messengers came and announced to him that Cleitus son of Bardylis had revolted and he had as ally Glaukias the king of Taulantians. The bad news didn’t end here, a third force appeared in the game and it was that the Autariatae were willing to attack Alexander, while he was marching. Cleitus according to most of the scholars was the son of the well-known enemy of Macedonia, Bardylis, who had fought against Philip II in 358 B.C. On the other hand, Hammond supports that this Cleitus is the son of Bardylis II, so Cleitus is the grandson of the well-known Bardylis. It is not authenticated as to which branch of the Illyrians the Bardylis ruled, but it is probably the Dardanians, a tribe north of Macedonia straddling the significant region amid the Drin and the Erigon. Since the Taulantians and Autariatae are referred to in Arrian’s narrative, we can consider that Cleitus’ troops were the great tribe of Dardanians. The history of this tribe is strongly connected with Macedonia, and the only relationship between these two nations was war; as in the Dardanians’ onslaught on Macedonia or the Macedonian kings marched into Dardania to impose their authority. Friendship never existed amid the two nations.

250 Clarysee, Schepens 1985,34-35.
251 Arr. An. 1.5.1.
252 Hammond 1974,79.( However , Hammond in his article “The Kingdoms in Illyria circa 400-167 B.C.” refers that Cleitus is the son of the Bardylis who fought with Philip II at 358 BC. Hammond 1966,243,245. The same Opinion is at the book Φιλίππος ο Μακεδών 2007,p.255 original title Philip of Macedon 1995. Maybe Hammond had reconsider his opinion about Cleitus son of Bardylis I. )
254 Bosworth 1980,65 ( Here for practical reasons , I follow the traditional view which characterize the Dardanians as Illyrians. However there is large conversation which analyze all the data about their ethnicity. ( Papazoglou 1974, 210-269).)
The Taulantians, were in the inland of Epidamnus, and Epidamnus remained their significant area through the whole of antiquity. In 335 BC their personal benefit was to be federated with the Dardanians against the federated kingdoms of Molossia and Macedonia.257

The third force the Autariatae are described by Strabo as one of the three most forceful Illyrian tribes. Their terrain bordered on Paeonia like that of the Dardanians and reached as far as the Bessi of the Haemus. According to Arrian’s testimony, we can see that the Autariatae were close to the Agrianians because Langarus made an invasion easily, but also, we can see that they were not under the sway of Macedonia. Here Bosworth continues by saying that Alexander had no idea about their existence. Bosworth locates their country adjacent to the Nis and Morava rivers. Finally, we can mention that their region stretched a great distance west, since they were also certified as neighbors of the Ardiaei of the Adriatic coast.258 Moreover, Hammond says that the Autariatae were an autonomous tribe which had been defeated by Philip but they didn’t lose their independence.259

It is presumable that the forces of Cleitus and Glaukias intended to attack western Macedonia while Alexander was far away, simultaneously the crucial appearance of Autariatae, aimed to hinder Alexander on his return.260 The situation warned Alexander that most of Illyria would soon be in revolt and the western border of Macedonian would be invaded. Alexander knew that if he wanted to exterminate this threat he had to act immediately.261 English points out, that an Illyrian threat was a significant and delicate issue, which symbolized a strong enmity between the two peoples, if we judge according to the wars between Macedonia and Illyria.262 The danger was vast, the Illyrians had united forces which would direct them against western Macedonia for devastation, something that was their traditional tactic.263

257 Bosworth 1980,66.
258 Ibid, 66.
259 Hammond 1989,49.
260 Hammond 1973,506; also see: Dodge 2004,199.
261 Fuller 1960,223.
262 English 2009,27.
At this point, English marks that this was probably a mistaken oversight by Alexander who had left his homeland with no protection, for the reasons we already mention in chapter 2. Alexander had to act quickly before the Illyrian threat destroys him, and all his conquests in Thrace and Hellas would try to revolt again. On the other hand, Sarantis supports that when Alexander left his homeland for Thrace and Danube, he left Pella with great forces under Antipater for the internal order and the protection of the frontiers. Sarantis declares that he could appoint the Illyrian threat to Antipater, something that Philip would have done. Nevertheless, Alexander was a totally different character in contrast with his father and acted immediately.

We cannot know how many men were left in Macedonia, while Alexander was in Balkans, albeit we are sure that the main army was absent from its fatherland. We must not forget that there was a Macedonian force in Asia Minor too, with Parmenio. However, Hammond-Walbank suggests that Alexander left substantial forces under Antipater in Macedonia. Furthermore, I would like to add that the campaign of 335 BC was a secure movement by itself, the attack of Alexander to his north neighbors until Danube was a protective measure. Personally, I tend to think that his defeated ex rivals like Triballians, Thracians and Getae would not have had time to reorganize their troops and to march against Alexander, after their humiliating defeats. By that I mean, that there was not any possible danger at least from Thrace, while in Hellas the enmity to Macedonian sway had not yet been provoked.

At that point Laggarus, king of Agrianians makes his appearance, who from the reign of Philip had declared his friendship to Alexander, and he appeared in 335 BC in close alliance with his hypaspists. He listened to the questions of Alexander about the Autariatae and replied that he must not be concerned about them, because they are the most ἀπολεμωτάτους to the region. So, on the command of Alexander,
Laggarus was heading against the Autariatae, fought with them and exempted Alexander from their hostility.\textsuperscript{268}

Laggarus was honored with great gifts by Alexander, and he accepted Cynnane, the sister of Alexander, daughter of Philip with the Illyrian princess Audata,\textsuperscript{269} for marriage. Although, this marriage never occurred, because Laggarus passed away due to an illness.\textsuperscript{270} Another fact that indicates his success was the silence of Autariatae, who didn’t create any problems again, when Alexander was in Asia.\textsuperscript{271} The action of Laggarus was extremely significant, because he secured Alexander’s flank for this march. Laggarus directed the army west against the Autariatae, with the aim of preventing any attack on the Macedonian column, while Alexander was marching.\textsuperscript{272} That period, Autariatae did not seem to be a strong military force and thusly, Laggarus easily took control of them.\textsuperscript{273} However, later they become a great military power, as we know from Strabo, and from the account of Diodorus who referred to their military action.\textsuperscript{274}

Bosworth argues, that the appearance of Laggarus was connected to the only information we have about the Agrianians, under the sway of Philip. Agrianians were an essential military force, which accompanied Alexander from the beginning of his reign, while they were also significant in the reign of Philip. Bosworth continues his reflection by arguing that, we don’t know when these people became subjects of Philip and we only know that when Agis king of the Paeonians died in 358, Philip attacked their kingdom and forced the Paeonians to come under his authority. Bosworth assumes that at this subjugation maybe included and the Agrianians, and Laggarus were Agis’ successor.\textsuperscript{275} However, this thought comes in contrast with Hammond, who suggests that Luppeius was the king of the Paeonians.

\textsuperscript{268}Arr. An. 1.5.2-4.
\textsuperscript{269}Bartels 2015,384. ( For Cynnane see : Bartels, Jens. “Cynnane « the Illyrian »?: the perils of onomastics”, Classical Quarterly 2015 N. S. 65 (1): 384-387.)
\textsuperscript{270}Arr. An. 1.5.4-5.
\textsuperscript{271}English 2009,26.
\textsuperscript{272}Ibid,26.
\textsuperscript{273}Bosworth 1980,67.
\textsuperscript{274}Bosworth 1980, 67, Strab. 7.5.11, Diod. 20.19.1.
\textsuperscript{275}Bosworth 1980,66.
The young king continued his march, heading along the river Erigon, moving against the city Pellion which was occupied by Cleitus, because it was the most fortressied city of the area. When Alexander reached the city, he encamped near the river Eordaicus and was keen to attack the city the next day.\textsuperscript{276}

It is true that in Arrian’s testimony there is a lot of ambiguity about the location of the city of Pellion and its vicinity.\textsuperscript{277} Leake has pointed out that Pellion was below the pass in the proximity of Pliassa. Grote immediately accepted the location of the city.\textsuperscript{278} Droysen places Pellion in the vicinity of Pliassa too.\textsuperscript{279} Moreover, Hammond suggests that the Gorice is the ancient city of Pellion.\textsuperscript{280} On the other hand, Sarantis points out that the place that Alexander fought with Illyrians was located in the modern-day hills Bregou -I- Kersis southwest of the village Gkolobart.\textsuperscript{281} While Bosworth supports that the Illyrians may have occupied a site inside Macedonia and more specifically in modern Florina in Lyncestis, close to the Macedonian border near to Eordaea and the western city of Edessa.\textsuperscript{282} Finally, in 2003, Winnifrith mentioned Zvezde, and it connects it to Arrian’s text.\textsuperscript{283} The present paper follows the topographical survey of N.G.L. Hammond.

Except for the account of Arrian, the other sources (\textit{Diod. Plut. Strab.}) cannot help us with the location of Pellion. Although, if the Illyrian threat was in Lyncus, as Bosworth suggests, I thought that the sources would have spoken about an Illyrian invasion. When, Perdiccas III died, the Illyrians had occupied many cities in Upper Macedonia and Philip was the man who removed the Illyrian shadow from entire Macedonia.\textsuperscript{284} If after Philip’s death we had a new invasion, it would be an extremely significant event for the sources to mention. That Alexander faced an invasion and he would be forced to defend his kingdom, while he was in a campaign far away. Conversely, we must not forget that Alexander executed the Lyncestian princes, and

\textsuperscript{276} Arr. An. 1.5.5.  
\textsuperscript{277} English 2009,27.  
\textsuperscript{278} Bosworth 1982,77.  
\textsuperscript{279} Droysen 2012, 452(footnote 57).  
\textsuperscript{280} Hammond 1974,76( see Hammond’s argument 66-77.  
\textsuperscript{281} Sarantis 1983,252.  
\textsuperscript{283} Fox 2010,387.  
\textsuperscript{284} Diod.16.2-4.
some local turmoil against him would be logical in these terrains.285 But and if a turmoil existed and the Illyrians came down to unite with the disenchanted Lyncestians, the sources would never omit that historical detail.

For the route that Alexander followed for Pellion, Hammond states that “Alexander took the quickest route to western Macedonia via Sofia, Kjustendi (ancient Pataulia), Kratovo(Tranupara) and Strip (Astibus), and then from the upper Vardar valley via Gradsko and Prilep into Pelagonia and Lyncus, the two cantons in which the river Erigon (the Cerna Reka) gathers its headwaters. From Lyncus the most direct route to Pelion was via Florina, Pisodherion, Kariai and the Gryke e Ujkut. It is possible that Alexander took this route; but it is more likely that he marched via Vatokhorion and Bilisht to cover the routes of entry into Orestis, because he could not have known whether Cleitus and Glaucias were ahead of him on their way into Macedonia”.286 Of course we realize that Arrian omits to give details and information about a huge distance like this.287

The troops of Cleitus occupied the mountains around the city, which were high and thickly wooded. These forces in the perfect strategic points were prepared to attack to Macedonians from all sides, if they attempted the onslaught against the city.288 Alexander decided to camp close to the River Devoll for logical reasons, i.e. to have some protection and to provide his men and horses with water. He was not so close to Pellion. Thusly, we can station him at the junction of Devoll with the old river of Ventrok which probably is the Eordaicus.

Cleitus came south via Tetovo and Kitsevo to the head of the Lake Ochrid and then directed along one or the other side of the lake to the Tsangon Pass and Pellion. His occupation in Pellion provides benefits for him as a base for invasions in Macedonia land.289 Concerning the occupation of the surrounding mountains and hills, Hammond suggests that is a hyperbole to support that Alexander’s army was exposed by the men of Cleitus from each side since Alexander needed a free route to

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285 Bosworth 1980,70.
286 Hammond 1974,78. There are many names for Πέλλιον, Scholars call it, Pellium, Pelion and Pellion.
287 Hammond 1974, 78, Bosworth 1980, 68 (There are many ideas and thoughts about the route that Alexander followed, for the sake of convenience I quote the opinion of Hammond, whose topographical research this paper follows.)
288 Arr. An. 1.5.6.
289 Hammond 1974,79.
his camp and because from the narrative it appeared that his army acted in a large plain.  

English suggests that, Cleitus maybe didn’t have such large forces to surround the Macedonians on every side, and of course the troops which were stationed in the mountains would not be visible in that region immediately upon Alexander’s arrival on the flatland, otherwise Alexander would have realized that he was moving into an ambush. The Illyrians must have had some distance and their action would have started with a prearranged signal.

When Alexander arrived in the flatland, the surrounding forces appeared, and the Macedonians realized in how difficult position they were. Alexander knew that his father had lost a battle against Onomarchus of Phocis under similar circumstances, in a horseshoe-shaped gorge, when Onomarchus released his catapults and missile weapons upon Philip from above. Although, Ashley attests that the Illyrian infantry opted to abate the power of their rivals with missile fires, fighting from a distance instead of hand to hand combats. However, In this case, the Illyrians didn’t have such equipment, otherwise the situation would have been extremely difficult for Alexander.

We can easily guess how difficult the night might have been for Macedonians. As it was logical, Alexander needed to keep his troops under arms as protecting measure for a night assault. Cleitus had missed opportunities to destroy the Macedonian army. He did not have missile weapons at the time that he needed them to create a vast turmoil with his ambush. Secondly, he didn’t act at night, he had armies from three sides that could onslaught the Macedonians. We must not forget that the fact that Alexander retained his troops with weapon means that they were tired and this was an advantage for Cleitus, who was determined to act the next day in the morning.

At that time, Glaukias had not arrived in Pellion with his troops and Cleitus was alone. The next day Alexander moved against the city. The Illyrians offered sacrifices

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290 Ibid, 79.
291 English 2009, 27.
293 Ashley 1998, 18.
294 English 2009, 28.
295 Ibid, 28.
by slaying three young boys, three young girls and three black rams and they assaulted the Macedonians. When they entered in the fire of battle they withdrew from the battlefield immediately, although they had occupied strong defensive positions, the success of Macedonians was for once so fast and dynamic that they found the dead corpses lying on the ground of the youths and animals. That day Alexander forced the Illyrians to seek refuge in the city. Alexander’s plan was to build a wall around the city with the aim of blocking them. The next day Glaukias arrived with strong forces.²⁹⁶

Sarantis mentions that the forces of the Illyrians were not appropriate for a siege struggle. When Cleitus conquered the Pellion, he did not prepare for defense and for a siege but he stationed the largest part of his troops outside of the city with the thought, that when he repelled the attack of Alexander, he would reinforce his position and attack Alexander from several directions.²⁹⁷ From the battle’s result, we can easily understand that the rapid retreat of Cleitus indicates his low confidence in his troops. Moreover, Glaukias hadn’t yet arrived and Cleitus opted for defense. With that option, he destroyed his initial advantage i.e. of surrounding the Macedonians.²⁹⁸

Alexander’s campaign in Pellion is interesting and due to the factor of the speed of the king. Here we see that his arrival was so fast, that the forces of the Illyrians couldn’t unite. Glaukias came after Alexander at the field, although he had organized this plan with Cleitus before Alexander marched on Pellion.²⁹⁹ Alexander’s idea about circumvallation, (περιτειχισμῷ) is truly curious, according to Hammond, since Alexander knew that Glaukias was on his way and would unite forces with Cleitus thus would create a serious nuisance to Alexander’s supplementation as long as the wall was under construction. It would seem more logical if Alexander had sacked the city.³⁰⁰ Hammond-Walbank, refers that Alexander decided to build the wall around the city because with this action he would blockade the city and his forces could

²⁹⁶Arr. An. 1.5.7-8. (The custom with the human sacrifice of youths was a habit for the Illyrians. This action reminds the sacrifice of Iphigenia’s from Agamemnon at Aulida. It seems that this habit was popular at the antiquity and that the sacrifice was an offer to the gods, who with this action would offer the catharsis from the coming disaster.)Zitros 2009,239.
²⁹⁷Sarantis 1983, 254-255 (At this comment I don’t use the topographical view of Sarantis)
²⁹⁸English 2009,28.
²⁹⁹Worthington 2004, 57-58; also see: Hammond 1974,86.
³⁰⁰Hammond 1974,86.
operate inside its own defenses. Having established his authority in the flatland over the Dardanians of the heights, he would have the chance to gather supplies and obtain pasture in the flatland of Poloske.\textsuperscript{301}

Here English suggests that Alexander had no another choice except from the circumvallation of the town. He points out that before Alexander’s lifetime, the defenders in sieges always had the advantage. This occurred since there was an ellipse of effective siege equipment, while catapults were a fresh discovery. The catapults with stones first introduced in 334 BC, while the attackers-besiegers had some limits to their actions, as to use ladders and rams or to try to gain betrayal from the defenders of the city. English continues by saying that Alexander’s forces out of Pellion were not so large and the limited siege train was not available for Alexander now. Furthermore, English adds that Alexander didn’t have some high skills in guile and cunning as his father, which would offer him the surrender of the town. So, Alexander had only one alternative, the blockade of Pellion.\textsuperscript{302}

Sarantis supports that Alexander started the circumvallation with the aim of preventing the Illyrians from escaping from the fortress, during the night. The next day he would start his siege.\textsuperscript{303} The appearance of Glaukias proved, that the idea of circumvallation could not be undertaken. Moreover, the supplementation started to come under danger and the enemy was not so foolish as to offer a battle to Alexander on his own ground. They were aware that their advantage was to make Macedonians hungry or to force them to move, while the Illyrians were willing to assault them on their move. Furthermore, they knew that when Alexander would be forced to move he would immediately lose his strong advantage. Alexander had defeated the troops of Cleitus who found refuge inside the town, so Alexander’s presence was responsible for the isolation inside the town, of the strongest troops of Cleitus. This was precisely Alexander’s advantage.\textsuperscript{304}

Green admits that the circumvallation of Pellion was a tactical mistake, due to the fact that Alexander had no time to waste to starve the forces of Cleitus. Moreover, according to Green, Alexander’s troops were not enough and they

\textsuperscript{301}Hammond, Walbank 1988, 43.
\textsuperscript{302}English 2009, 29.
\textsuperscript{303}Sarantis 1983, 255.
\textsuperscript{304}Hammond 1974, 86.
couldn’t offer him the opportunity to occupy the well defended city by storm, with the threat of Glaukia’s appearance.\textsuperscript{305} On the other hand, Ashley argues that Pellion “\textit{was only lightly held at the time}” and Alexander did not assault the city because the siege machines didn’t follow the army during that phase. He refers that Alexander would fear that without his siege train he would suffer many casualties. Moreover, he believes too, that this was a tactical error, especially at that moment where time was significant and without his engines he had to at least attack the city.\textsuperscript{306}

English emphasizes that, if Alexander knew of the advent of Glaukias, then his choice of advancing and the plan of circumvallation would be a tactical mistake. He suggests that a better solution would have been a retreat through the pass and to prepare for another strategy. In contrast, English states that if Alexander didn’t know about the influx of Glaukias, this is an example of the poor quality of military information in antiquity; meaning that a large force was approaching nearby and its arrival on the battlefield was completely unknown to Alexander.\textsuperscript{307}

I thought that in this phase, we are very unfair with Alexander’s action. Firstly, I found it impossible to believe that Alexander didn’t know or at least didn’t predict the coming of Glaukias since he had been informed that these two powers had united and since the station of Cleitus towards Pellion was a strong clue, which emphasized that he stayed on a perfect base for hostile movements towards Macedonia. Furthermore, here we are dealing with Alexander, a person who always had alternatives thanks to his charisma to predict the movements and the intentions of his rivals. Something that he also did in Mt. Haemus. I tend to think that with the circumvallation Alexander aimed to block Cleitus and to isolate him and then to face Glaukia alone.\textsuperscript{308} By that I mean, that Alexander desired to separate the forces of his enemies. Maybe Alexander thought that he had some time to block the city, but Glaukia’s arrival showed that he didn’t succeed in finishing his plan in time. Alexander wanted to have time and rapidity at his own advantage. This is the reason

\textsuperscript{305}Green 2013,132. (Green and English seems to believe that Alexander had not great forces in the Balkan campaign. Moreover, Green believes that the siege machines were already in occupation of Alexander in contrast with other scholars.)

\textsuperscript{306}Ashley 1998,171-174.

\textsuperscript{307}English 2009,29.

\textsuperscript{308}Hammond,Walbank 1988, 43. (In page 43 scholars claim that “\textit{Alexander wanted to strike at Cleitus first}”.)
why he chose this lightning battle route, he appeared to Cleitus earlier than Glaukias. He was aiming to finish Cleitus and if Cleitus didn’t offer him a straight and fair battle, he wanted to isolate him with the περιτειχισμῳ and then to direct his army against Glaukia, while Cleitus and his troops would watch from inside the city walls, helpless to act. In this point we have to add that, another reason justifying Alexander’s apathy towards the arrival of the Glaukias and his insistence on the circumvallation plan, may be because Alexander was not afraid of the Illyrian ruler’s army, considering his Macedonian powers as being far superior.

When Glaukias arrived, Alexander stopped the idea of taking the city, due to the fact that many men had taken refuge inside Pellion and Glaukias would attack Alexander if he charged the wall. Alexander decided to send Philotas with many horsemen and all the baggage animals from the camp, with the aim of obtaining food. When Glaukias was informed about the movement of Alexander, he was determined to prevent the supplementation and occupied the heights around the region, where the men of Philotas would obtain food. Afterwards, when Alexander was informed that the mission of Philotas was in danger, he acted immediately by taking with him his hypaspists, archers, Agrianians and four hundred equestrians. The rest of the army, stayed on, near the city, to prevent a union of Cleitus and Glaukias troops. When Glaukias saw Alexander with his army, he abandoned his plan, Philotas and his men returned to camp with safety.

Here as it is logical, the fact that Alexander learned about the danger of his forage mission, (ἀπηγγέλθη αὐτῷ) indicates the effectiveness of the intelligence system. Moreover, Arrian provides us with this information: καὶ ὁ Γλαυκίας μαθὼν τὴν ὀρμήν τῶν ἀμφὶ Φιλώταν ἐξελαύνει ἐπὶ αὐτούς, which declares that maybe and the Illyrians or more specific the Illyrian Glaukias had established an intelligent system too.

It seems that Glaukias took only a part of his army in the mission against Philotas while his main part of the army remained in the mountains over Pellion. These were

309 Arr. An. 1.5.8.  
310 Arr. An. 1.5.9-11.  
311 Arr. An. 1.5.10.  
312 Arr. An. 1.5.9.
the forces which Alexander didn’t want to federate with the troops of Cleitus.\textsuperscript{313} Alexander sought to save his men and he took the troops of the army with him which were the most appropriate to fight the enemy on a rough terrain.\textsuperscript{314} The mission for supplementation was a risky one. Glaukias had some opportunities here that he did not handle so well. To begin with, Alexander would probably have needed some hours to arrive to the flatland, which was 8km\textsuperscript{315} far away from Pellion. This time span was enough for Glaukias to engage with Macedonians and to create some problems for them. Secondly, here there is again the failure of Glaukias and Cleitus to attack the remaining army of Alexander to Pellion, many special forces were with Alexander who was far away. It would be a chaotic charge from in front and the rear by the Illyrians to the Macedonians who would have had to react without the leadership of Alexander.\textsuperscript{316}

After the rescue of the food expedition, Arrian give us a strong passage which testifies how difficult and desperate Alexander’s position was.

\begin{quote}
\textit{ἐδόκουν δὲ ἐτι τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐν δυσχώριᾳ ἀπευληφέναι οἱ ἀμφί τὸν Κλεῖτον καὶ Γλαυκίαν: τὰ τὲ γὰρ ὅρη τὰ ὑπερθέξια κατέζηκαν πολλοὶ μὲν ἵππευσι, πολλοί δὲ ἀκονισταῖς καὶ σφενδονήταις καὶ ὀπλίταις δὲ ὁὐκ ὀλίγοις, καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει κατειλημμένοι προσκέισθαι ἀπαλλαττομένοι ᾲμελλον: τὰ τὲ χωρία δι᾽ ὅν ἡ πάροδος ἦν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ στενὰ καὶ ὑλώδη ἐφαίνετο, τῇ μὲν πρὸς τὸν ποταμοῦ ἀπειρόμενα, τῇ δὲ ὄροι ὑπερύψηλον ἤν καὶ κρημνοὶ πρὸς τὸν ὄρους, ὡστε οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ἀσπίδων ἄν τῷ στρατεύματι ἡ πάροδος ἑγένετο.\textsuperscript{317} }
\end{quote}

In this passage, we see the variety of the large number of troops of Illyrians, the occupation of strategic positions by the rivals and the terrain limitations that Alexander faced. Hammond estimates that Cleitus and Glaukias may have gathered

\begin{footnotes}
\item[313] Hammond 1974,80.
\item[314] Hammond 1974,81.
\item[316] English 2009, 30-31.
\item[317] Arr. An. 1.5.11-12.
\end{footnotes}
circra 50,000 troops. The professor suggests that the Gryke e Ujkut pass matches Arrian’s description \( \pi \alpha \rho \delta \omega \zeta \). Through the Gryke e Ujkut, Alexander would enter into the Macedonian land and would have open communications lines with Prespa basin and Lyncus. Certainly, he would gain an advantage because he would hold the Gryke e Ujkut passage against Illyrians. Here the tactical problem for the young king was how to lead his troops through this narrow route in front of his rivals and with the troops of the Pellion probably on his heels.

Arrian describes the stratagem that Alexander followed. Alexander arrayed the phalanx in a formation of 120 men deep in each file and he stationed 200 horsemen on each wing. He ordered them to stay silent and to obey his commands immediately. Arrian here quotes the orders of Alexander for the infantry. To raise their pikes upright, then to put them in the position of attack at the word of command, and to swing the pikes coordinated to the right and then to the left. He moved the phalanx forward with rapidity and then changed direction now to one flank and now to the other. Thus, he deployed and maneuvered it in many difficult formations very quickly, and making a kind of wedge on the left part of the phalanx whereby he assaulted the enemies. The Illyrians watched this and they were impressed from the concerted maneuvers of the perfectly trained army. They immediately abandoned the first hills without a fight. Alexander had ordered the Macedonians to shout with their war-cry and to clash the pikes to their shields, this action provoked extreme terror in the Taulantians who retreated and headed back to Pellion.

The sarissae of the infantry were held vertical until the moment of clash, when the first rows brought their sarissae into horizontal position. \( \Pi \rho \delta \omega \lambda \eta \) is the technical term for the sarissae in this position, i.e. battle position and Plutarch refers

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318 Hammond 1977,507.
319 Hammond 1974,81-82. (See Hammond’s analysis for the pass)
320 Hammond 1974,82
321 Ibid,82
323 Arr. An. 1.6.4.
to it with the formation (συνασπισμός) as the basic feature of the Macedonian phalanx. (Flamininus 8.4, Philopoemen 9.4). 324

The Illyrians watched this entire ruse from the Pellion and from the surrounding hills that were occupied, the Veljak, Tren, Trajan, Shpile and Shkoze. The foe was incapable of guessing where Alexander would strike or if he planned to strike. Epaminondas, who was considered as the forerunner of the Macedonian commanders, had a similar result in the flatland south of Mantinea in 362 B.C. In that case, Epaminondas had suddenly attacked with a massed left, which emulated the bow of a ship. Something that is strongly similar with Alexander’s movement here. 325

Markle supports that the maneuvers of the phalanx at this event cannot occur with large lances as long as eighteen feet in length, and that a soldier cannot clash the long heavy pike with success i.e. the sarissa which was held with both hands and the small Macedonian shield hanging around the neck. Moreover, Markle refers very cogently the reference of Arrian to spears and not to sarissae. 326 Bosworth states that, (τοῖς δόρασι δουπῆσαι) Alexander commanded the same order at Gaugamela and it must have been a habitual part of the phalanx in the offence. The small shield was fastened over the shoulder. In the commencement of the battle, it was drawn down the arm so that it could be shaken against the sarissa, while they moved forward. It was likely that they held the weapon fixed with the left hand, while the right handled the shield. 327 On the other hand, Markle refers in his footnotes to Bosworth’s opinion, that “A.B. Bosworth believes that it would be possible to beat with the shield held in the right hand against the sarissa supported by the left hand, but that method is not what is described in the text of Arrian (Anab.1 6.3) nor by Diodorus (17.57.6, 58.3) as happening at Gaugamela. In the former case τοῖς δόρασι and in the latter ταῖς σαρισσαῖς are both clearly instrumental datives; thus, the shields are made to resound by being hit with the spears and lances”. 328

324 Bosworth 1980,70.
325 Hammond 1974, 82.
328 Markle 1978,492 (footnote 46).
Whatever the weapon of the Phalangite’s was, *sarissa* (something that was believed of the majority of the scholars for this ruse\textsuperscript{329}, or they just didn’t think of an alternative weapon) or spear, the ruse was great. About this ruse, Hammond suggests that the drill that the Macedonian large army executed with the phalanx having a front of 100 men and depth of 120 men, if we can assume 12,000 Phalangites,\textsuperscript{330} was feasible only on a broad land of flat ground. The sole region close to the camp and the city was the flatland which was located amid Gorice, i.e. Pellion and Mt. Veljak and to the south-west of that line. So, when Alexander directed the phalanx forward and then to the left, it appeared that he was threatening the Illyrians in Pellion and its area; when he directed it forward and then to the right, he appeared to threaten the enemy on the hillsides of the Mt Veljak, which were closest to the execution of the drill by Macedonians, i.e. the first hills.\textsuperscript{331}

Hammond notes that Arrian described two separate actions of the infantry. The first was the wedge formation of the left phalanx, which had as result the retreat of the enemy from the first hills i.e. the Mt. Veljack on to a higher ground of Mt. Vipiakut. The phalanx then obeyed at the second command which was the shouting and clash of weapons, which created terror to the Taulantians, who ran back to Pellion. The enemy on the southern side had no name, in contrast to the rivals on the northern side that were called *Ταυλάντιοι* (1.6.4.). The original source possibly named the missing enemy and Arrian pretermitted it. We can assume that the Dardanians were the missing rival.\textsuperscript{332}

So, the Taulantians were on the northern hills and the Dardanians (except from those inside Pellion) were on the southern hills. When Alexander finished with the threat at Mt. Veljak of the Dardanians, the Taulantians descended from the northern hills (including the slopes of Gorice) and attacked or were ready to attack the rear of Alexander’s troops. However, that moment the phalanx turned and the war-cry with the clash of arms, a terrifying noise that arose from thousands men at the same time was enough to force the Taulantians to flight.\textsuperscript{333} As Green refers “*this sudden*,


\textsuperscript{330} Hammond 1974,82, Gabriel 2010,69.

\textsuperscript{331} Hammond 1974,82.

\textsuperscript{332} Hammond 1974,82-83.

\textsuperscript{333} Hammond 1974,83.
shattering explosion of sound, especially after the dead stillness which had preceded it, completely unnerved Glaucias tribesmen, who fled back in wild confusion from the foothills to the safety of their fortress.” And as Fuller states “An unexpected and tremendous shout can at times be as effective as a volley of musketry, as happened at the storming of the Alamo during the Texan Rising of 1836”. So, with these rapid steps forward, the main rival fled from the first hills because of the perfect act of the drill and of the sound of the appalling war cry.

Then Alexander saw that a significant hill, from where his army would pass, was occupied by some Taulantians. Immediately, he ordered τοῖς σωματοφύλαξι καὶ τοῖς ἀμφὶ αὐτῶν ἔταξαν, (1.6.5) to take their shields on horseback and attack on the hill. The command was that if the enemy didn’t retreat, half of them were to fight on foot in combination with the cavalry. The attack of these selected troops made the enemies take flight again and to run to the mountains on either side. The aim of Alexander was the Kalaja e Shpelles, it looms over the entrance of the Gryke e Ujkut and on the hill beside which his passage is located. Of course, his troops achieved their mission and the Taulantians retreated again, some to Mt. Trajan and others to Mt Shpile, (ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερα τῶν ὀρῶν). These are the mountains that border the Gryke e Ujkut. All that occurred while the phalanx was following with rapidity. This group of close companions was Alexander’s staff, his personal team that were comprised of high-ranking officers. In the action against the Illyrians, we can calculate their number as 100 or so.

This tactic provoked curiosity for English, due to the utilization of the companions, where half of them fought as foot soldiers. English assumes that Alexander chose to attack the enemy without hindrance. The cavalry would strike the opponent faster in contrast with the infantry units. English concludes that Alexander wanted to remove the rivals from this pass before the Macedonian

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334 Green 2013,133.
335 Fuller 1960,225(footnote 3).
336 Fox 2004,85.
337 Arr. An. 1.6.5-6.
338 Hammond 1974,83.
infantry reached it. So, for this reason he used the cavalry in this unique way, with the goal of destroying the threat immediately.\textsuperscript{340}

When Alexander occupied the hill with his \textit{hetairoi}, he sent the Agrianians and the archers who were 2,000 men, to connect with the companions, while he ordered the \textit{Hypaspists} to cross the river and the Macedonians (i.e. the phalanx.) to follow them. There he gave the smart commands that when his troops were to cross the river, they would extend to the left, so that the phalanx might appear solid the moment they had crossed. Alexander from the occupied hill observed the movements of the Illyrians, who when they saw the Macedonians crossing the river, they rushed down from the mountains with the goal of attacking the Macedonian soldiers and Alexander, who were the last remaining troops, i.e. the rear guard that didn’t crossed the river.\textsuperscript{341}

During this phase we can see that Alexander strengthened his bodyguards and the companions with the archers and Agrianians, while he occupied the Kalaja e Shpelles with his troops. The remaining of the army could advance with safety to the river, where the \textit{Hypaspists} and the phalanx crossed the river and moved left onto the flat ground amid the entrance of the Gryke e Ujkut and Kalaja e Ventrokut. With that action, they maintained the close formation and confronted the enemy, who was on the slopes of Mt. Shpile and Kalaja e Ventrokut, while the force of Alexander was the rear-protector, who hadn’t crossed the river, the Illyrians descended from their hills, (Mt Trajan and Tren) and attacked them.\textsuperscript{342}

Here Arrian presents how Alexander again reacted immediately:

\begin{quote}
Ο δὲ πελαζόντων ἦδη αὐτὸς ἐκθεῖ σὺν τοῖς ἀμφ’ αὐτὸν, καὶ ἢ φάλαγξ, ως διὰ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπιούσα, ἐπηλάλαξεν: οἱ δὲ πολέμιοι πάντων ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἐλαυνόντων ἐγκλίναντες ἐφευγον: καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐπήγαγεν ἀλέξανδρος τοὺς τε ἀγριάνας καὶ τοὺς τοξότας ὑστρῶν ως ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμόν. Καὶ πρῶτος μὲν αὐτὸς φθάσας διαβαίνετο τοῖς τελευταῖοις δὲ ως ἐἶδεν ἐπικεκόμησα τοὺς πολεμίους ἐπιστήσας ἐπὶ τῇ ὀχθῇ τὰς μηχανὰς ἐξακοντίζειν ως πορρωτάτω ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἐκέλευσεν όσα ἀπὸ μηχανῶν ἥξει ἐξακοντίζεται, καὶ τοὺς τοξότας δὲ ἐκ μέσου τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐκτοξεύειν, ἐπεσθάνσας καὶ
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{340}English 2009,31-32  
\textsuperscript{341}Arr. An. 1.6.6-7  
\textsuperscript{342}Hammond 1974,83-84
The main jeopardy was from the attackers of the Mt. Trajan and Mt. Tren who came down from the slopes. Despite this, they still had to cross a trough before they attacked in the Kalaja e Shpelles. Alexander suddenly attacked them when they were close enough i.e. in this trough. We can assume that he used his elite forces again in the identical way as previously intended, namely half on foot and half on horses while the last part of the phalanx that crossed the river yelled the war-cry giving the impression that it would come back to attack. Here Hammond stipulates that the Hypaspists and the rest of the phalanx confronted the enemy at Mt. Shpile and Kalaja e Ventrotuk. Alexander took his archers and Agrianians across the river, while the elite of companions and the bodyguards remained with the aim of retreating without being overwhelmed. Alexander prepared the firing, the archers entered the river and shot over the Kalaja e Shpelles, while the catapults on the river shore shot too. 344

Alexander’s catapults were established along the far shore of the river to provide cover during the retreat. This artillery was with the siege train that was obviously on its way to Pellion, but had not arrived when Alexander was sieging the city. Here English refers in contrast to Ashley and Green that the catapults threw arrows, (Ashley and Green suggest that the catapults threw stones) which were not really effective as anti-personnel weapons, nevertheless they were responsible for the creation of fear in the enemies, as we see according to the movements of the Illyrians, who didn’t venture to came close to the fire range of these weapons. 345 The catapult was a new weapon and maybe the residents of the Balkans had never seen a weapon like this. This is an indication which justified the fear that a weapon like this can create in the rivals. 346 The heavy missile fire of archers in combination with

343 Arr. An. 1.6.7-8.
344 Hammond 1974,84.
345 English 2009,32. (Here maybe English is right, due to the fact that Arrian refers arrows, ὅσα ἀπόμηχανοι βέλη ἔξακοντίζεται.)
346 English 2009,6.
the fire of the catapults repelled the Illyrians and resulted in a completely safe retreat. 347

Sarantis emphasizes that this retreat maneuver, could only be achieved by the Macedonians. Alexander executed a magnificent retreat maneuver while crossing a river, for the first time in universal history and in his life. This maneuver in the military art was named «Retreating maneuver in front of the enemy». In front of an enemy who lurks and waits for a mistake or an omission during the retreat with the aim of benefitting from this and crashing the retreating troops. 348

This brilliant deliberate retreat was a great maneuver of such a procedure that Alexander’s first failure to conquer the city balanced with his success of not losing a man, which was the result of the great leadership of Alexander, the strict discipline of the army and the tactical originality. This was the second time in antiquity where the artillery supported a field operation the first was the defeat of Philip by Onomarchus of Phocis as I mentioned above. 349

The Taulantians under Glaukias who were located on the northern side, i.e. on Kalaja e Ventrokut and Mt Shpile, did not dare to come closer and to charge the phalanx. Alexander had achieved his goal, he occupied the entrance into the Gryke e Ujikut on its northern broader side and he could retreat his troops safely into the basin of Lake Ventrok. The most significant point was that the Illyrians could not follow him, since the Macedonian infantry could resist and hold the narrow passage and the companions could watch the flatland of the Prespa basin. 350

Sarantis refers that Alexander in his whole life as general-king had never used so many maneuvers as here in the events at the battle of Pellion, 351 while Fox adds that in no place was the phalanx more skilled than in the Illyrian expedition of 335 BC against Cleitus and Glaukias. 352 Gabriel claims that nowhere was the Macedonian phalanx more flexible and maneuverable than the events of the Balkan campaign of

347 Ashley 1998,173
349 English 2009, 32 , Ashley 1998,173 ( Other scholars support that this is first recorded appearance of the artillery used in field battle).
350 Hammond 1974,84
351 Sarantis 1983,261
352 Fox 2011,387.
Alexander and he referred to the events of Pellion. Green states that if it was Alexander’s mistake of letting himself be trapped by the rivals, the stratagem that he followed, saved his troops, and adds that “Must stand as one of the most eccentrically brilliant stratagems in the whole history of warfare”. While Dogde says about this maneuver “Never was so curious, so magnificent a ruse employed in war before; never since”.

The choice of Alexander to pass his army through the wolf pass i.e. the Gryke e Ujkut in Albanian language, seems too reckless for an army of 25,000 men, if the rivals knew the plans of Alexander. However, the enemy knew nothing and the fraud of Alexander was his best weapon at this phase. No one could guess how Alexander would act at that formation of his troops. Moreover, we must not forget a fact which Arrian omits to refer. The transfer of the baggage-train was abandoned in the Macedonian camp. It was not present during the drills and the maneuvers of the Macedonian phalanx. If the Macedonian army carried the supplies with them, the enemy would have realized Alexander’s plan. Furthermore, the supplies weren’t at the crossing of the river either. All the rapidity of the maneuvers and the changes of front by the troops of Alexander would not be feasible if a baggage train related to the phalanx. On the other hand, the catapults and their projectiles were the military supplies that refer by Arrian, and it was possible that they transferred alongside or in the phalanx. In conclusion, Alexander had no objective to retreat to Lyncus, but to defeat his enemies. This action is reminiscent of the famous words of the young king at Gaugamela: “Defeated we no longer have the need of baggage animals, victorious we shall have both ours and of the enemy’s” (Polyan. IV.3.6, Plut. Alex. 32.3-4, Curt.4.15.7).

After his successive withdrawal, Alexander was informed that the rival forces were badly positioned in their base without the appropriate protective measures, i.e. no garrisons, palisade and ditch, and their line unduly elongated. They foolishly
believed that Alexander had retreated because he was panicked and the Illyrians became careless, and let their guard down. Alexander was prepared to punish them and to give them a lesson. After three days, at night, he crossed the river unnoticed, with his Hypaspists, Agrianians and the battalions of Perdiccas and Coenus while the rest of the army had the command to follow. When Alexander judged that he had the appropriate time to strike, without waiting for the army to concentrate, he gave his command to Agrianians and archers to attack. Their onslaught was unexpected and they struck the enemy line at one end, where their own onslaught in deep formation at its strongest was likely to strike the weakest point of the enemy. Many were killed in their beds, and many were killed immediately. Furthermore, many were captured as hostages and many were caught during their flight and many were killed during the retreat. Alexander’s cavalry pursued the troops of Glaukias until the mountains of Taulantians and some of them were saved without their weapons. Cleitus sought refuge into the Pellion and then he set fire to the city and fled to Glaukias and his Taulantians.\textsuperscript{360}

The battalions of Perdiccas and Coenus were recruited from Upper Macedonia.\textsuperscript{361} Coenus was the son of Polemocrates and his battalion first appeared in this event at Pellion. He may have had the generalship already from the late years of Philip’s reign. Perdiccas was the son of Orontes, a member of royal hypaspists at the time of the assassination of Philip October 336. In the events of Pellion, Perdiccas commanded the \textit{taxis} of Orestians and Lyncestians.\textsuperscript{362}

We must mention that Arrian doesn’t refer exactly what occurred. By that I mean, did the forces that were in Pellion, come out of the city? From the source, we can understand that there were no more troops inside the town and that they were all unprotected in the countryside because of their illusion of a fake victory. Alexander predicted that the barbarians would believe that he left from the battlefield. So, he retreated for some miles and offered three days to the Illyrians, with the goal of retrieving their confidence. Soon he had been proven justly by the good news, that the Illyrians had no protection. The overconfidence and the lack of

\textsuperscript{360}Arr.An. 1.6.9-11.
\textsuperscript{361}Bosworth 1980,73.
\textsuperscript{362}Heckel 2006,91,197.
discipline of the foe proved to be the best allies of Alexander. From this bloodshed event, we realize that the Taulantians and the Dardanians had remained in their initial location i.e. near the Pellion in contrast with Alexander, who had retreated to some distance. We have reached this conclusion since the enemy thought that Alexander had withdrawn his army in panic and because of the information Alexander had on the position of his rivals. The abandonment of his supplies at the initial Macedonian camp and the pause of every hostility for three days, was the perfect trick to convince the Illyrians that Alexander had gone.

So here, Hammond suggests that Alexander had retreated into the northern part of the Ventrok basin, while the Illyrians wrongly thought that he was on the way somewhere towards Upper Macedonia. However, Alexander’s plan was not over, he came back in the night concealed by darkness. His forces used the broader side of the Gryke e Ujkut and crossed the river from the right shore to the left shore. So, Alexander’s onslaught was on the eastern end of the rival line which was in the flatland south and west of the Gryke e Ujkut. The Taulantians and the Dardanians had encamped the night in the battle order which they kept during the day. That means that the Taulantians were on the left and the Dardanians on the right facing the Gryke e Ujkut. Alexander attacked immediately with Agrianians and archers without waiting for the rest of the army, if he had waited he would have lost his advantage of a surprise attack and the onslaught wouldn’t be so powerful. Alexander got in through the end of the Dardanian line and turned right to roll up the line with the result of driving Cleitus into the Pellion.

The Taulantians abandoned the battlefield and Alexander’s pursuit occurred through the flatlands of Poloske and through the flatlands of Korçë and presumably as far as Elbasan. The pursuit of the cavalry which lasted for some days over a large distance of 95 kilometers, secured the total victory of Alexander and harks back

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363 Green 2013, 134.
364 Hammond 1974, 85, 87.
365 Hammond 1974, 85.
366 Hammond 1974, 85-86.
367 English 2009, 33.
368 Hammond 1974, 85-86.
369 Hammond 1974, 86.
to the decisive victory and pursuit of Philip in 358 BC. One of the major abilities of the cavalry was to destroy the army of enemy via a terrific pursuit. These pursuits which were unknown to the south Hellenes, were maybe a creation of Philip in his Balkan wars. Here at the pursuit of the Illyrians by Alexander, the major aim was to conquer the cavalrymen, because they were the elite in the kingdoms of Dardania and Taulantia. As Philip desired to subjugate the Illyrian kings by his exerting his personal effort, thus Alexander acted in the same way here in Illyria and later to Asia.

Upon his return, Alexander had gained every supply that he had left in the camp and he had captured great booty. He might have actualized a siege to Pellion, but the terrible news from Thebes reached him, declaring the unrest of the Thebans. Alexander marched at speed while Cleitus burnt Pellion and rejoined with Glaukias in the region of Tirana. Alexander couldn’t complete the campaign because of the unrest in Thebes and the general turmoil in south Hellas. Time was limited and he couldn’t force the Illyrians kings to enter a formal allegiance. However, the Illyrians lost completely and there was no hope for new wars. Glaukias surrendered, and in this way he retained his throne, while Cleitus later made peace with Alexander, albeit we know nothing about it. (Image 9)

As Bosworth correctly refers, it was the Illyrians who were unconcerned about the defensive measures which urged Alexander to his surprise night charge and to destroy the Illyrian soldiery. The Illyrians with their apathy, permitted Alexander to be victorious and to avoid the initial advantage that the Illyrians had i.e. their position. Bosworth continues, if the Illyrians stayed under arms in caution until the news of Thebes arrived, they would had put Alexander in a very difficult position and would have created an extremely difficult dilemma. If he had abandoned the case in Thebes, he would probably have had a vast war in southern Hellas. On the other hand, if he had retreated to deal with Thebes, the Illyrians would have stayed aggressive and active in their position, keen to threaten his kingdom. All in all, he

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370 Hammond 1989,54.
371 Hammond 1978, 138-139; also see: Gabriel 2010,81.
372 Hammond 1974,86.
374 Hammond 1989,54.
was saved by an affair of a few days. The Illyrians were defeated because of their negligence, while a little more effort towards a defensive organization would have written the story of Alexander in other way.\textsuperscript{375}

English interprets the campaign of Pellion as being a great example for analyzing the abilities of Alexander in the procedure of siege craft. In this case, we can see many mistakes according to his thinking. To begin with, English supports that Alexander’s error was that he did not have enough supplies which could help him to actualize a strong siege. Of course, the situation got harder when he ended up being surrounded by Dardanians and Taulantians, something that was also characterized by Ashley as a mistake.\textsuperscript{376} An interesting point is that Alexander learned from his mistakes, we see later in Hydaspes, where he was aware of the advancing reinforcements and forces a battle before they arrive, in contrast with Pellion where he didn’t seem to have such cognizance. This was a result of a significant lack of scouts, but it can be a declaration that the wooded and mountainous land was too difficult a terrain, and had as a result that the coming powers weren’t perceived by the scouts. Maybe the two hypotheses are responsible for this situation.\textsuperscript{377} English continues, that the expedition of Philotas who was responsible for obtaining food was too hazard and risky. If it was Alexander’s plan to retreat, then he could act without waiting by the ruse that he chose and foraging was not necessary. This movement declares that Alexander had as his goal to continue the siege towards the city although he was surrounded. However, except for these mistakes, English admits the brilliance of the maneuvers and of the retreat of some days from the region by Alexander, which offered him the victory.\textsuperscript{378}

After Alexander’s successful campaign, he received Illyrian mercenaries to Asia although these may have been dispatched later. These troops reinforced Alexander’s soldiery but also acted as hostages for the good attitude of their people. Moreover, Alexander gathered around him Illyrian forces through that action that in any other case would not be so quiet, while Alexander was in the East. From Curtius, we are informed that Alexander received reinforcements from Antipater which were Illyrian

\textsuperscript{375}Bosworth 1982,80-81.
\textsuperscript{376} English 2009,33; see also: Ashley 1998,174.
\textsuperscript{377} English 2009,33-34
\textsuperscript{378} English 2009,33-34.
troops. Antipater as regent was responsible for safeguarding the interests of the king at the Illyria border, as long as Alexander would be in Asia\textsuperscript{379}. This period was spectacularly peaceful for Illyria and Epirus, even though during the first half of the 320s, Hellas and its neighbors suffered from a famine. Diodorus informs us about some ambassadors who came to Alexander and congratulated him for his achievements, just before his end. Maybe this was a sign of their conformity.\textsuperscript{380}

\textsuperscript{379} Greenwalt 2010, 295; Diod 17.17.4, Curt. 4.13.31, Curtius 6.6.35 also see: Sarantis 1977, 260.
\textsuperscript{380} Greenwalt 2010, 295, Diod.17.113.2.
b. Formidable Illyrians?
The events of Pellion from another facet.

So, why did the Dardanians and Taulantians fail? Or even better; why did Alexander succeed? If we take a closer glance to Arrian, we can shed light in this case. In contrast, to many scholars, I would not justify the defeat of Illyrians because of the greatness of Alexander. Instead, I strongly believe that Alexander succeeded in this lunatic mission because of the incapability of Illyrians to face a professional army, which formed in array for battle. Sarantis correctly argues that the Illyrians in the events of Pellion, more specifically during the first battle, when they sacrificed the youths and animals, i.e. the Dardanians, were not well equipped with defensive armor and were incapable of fighting a battle in array. This was the reason why they retreated to town.\footnote{Sarantis 1983,255.}

If we want to find some authoritative conclusions we must go deeper into the war history of Illyrians and Macedonians. The first contacts of these two people came from the passage of Polyænus, who inform us that the Macedonians at the time that Argœus was the king, with a ruse, they used the women to appear as army and forced Taulantians to flight from the battlefield. The Macedonians gained victory without giving a fight.\footnote{Polyan.4.1.} The next hostile incident occurred, during the kingship of an infant, Aeropus. The Macedonians had been used to the hostilities with Thracians and Illyrians and they had achieved a reputation for their military action. However, the son of Philip I, Aeropus, was still a baby and this situation led the Illyrians to attack the Macedonian realm. The Macedonians brought the infant in the front lines during the battle and they managed to defeat the rivals. The presence of the young king offered confidence in Macedonian troops, who believed that the fortune supported them.\footnote{Justin 7.2.}

Although Justin states that the Macedonians had gained a reputation for war against these tribes, the next incident indicates that the troops of Perdiccas II were
not the most capable forces. However, according to the passages of Polyaeenus and Justin, we keep a reservation due to the fact that these two passages are doubtful as to their historicity, albeit they are great paradigms for the rival relationship between these two people, while there is no reason to doubt that they express a truth that, from the early times Macedonia was threatened by Illyrian raids.\textsuperscript{384}

In 424 BC during the Peloponnesian war, Brasidas oversaw an expedition to the north. Meanwhile, Perdiccas II ensured a portion of the costs that was related to Brasida’s campaign to confirm him as an ally in the war against Arrhabaeus of Lyncus, whom Perdiccas at the time desired to subject him under his sway. Although he had his first failures, in the end Perdiccas succeeds in gaining Brasidas’ help in the war against Arrhabaeus because Brasidas too, needed Perdiccas as an ally in these regions, as enemy of the Athenians. This campaign was successful in the beginning, as the armies of Perdiccas and Brasidas defeated the forces of Arrhabaeus, but their luck changed when the Illyrians mercenaries that had been employed by Perdiccas, betrayed him and supported the Lyncestian forces. In front of the danger of the Illyrian threat, the troops of Perdiccas abandoned the mission and retreated, leaving the south Hellenes alone against the combined forces of Arrhabaeus and of Illyrians.\textsuperscript{385}

In fact, the speech of Brasidas, offers some light to us in the case of the Illyrian military ability. The Spartan general pointed out that the Illyrians had large forces, their battle cry were intolerable and the idle brandishing of their weapon had a similar terror effect. But in fact, these men in close combat were not the threat that they seem to be. Because if their rivals, remained in their positions, the Illyrians who don’t have a regular order, would not hesitate to retreat, as in their customs, the retreat had the same honor as staying in the battlefield. So, their courage is not always a credible fact. However, we must not forget that, until the bad news arrived which related to the betrayal of the Illyrians, Brasidas was prepared to fight with these men at his side, which later in his speech he accused.\textsuperscript{386}

\textsuperscript{384}Greenwalt 2010,281.
\textsuperscript{385}Greenwalt 2010, 282-283, Thuc. 4.82.3-83.1, 4.83.2-6,4.124-128.
\textsuperscript{386}Wallace 1998,216,Thuc.4.126.3-6.
In the end, the Spartan battalion achieved to withdraw with safety and to move away from the Illyrian threat because of their superior organization, training and strict docility. Thucydides here presented that the Illyrians can shock their rivals but in fact he demoted their value against a professional and capable opponent as the troops of Brasidas, in contrast with the troops of Perdiccas who panicked and ran. Nonetheless, we must not forget that the presence of the Illyrians in this mission was not a cause for conquest or of loyalty, but a goal for profit.  

In the subsequent years, Archelaus tried to create a stronger Macedonia but his death provoked chaos in the kingdom and four rulers rose and fell in seven years (399-393). Amyntas III who succeeded of dying from naturals causes, abandoned his kingdom twice because of two Illyrians invasions.  

Of course, with so turmoil in Macedonia, after the evanescent kings, it was logical that the Illyrians would dominate in the war, if we judge from the paradigm of Aeropus on how significant the king was for the Macedonian people.

In the short reign of Alexander II, we know that he offered a sum of money and his brother Philip II as hostage to the Illyrians for gaining the peace. Afterwards, we have the death of Perdiccas III at 359 BC, where 4.000 Macedonians with their king died on the battlefield against Bardylis an Illyrian chieftain of Dardanians. As we know for Philip II, he created an army, trained his troops and prepared them for fighting. Gabriel aptly refers that in contrast with the southern Hellenes, who had established a capable hoplite infantry, the Macedonians had never created infantry units in the same model for infantry battle. In fact, the infantry Macedonians units were close to untrained peasants, who were hastily gathered for the occasion, with poor armor that was suitable for agriculture work. The significant military unit of the Macedonians constituted the horsemen who belonged to the elite class, they had theirs horses and their own equipment and fought as individuals. Alexander II may have made an effort of creating a hoplite army that would be composed of hundred troops, but they would probably perish in the catastrophe of 359 B.C., while

387Greenwalt 2010,283.  
389Just.7.5.1, Greenwalt 2010,287, Roisman 2010,161.  
390Diod 16.2.4-5, Polyan.4.10.1  
391Diod. 16.3.1-.3.3, Polyan. 4.2.10.
Macedonia remained with its inefficient peasant infantry unit. Moreover, as Greenwalt states, Illyrians raid Macedonia, since Macedonia was weaker than most poleis and because it was closer to the Illyrian terrain in contrast to most poleis (apart from cities such as Epidamnus and Apollonia). These may be the reasons and not due to any special enmity. These data indicate that the Macedonians were not capable troops, due to the fact that may had experience, and the memory of fear for the Illyrians, albeit they did not have some serious training program which would develop their fighting skills. Diodorus informs us that the first victims of the brand new Macedonian army were the Paeonians, who Philip defeated and made them subjects to Macedonian authority. Then, he attacked the Illyrians and defeated Bardylis in a great battle.

An interesting passage that will enlighten us about this though is from the speech of Alexander the Great at Opis (324).

This passage is the ultimate evidence that shows us that the Macedonians did not have great abilities in fighting such as their rivals i.e. Illyrians, who were used to tribal wars. Alexander supports that Philip made the Macedonians capable of fighting. (άξιομάχους καταστήσας)

Greenwalt points out that Philip, after about 18 months of plotting, training and achieving his aims, he directed his army against Bardylis. Being a martial artist for

393 Greenwalt 2010,282
394 Diod. 16.4.2-4.7.
395 Arr.An. 7.9.2.
396 Greenwalt 2010,290.
several years, I know that it is truly difficult to learn to defend yourself, let alone to learn to act and fight in a formation as the phalanx where you have to operate and fight as a group, as one unit. The action of fighting demands time, intensive practice, patience and perseverance. There is no short path and these characteristics remain the same no matter how many years pass. Polyaeus informs us that Philip accustomed the Macedonians to constant exercise before they went to war. Here we see that Philip very soon, put his army out to the field by defeating Paeonians and then the Illyrians. This is a strong indication that the Macedonians and the other tribes were used to tribal wars and not in professional conflicts where hoplites phalanx attended (e.g. battle of Chaeronea 338 BC). By that I mean, that when the Macedonians received special training in war, immediately they surpassed their enemies i.e. the Thracians, Paeonians and Illyrians. The Macedonian soldiery was created during the years of the crisis and Philip II fabricated its structure, arms and tactics for dealing with the crisis.

Moreover, the fact that in only 18 months Philip managed to dominate the Paeonians and Illyrians, reinforces the view that the Illyrians and Paeonians were not so formidable enemies. In a short period of several months, no army can be transformed into a great force like this. Unless the enemy is not so great. Although we have the testimony of Strabo who supports that, from the Illyrians the strongest was the Autariate, Ardiaei and Dardanians. Nevertheless, we must not infer that these forces were so effective in battle against every opponent. We must have in our mind that they were the strongest among the Illyrians.

About the passage of Diodorus 16.3 which informs us about the creation of the new Macedonian phalanx, many scholars agree that Diodorus here had compressed an action which lasted for years. Hammond refers that the new formation needed constant practice for training the new weapon and the new order. He supports that the troops that Philip had received from his brother Perdiccas, were trained in these new military formations since 364 BC. These troops were not in the catastrophe of

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397 Polyan.4.2.10.
398 Gabriel 2010,61.
399 Strabo 7.5.6.
400 Fox 2011,341.
359 BC. I believe that Hammond is correct, but my doubt is about the other army that needed to learn how to fight in the new phalanx of Philip. For the sake of convenience, we can assume that from that period i.e. 359 the Macedonians were trained in sarissa, although it is known that many scholars don’t accept this argument.

It is known that when Philip attained the leadership of Macedonia, the state was in vast danger on each side from external threats, so there was the necessity for an army that could immediately resist. In this way, Philip created the Macedonian phalanx. Gabriel believes that the Macedonian phalanx was a military instrument that was created in a short period with the aim to cover the pressing necessities of the kingdom. Fox believes, that Philip could have made the new phalanx capable within months. He supports this, because in 2003 he watched the training of a large infantry-army in the use of sarissa, without these men having any experience. They practiced in the Moroccan desert and for this they employed Moroccan army-members and other recruits. Fox said that: “Within five weeks, units of 256 warriors each had blended into a workable sarissa-army, if only for (complex) film-maneuvers and lifelike combat.” He concludes that, Philip’s training was much more demanding, harder and constant than Oliver Stone’ sex-marine commanders. Thus, Philip could have created a capable phalanx within months. If this is true, then we can add with reasonable safety that the Illyrians were defeated by an army that was created in a few months, when this new army clashed with Illyrians had the experience of one year and few months.

Of course, the Illyrians were a formidable enemy, but they were more specialized in pillaging and their invasions were not the result of some notorious enmity against the Macedonians but they had the main objective of making a profit. So, they were not forces who made a conquest, but they attacked for spoils. As Curtius refers, the Illyrians and Thracians were people accustomed to living by rapine. Only Bardylis was a great paradigm of the Illyrian military action, with Bardylis, we saw a

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401 Hammond 2007,63.
403 Fox 2015,341.
404 Greenwalt 2010, 279-295.
405 Curt. 3.10.9.
series of calamities in Macedonia and Epirus. As Hammond refers this man was the precursor of Philip II in the establishment of a strong monarchy.\textsuperscript{406}

Diodorus informs us, that Dionysius the tyrant of the Syracusans allied with Illyrians and planned to put Alcetas who was in exile on the Epirote throne. He sent two thousand troops to reinforce the Illyrians and 500 Hellenic type panoplies which the Illyrians offered to their stronger troops. In the battle that followed, 15,000 Mollosians perished. The total disaster was curbed by the Spartans who sent aid to the hapless Epirotes. This massacre occurred in 385/4.\textsuperscript{407} This occasion and the incident of Perdiccas’ death with 4,000 Macedonians, illustrates that the Illyrians were a formidable foe to people with no special war training. However, when the opponent of the Illyrians was capable and worthy, they had no advantage in fighting, as we see from Philip’s and Alexander’s military actions and the minimal contacts of the Spartans and Illyrians. As Hammond states, in comparison with Alexander’s forces, the Dardanians and Taulantians were amateur, although the Dardanians had killed 4000 Macedonians in 359 BC.\textsuperscript{408} What was the difference? The Macedonians of Perdiccas III were not the same Macedonians of Philip II and his son Alexander. Moreover, as Dogde, Sarantis and Droysen attested to the war at Pellion, these movements of Alexander’s troops could only be executed by the Macedonians,\textsuperscript{409} i.e. the well-trained army.

Hammond points out that the infantry of the Macedonians was superior from the infantry forces of Cleitus and Glaukias but only in the plain, and he adds that the forces of Illyrians were larger and were first-class troops.\textsuperscript{410} Sarantis refers that the troops of Cleitus, although they had not had the coordinate formation of the Macedonian army, they were rough warriors with great endurance, while they were specialists in irregular mountainous war. He concludes that the war history of the Macedonians with Illyrians proved the Illyrians as a being a hard enemy.\textsuperscript{411} The archetypal Illyrian combatant was undisciplined and light armed while fought as an

individual, with the aim of displaying military bravery. Ashley, refers that the Illyrian infantry preferred to occupy an impressive wooded hill that offered to them some advantages against a variety of troops. Albeit here we saw that the Illyrians didn’t manage to confront Alexander on the hills, when Alexander tried to secure his foraging mission. In fact, for me the inability of Illyrians to follow a tactic or a well-organized strategy is an indication of their low military level. They were capable in mountainous war, but they achieved nothing with the occupation of hills to Pellion. The greatest evidence is that they could easily run for their lives, since it was not a shame. Moreover, we have to mention that, the Illyrian social life based on the social concept of a tribe, a triumphant tribe such as the Ardiaei reduced some of its neighbors to bondage. Other tribes were forced by the Ardiaei to pay tribute. Furthermore the Dardanians too, had large number of slaves who fought in the wars under the leadership of Dardanians. This indicate that a part of the large Dardanian army was composed by slaves, who of course were not equal to the professional Macedonian forces.

We can add with some safety, that the Illyrians were a hard rival for the Macedonians before Philip II, after the contribution of this great king to the military affairs, the Illyrians were not equals to the Macedonian army. The Macedonian soldiery was superior in comparison to every force in the central or eastern Mediterranean at that era. They had been trained under Philip II and the Macedonian armory, defensive and offensive was not equal to the light armed Balkan tribes. These tribes were swarm of warriors who fought as individuals, reminding one of the Homeric era. Because of their low discipline they had little staying forces, while at the first difficulty they retreated in disarray. After a defeat, it was almost impossible for them to concentrate again for further military action.

In conclusion, the success of Alexander against the Illyrians was due to his brilliance, military commandership and of course, courage. He fought in the first lines and he was injured by a stone which was thrown to his head and he received a

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412 Ashley 1998,18
413 Ibid, 18
414 Ibid, 18
416 Ashley 1998,167,175.
blow in the neck by a club.\textsuperscript{417} However, the inability of the Dardanians and Taulantians to confront a highly trained army was the main reason for his accomplishment. The Illyrians had trapped Alexander in a desperate position with no supplies, they had the advantage of the hills, the fortified city, and finally they had larger forces. Nevertheless, in every operation and battle they failed and retreated many times even without giving a single fight. As already mentioned above, Alexander had some serious problems as well and managed to escape because the Illyrians didn’t offer him a dignified battle as the Triballians had done. In fact, as Green states during these first campaigns of Alexander, as it proven the psychological exploitation of tribal contumacy was one of the strongest weapons of king.\textsuperscript{418} Something that worked against the Getae and, of course, the Illyrians.

The Thracians were inferior too, but the reason I’m focusing on the Illyrians is because they had the golden opportunity to offer a lethal strike to Alexander, in contrast with the other rivals in the Thraco-Illyrian campaign, and in a totally remarkable way, they failed. In fact, all this can be proven through the actions of Alexander in the campaign of 335 BC. Firstly, he called the Celts \textit{ἀλαζόνες} because they were not afraid of him, secondly the crossing of Danube with the aim to destroy the morale of the people of Peuce, thirdly the fact that he started a blockade of a town although Glaukias was on his way to Pellion, fourth the fact that English refer that at the first battle Cleitus retreated into the town immediately, an indication of his low confidence about his troops, and finally that when Alexander was trapped, he kept his plan for victory instead of retreat, all these data indicate the risky and brave character of Alexander, but they also indicate that Alexander underestimated his opponent’s military value and knew very well the superiority of Macedonians. This knowledge, i.e. of the military superiority was a result, of his father’s expansions and from his own military experiences and of course because the Macedonian army had prevailed in Chaeronea, which was a professional hoplite clash, let alone here in conflicts with undisciplined tribes.

\textsuperscript{417}Hammond 1974, 87, Droysen 2012, 86.
\textsuperscript{418}Green 2013, 134.
Chapter IV

Logistics of the campaign.

Φιλώταν δὲ ἀναλαβόντα τῶν ἵππων ὅσους ἐς προφυλακὴν καὶ τὰ υποζύγια τά ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἐς ἑπιστημόν ἐπεμεπ. (Arr. An. 1.5.9)


The logistics of the Macedonian army is not part of the most common studies for Alexander, while little evidence can support the representation of this system. As far as the Balkan campaign of 335 B.C. is concerned, only a small passage with no significant details is offered by Arrian to us. So, here my task is to attempt to consider how Alexander would have acted in this field.

It is true that the base of strategy and tactics is the replenishment. It is obvious that without any broad supply system, Alexander would have failed to accomplish his lightning marches or to achieve to cross desert and hard terrains, something that was actualized in the later years in the East. It is unanimously accepted that Alexander was a great commander, and the traditional view indicates that one factor for successive leadership is an advanced intelligence and communication system. However, there is little evidence about the communication system of Alexander. This occurred because of the minor interest the people showed who wrote for Alexander, or on the transportation of the historical knowledge a part of it, change or lost. As we know Alexander was cognizant of the magnitude of military intelligence and the significance of having sufficient food for his troops. It is known how important the military intelligence was, especially for the logistics of the Macedonian army, due to the fact that intelligence was necessary for an efficient

419 Fuller 1960,52-53
420 Borza 1977,295.
422 Borza 1977,297.
423 Engels 1978,2.
logistic system as had been analyzed in the work of Engels "Alexander’s intelligence system".\textsuperscript{424}

It was very crucial for every ancient commander to take care of the logistics. Some errors to the logistics calculation, would lead to a huge calamity that would provoke more casualties than the most frightening battle.\textsuperscript{425} Hence, it was important, either to establish magazines of provisions beforehand or to have a supporting fleet whether it could occur. Only a professional logistic system could support the insurance of provisions for the long marches. It was significant for the general to know the route perfectly so that the army would follow, and that was a result of the intelligence. To create magazines, advanced groups who must have secured some alliances or to arrange for the local populations to provide the army with efficient supplies. Furthermore, some protection system must have been responsible for the provisions until the main force arrived. Communications was a significant part of these situations since the army of Alexander was vast and it could survive only via professional logistical action, of which communications, local and long distance are an essential characteristic.\textsuperscript{426}

Alexander from his early life, showed his interest for the interior affairs of Persia, when he asked and impressed the Persian envoys, who saw a young boy asking them about the roads and the military force of the Persian Empire.\textsuperscript{427} Although this incident is doubtful as to its historicity, we can support that this fact illustrates the types of questions that the Macedonian court would ask the Persian authorities.\textsuperscript{428} Moreover, it can relate to logistics affairs. The roads, as it is logical have always been a part of logistic plans.

Moreover, Vitruvius presents us with an Alexander, who fully understands the difficulties of supplementation of cities (or armies which are moving cities) when they are far away from tillable land. As a general characteristic, according to Engels

\textsuperscript{424} Engels 1980,327-340.  
\textsuperscript{425} Ashley 1998,82.  
\textsuperscript{426} Borza 1977,301-302.  
\textsuperscript{427} Plut. Alex. 5.1 , Hamilton 1965,118.  
\textsuperscript{428} Engels 1980,329.
we can add that the successfulness of Alexander’s campaign is a result of his fastidious concern about the provisioning of his troops.\textsuperscript{429}

As expected, every chapter of Alexander’s military affair we research, we must first see Philip’s contribution to that field. The army that Philip left to his young son was an advanced and renewed soldiery. It was the most efficient force in Europe or Asia. The new heir of the throne, cared to maintain the veterans of his father, the obedient measures and the logistic system that was in use during the reign of Philip.\textsuperscript{430} Some authorities agree that Philip invented the first logistic system for the armies in Hellenic warfare, setting the standard for the future soldieries in the West.\textsuperscript{431} So, in the Balkan campaign as it is logical we see the logistic model of Philip II.

In order to gain a better understanding of the Macedonian logistic system that Philip established, we must compare it with the logistic system of the other Hellenes. Hellenic armies were used to march from their cities for short distances, they fought with the enemy and then they return to their cities, where the soldiers demobilized until the next emergency.\textsuperscript{432} In fact, Hellenic armies had limited logistic efficiency, while they couldn’t retain their armies in the field for a long time or to march for long routes.\textsuperscript{433}

Why is that? The majority of Hellenic armies used a servant for each hoplite and the Spartans had even seven servants. Arms and panoply were carried by the servants or baggage animals and not by the warriors. In fact, the existence of a lot of followers, as slaves, women, sutlers and other hangers-on, had as a result that sometimes the number of followers with no fighting ability, were larger than the number of warriors. The usage of many attendants and valets would increase the amount of supplies and could not offer anything to the fighting capability of the army. This impractical policy had as a result that these armies couldn’t have a great range for their campaigns far away from the fatherland, because they would face logistic problems. The more provisions that were consumed, the shorter expedition

\textsuperscript{429} Engels 1978, 2-3.
\textsuperscript{430} Engels 1978, 12.
\textsuperscript{431} Karunanithy 2013, 172.
\textsuperscript{432} Gabriel 2010, 85.
\textsuperscript{433} Ibid, 85.
range of the soldiery. Moreover, the utilization of oxcarts and wagons rendered their armies slower. Without a proper and well organized logistic system, the Hellenic armies were unable to support a field operation for long routes, which resulted in the army becoming inefficient in a strategic war.\textsuperscript{434}

On the other hand, Philip saw the situation of logistics in a different way and for sure his brilliance is evident as very soon he realized the value of an efficient replenishment system. Philip created a logistic system that could reinforce the army for long distances over long periods.\textsuperscript{435} I would start with the evidence of the ancient sources and later I will proceed with their analysis.

Frontinus inform us, that Philip forbade anyone to use a cart and that only one servant was allowed per one horseman, while on the infantry he allowed for every ten men, only one servant who was ordered to carry the mills and ropes. When the army marched in the summer quarter, Philip commanded that each soldier must carry his flour for a month.\textsuperscript{436} Polyaeus refers, that Philip accustomed the Macedonians to continuing exercise before wars. The Macedonians often marched 300 stadia with their arms, panoply, food and utensils.\textsuperscript{437}

Firstly, why did Philip forbid carts? Philip’s early conflicts were fought in the Upper Macedonia, Illyria, Thrace and Paeonia. All these regions are mountainous enough with abrupt paths, expeditious streams and several places where his army could fall on a destructive ambuscade. So, carts wouldn’t be valuable in these lands.\textsuperscript{438} A horse with a breast band is not useful for heavy cargos. However, a horse collar permits these animals to be utilized effectively as draft animals, a task that only oxen would do.\textsuperscript{439} The population of Macedonia was poor and scattered, it didn’t have the ability to afford a panoply along the Hellenic standards, let alone if the state had to recruit the few oxen of the poor Macedonia, few Macedonians owned oxen, horses or mules, and it wouldn’t be easy for the villagers to lose their animals for a military expedition, the result of which would be catastrophic for the

\textsuperscript{435} Gabriel 2010,85.
\textsuperscript{436} Front. 4.1.6.
\textsuperscript{437} Polyaeus.4.2.10.
\textsuperscript{438} Gabriel 2010,85.; also see : Engels 1978,22-23.
\textsuperscript{439} Ibid,85.
finance of the village farmers.\textsuperscript{440} We can generally add, that the Macedonians didn’t have the opportunity to dispose of a vast number of animals.\textsuperscript{441}

Engels supports that Ox carts were never utilized by Alexander, because oxen can only attain a velocity of 2 mph and their hooves are not suitable for traveling many kilometers. Oxen are very slow animals and are frequently incapable of traveling more than seven or eight miles per day before becoming exhausted. Their stamina is less than that of a horse or mule. They can work only for five hours in contrast with the mules or horses, which can work for eight hours per day. Therefore, the ox carts could not attain the demanding velocity, which would help them to conform to an army’s daily marches, some for fifteen miles per day. One more reason for the confined utilization of carts by Philip and his son was the ineffective throat and girth harness used for horses and mules at the ancient times. The throat harness was put over the animal’s windpipe, and the harder it tugged, the more it suffered from choking. The weight that could be pulled was so little that it can be compared to a current shoulder harness. Moreover, they could break down, and their velocity would be reduced in rough and hilly country because they would have to pull harder, and as a result would choke themselves. Even more they were slower as I mention and they frequently demanded special routes because these animals were not able to travel the same trail as the pack animals.\textsuperscript{442}

So, according to this logic, the commanders in antiquity believed that the utilization of carts would reduce the velocity and the motility of the army and it would reinforce the occupation of overweight baggage by soldiers.\textsuperscript{443} A horse could easily transfer 200-250 pounds of load when it was equipped with panniers. An ox can transfer 1000 pounds of load a day, albeit five horses can transfer the same cargo for thirty-two miles a day at twice the velocity, with half of food.\textsuperscript{444} Hence, Philip replaced ox carts with horses and mules, which were used as pack animals.\textsuperscript{445} As we mention, it has been supporting that Philip created an army with different logistic organization in contrast with contemporary Hellenes and Persians, who had a

\textsuperscript{441}Engels 1978,19.
\textsuperscript{442}Engels 1978,15-16,Gabriel 2010,85.
\textsuperscript{443}Engels 1978,16.
\textsuperscript{444}Gabriel 2010,85 ( Engel estimates 200 lb for the horse or mule p.14).
\textsuperscript{445}Engels 1978,14,Gabriel 2010, 85 , Karunanithy 2013 ,173.
large logistic tails to follow the fighting force, with a result to make these armies slower and more vulnerable. 446

On the other hand, Ferril supports that in the field of logistics, a field that Hellenes didn’t develop, Philip followed the ancient near Eastern system and used it to his soldiery. 447 The utilization of few animals and carts for the practical needs by the Macedonian army was a practice that Persians already used. Ferril observes an initiation of Philip and Alexander to the logistical system of Cyrus the younger. 448 It is true that the Persians first utilized the horse as a pack animal for the logistic column, however Philip was the first Western general, who realized the valuable of utilizing horses as pack animals. 449 Concerning other animals, Engels refer that donkeys, oxen and ox carts were not used, in contrast with Karunanithy who states that donkeys and asses were also utilized depending on what was available. The later added the camel (332) and is out of my concern. 450

Now let’s research the statement of Polyaenus and Frontinus about the soldiers and the attendants. In Philip’s and Alexander’s armies, the soldiers were responsible for carrying their arms, panoply, utensils, and some supplies while they marched, compared to the other Hellenic and Persian armies who used servants or carts to carry those objects. In addition, Philip relieved his logistics further by decreasing the number of attendants and by prohibiting wives, women and other civilian personnel to follow the soldiery, a custom that Alexander retained until the army turned inland away from the Mediterranean towards Mesopotamia. 451 A large crowd of people with no fighting skills would be a disadvantage in the difficult terrains of the Balkans, i.e. Thrace, Paeonia, Illyria. It would slow the army and it would make it vulnerable when it crossed mountain paths. 452 It is possible that Philip too knew the actions of Xenophon, if we judge from the crossing of Danube River where Alexander applied a

447 Ferril 1988,183 ( For this thought follow the arguments of Ferril p.183-185).
448 Ferril 1988,183-185.
452 Engels 1978,23.
crossing river tactic of Xenophon. It is plausible that Philip, decreased the number of
attendants and animals imitating Xenophon.  

Gabriel suggests that a Macedonian army of 10000 troops would have 1600 attendants to carry food and equipment. These attendants could help to undertake many tasks as cutting roads, or to advance to forage missions when the transported food supply was exhausted. Finally, these followers guarded the camp and could participate in battles as light infantry.

Since many supplies were carried by the men and their few servants in the Macedonian army, we can easily realize that the baggage train would comprise of a confined number of pack animals and very few wagons. Hence, any other contemporary army would need much more pack animals in contrast with the Macedonians. Furthermore, the Macedonians had limited the problem of finding so many animals and of feeding the animal in this way. The limited utilization of carts would increase the velocity of army to rough terrains. Moreover, in that way the drivers and the necessary tools and wood for fixing the wagons, would be decreased as well.

So, with these significant differences, we can add that a Hellenic hoplite army of 20,000 men which was followed by a crowd of attendants, would need almost the same food supplies as a Macedonian army of 35,000 men, while the hoplite soldiery was much slower. Ferril convincingly refers: “Allowing ten miles a day for a hoplite army, in a thirty-day campaign a Macedonian army of 35,000 could strike at a target 400 miles away on the same amount of food that would take a hoplite army of 20,000 no more than 300 miles.”

In conclusion, the brilliant logistic organization was first achieved during the Balkan campaigns of Philip, as already mentioned. He trained his troops to carry

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453 Engels 1978,13, Fox 2004,72. (Engels refers a same attitude of Xenophon)
454 Gabriel 2010,86, Engles 1978,12-13 (Engels estimates a different number for the attendants and the combatants. However Engels focus at the Asia campaign while Gabriel to Philip’s campaign. Of course the Gabriel survey is more close to my interests due to the fact that involves the Balkan terrains.
457 Ferril 1988,184.
458 Ferril 1988,184.
459 Karunanithy 2013,172.
their armory and their own supplies of food on the march as I mention, he prohibited the wagons and the women. A lot of equipment was carried by the servants and not by the pack animals or wagons. Philip developed this logistic system because it would be efficient for his expeditions in the mountainous terrains of Thrace, Paeonia and Illyria where the utility of wagons would be inefficient over the mountains trails, while a large crowd of valets would reduce the velocity of the army and would make it defenseless while crossing mountain passes, as I already postulated.\footnote{Engels 1978,23.} Thus, the development of Philip had as an aim to create the most light and mobile force that had ever existed, which would be able to actualize rapid attacks against rivals, before they understood what happened.\footnote{Engels 1978,23.} Philip’s alterations permitted his army to move faster and to march longer routes in a day, and remain in the field for weeks with its own provisions, something that none of the other Hellenic armies could achieve. Moreover, the strategic range of Philip’s army was greater than any other Hellenic force.\footnote{Gabriel 2010, 87.}

In this phase we can note an alteration of a Roman general. Frontinus and Plutarch informed us about a similar policy by Caius Marius, who ordered his soldier to carry his own necessary objects and reduced the number of the animals. With that action the troops of Marius gained the name “Marian mules.”\footnote{Front. 4.1.7, Plutarch Mar.13.1. Plutarch also refers that this name maybe have a different origin. Marian mules), Engels 1978,23-24.} Perhaps when Marius actualized these alterations in 99 BC to his army, he was imitating Philip’s policies.\footnote{Gabriel 2010,86.} However, the Roman armies during the Imperial Period had more pack animals in contrast with Macedonians of Philip and Alexander era.\footnote{Engels 1978,17( see the analysis of Engel).} According to this logic, although Ferril supported that Philip used the Persian logistic system, it is obvious that the Persian army had half of the velocity of the Macedonian soldiery due to the fact that it had a huge supply train, which the great king used in his army.\footnote{Ashley 1998,82.}
b. Men and Animals in the Macedonian Logistic Machine.

Although in the previous subsection, we refer to the restricted use of animals in the Macedonian army, some pack and draught animals were albeit necessary for the practical necessities of transportation, i.e. to carry items that people couldn’t.\textsuperscript{467}

In the Macedonian soldiery, wagons were utilized when there were roads. Contrariwise, the pack animals were utilized in terrains with no paths and were led by trained drivers, where most them were weaponless.\textsuperscript{468} Although we discuss the usefulness of a light logistic tail with few wagons and pack animals, some recruited pack animals would be necessary to transfer the army’s significant supplies such as tents, hammocks, medical provisions, the ambulance, the military machines, firewood, and loot. Packed animals were connected to Macedonian infantry at dekas or team; the horses, mules and donkeys were able of pulling a 60-100 kg. cargo. By using packsaddle or twin panniers, the animals transported water containers. Other objects were mills, straps, provender, and maybe some palisade stakes for the building of a camp in a campaign when the area had ellipses of trees. Also, all the equipment of a group for constructions, such as axes or adzes, saws or sickles, mattocks, picks and shovels. In fact, the pack animals could carry the cumbersome items at a ratio of one animal to fifty individuals.\textsuperscript{469} So here, Gabriel offers us a paradigm by supporting that Philip’s soldiery in the Illyria campaign required only 200 pack animals for a fighting force of 10000 combatants.\textsuperscript{470}

As we see, Philip’s army could cross 15 miles in a day and it could cross 20 miles on a forced march. Gabriel points out that these distances could have been traveled, although Philip had to stop every hour and rest the pack animals and horses for ten minutes. Afterwards, there was a cessation every three hours and to take off the animal’s burden and relax them for thirty minutes.\textsuperscript{471} However, these animals

\textsuperscript{467}Engels 1978,16.
\textsuperscript{468}Karunanithy 2013,173.
\textsuperscript{469}Engels 1978,16-18,Karunanithy. 2013,174, Ferril 1988,183 , Gabriel 2010,86-87. ( According to Engels pack animals could carry women and children although here in Balkan campaign there is no report of something like this.)
\textsuperscript{470}Gabriel 2010,87.
\textsuperscript{471}Gabriel 2010, 87.
needed food for the continuation of their contribution to the Macedonian army. The horses and the mules would require a ration of 10 lb. forage i.e. straw or chaff, and 10 lb. of grain per day. Each animal that was used, would need 8 gal. of water per day. If the animal hasn’t eaten for few days as it is logical, the requirements would increase, and it might require 20 gal at one time. The rations for humans and animals could be decreased for small periods, and it’s always depending on the terrain and climate, but if the army and the animals remained without food for several days, the army would paralyze in starvation and it would lose its ability to go to war.\textsuperscript{472}

As for people, the humans were as useful as the horses in antiquity. This was a result of the ineffective throat and girth harness. If we compare human and animal, we can see that the man can carry one third the burden of the latter i.e. about 80 lb. for long distances. Although, the man needed only one of third the amount of grain supplies of a horse. However, we mentioned that the practical tools were carried by animals.\textsuperscript{473} Engels suggests that the minimal ration for each man on a campaign would be 3lb. of grain per day and at least 2 qt.(i.e. circa 1.9 l.) of water per day. He refers that this would be the minimal quantity of water required for men, who marched through hot terrain with grain supplies as a basic food for their diet.\textsuperscript{474}

Every soldier in Alexander’s army would require 3600 calories per day, 1.36 kg. (i.e. circa 3lb) of bread and 1.9 l. of water.\textsuperscript{475} As in the Roman army, the basic food for the Macedonians was the grain ration of wheat, barley or millet, because they were the most readily accessible foods to be found during the campaign, and the easiest to transfer, once dried, they could be saved indefinitely, and in hot weather in contrast with meat, fish, vegetables or fruit.\textsuperscript{476}

Supposing that adequate water and food supplies were available, a phalanx which compromised by 1.500 phalangites might need 2.25 short tons of dry rations per day, while a companion cavalry squadron of 215 individuals might need 1.4 short tons for both, men and horses. Marches through deserts, through infertile paths in mountains, through rough areas, or inhabited areas, would affect the

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{472}Engels 1978,18.
\item\textsuperscript{473}Engels 1978,17.
\item\textsuperscript{474}Engels 1978,18 ( The Balkan campaign started with the spring and at the summer season Alexander was still there . So it is easy to understand that the climate was not cold).
\item\textsuperscript{475}Karunanithy 2013,181.( This estimation is based on Engels)
\item\textsuperscript{476} Engels 1978,123, Ashley 1998,80.
\end{itemize}
logistics of water by decreasing the available provisions and increasing the amount that was required. In such circumstances, a phalanx battalion would need six short tons for daily use and the cavalry squadron would need 11.6 short tons. This would be an extreme obstacle for the soldiery at the supply train, with an obvious result in the army, which would suffer from famine, due to the fact that their meals would be poorer.\textsuperscript{477}

The Macedonian soldier carried his military panoply and arms i.e. helmet, shield, greaves, sword and sarissa. Moreover, he had utensils and personal items in his kit. Other objects were his bedroll, blanket, tools for the construction of roads and of course, medical supplies.\textsuperscript{478} The burden of this load is circa 50 pounds and if we add the burden of the provisions of 30 days, which was almost forty pounds, we can calculate that a Macedonian soldier carried a burden of 80 or 90 pounds. In fact, a soldier can carry a burden of 80 pounds during a long journey without undue damage his health.\textsuperscript{479} It is extraordinary when one observes that certain military practices remain unchanged over the centuries. According to historian Vegetius The roman soldiers carried a burden of 75 pounds; this is the same burden that Napoleon’s troops carried at Waterloo in 1815 AD. The British in the attack of Bunker Hill at 1775 AD were carrying a burden of 80 pounds, as did the Macedonians more than 2000 years before them. Finally, the American troops in 1944 at Normandy carried 82 pounds of burden.\textsuperscript{480}

\textsuperscript{477}Ashley 1998,80-81.
\textsuperscript{478}Gabriel 2010, 86, Karunanithy 2013, 176-177 (For more details see Karunanithy 2013, 176-178).
\textsuperscript{479}Gabriel 2010,86.
\textsuperscript{480}Ibid,86.
c. The Campaign

As I already mentioned, Alexander started his campaign at the onset of spring. Because of the different level of the agricultural production of the ancient world, it was logical that the majority of the cities wouldn’t have the ability to feed a huge army and themselves sooner than the harvest.\textsuperscript{481} A general feature is that armies in ancient Hellas did not support military operations during the winter because the replenishment by sea and land was too difficult. Hence, Alexander was back in Macedonia for the winter of 336-335 BC.\textsuperscript{482} Furthermore, we can estimate that Alexander would probably need some supplies from the cities inside his kingdom during the Balkan campaign, while his soldiers carried with them their own provisions of food, according to Frontinus. Provisions for thirty days.

The luggage of every soldier comprised food provisions. The men were sometimes ordered to have pre-cooked food along with their luggage, for avoiding the weight of cooking items. This guidance was frequently connected with mobile expeditions. It has been suggested that the rations recommended was for a specific time, namely, two, three, four, or ten days. The ten-day provisions were the most frequent requirement that has been affirmed, which was for expeditions that would last for some unknown period of time, for sure for more than four days.\textsuperscript{483} Engels estimates that in an environment with abundance of water and forage for the horses, that only grain was necessary to carried, the army could carry only 10 days provisions and still the number of animals for larger routes would be enormous.\textsuperscript{484} We already mentioned the restricted availability of pack animals for the Macedonians since the livestock was costly for the ancient farmer. Moreover, according to Engels there is yet another problem, which is the finding and sharing of so many supplies for so many animals by the embryonic developed system of

\textsuperscript{481}Engels 1978,121.
\textsuperscript{482}Martin,Blackwell 2012,44.
\textsuperscript{483}Karunanithy 2013,178.
\textsuperscript{484}Engel 1978, 18-19 (the environment of abundant of water and forage could be connected it with the Balkans campaigns. although we have to remember that Engels calculations are for the Asia campaign.).
transport of the army.\textsuperscript{485} On the other hand, Gabriel seems to believe Frontinus, by supporting that Philip’s army could cover 300 miles with 25 days supplies, while it would have 5 days supplies as reserve, before his need to renew the provisions.\textsuperscript{486}

The Macedonian army passed from Amphipolis, which from 357 BC. was a Macedonian city, and remained in Macedonia until it became the capital of the first district without losing its Macedonian tradition, until the end of the ancient world.\textsuperscript{487} Everything that the army would need, was probably received from the ex-Athenian colony. We must always have in our mind that in the Balkan campaign Alexander had rivers next to him. Here, they are the Strymon and then the Nestus. These rivers were suitable for providing his men and animals (horses of cavalry and pack animals) with water supplies. Marches were frequently made from river to river because of the confined capacity of overland transportation, which didn’t allow large amount of food to be carried overland.\textsuperscript{488}

Forage was concentrated from the fields\textsuperscript{489} and the densely forested mountains of the Thracians would be perfect for feeding the animals of the army. Whereas, the men were fed by their own supplies that they had received from Macedonia, namely Pella and Amphipolis. When the troops of Alexander crossed the Nestus, his army marched for ten days, 240 kilometers i.e. 150 miles. It is likely that the animals again were supplied by the central plain of Marica.\textsuperscript{490}

Gabriel states that Philip’s army and in this case Alexander’s troops, could reach Paeonia and Illyria only in ten days’ march. (Image 10) Namely, the Macedonians could cover in ten days of marching circa 150 miles. Furthermore, Gabriel convincingly continues by referring that once the forces were in the region of the target, the troops could remain using their own supplies for 14 days and if required, to continue the march.\textsuperscript{491} Gabriel estimates that the distance from Pella to Nestus River was also a ten-day march. From Philippi to Byzantium,(240 miles) or north to Scythia (200 miles) was longer and still these routes remained in the strategic range

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{485}Engel 1978,19.
  \item \textsuperscript{486}Gabriel 2010,87.
  \item \textsuperscript{487}Petsas 1977, 375, Diod. 16.8.2.
  \item \textsuperscript{488}Ashley 1998,80.
  \item \textsuperscript{489}Gabriel 2010,87.
  \item \textsuperscript{490}Hammond,Walbank 1988,34 (Here we take the topographical route by Hammond and Walbank History of Macedonia III).
  \item \textsuperscript{491}Gabriel 2010,87.
\end{itemize}
of the army. From Philippi the Macedonians could reach the land of Triballians and Getae only in ten days march.\footnote{Ibid 87.}

Although Gabriel presents a situation that seems to have no problems in the logistic field, it is necessary to refer that some replenishment may have occurred from Philippiopolis (Plovdiv), which was a friendly territory.\footnote{Green 2013,125.} Philip’s town was located on the plain of Marica and stayed at the crossroads of communications. It is likely that other significant towns in special positions which Philip established were in strategic places on the trails which led out of the flatland.\footnote{Hammond,Walbank 1988,38.} It was Philip’s policy to establish fortresses and towns in specific and useful locations, which would operate as supply storage for the future. This system allowed Philip to march inside his line of communication and supplementation and even to receive troops from these forts.\footnote{Gabriel 2010,87-88.}

Moreover, another ingesting point is the non-hostility of the Odrysians. The Odrysians didn’t take advantage of the death of Philip with a hostile revolt and they didn’t communicate with the plotters, with Attalos, or with Athens.\footnote{Droysen 2012,79.} I would like to add that The Odrysae remained inactive without manifesting any warfare action, although they could either cooperate with Thracian tribes in the war against Alexander or hit him from behind when the Macedonians would fight off the enemy in the Danube area. Even an invasion in Macedonia, as long as Alexander was far away could happen, which would be deadly and perhaps effective enough to bring terrible disruption and failure in the Balkan campaign of Alexander. However, the Odrysae did not take advantage of these opportunities and remained inert. Xydopoulos correctly says that it is possible that the great diplomatic policy of Philip II during his reign and the fear of Macedonian revenge, were the reasons which prevented Odrysae to revolt against Macedon. Xydopoulos refers that the no mention of Odrysae in the narrative of Arrian is an indication that the Odrysae were under the authority of the Macedonian king, “\textit{therefore acting according to what}
Alexander enjoyed a good relationship with the royal house of Odrysae, due to the fact that one of Alexander’s commanders bore the Odrysae name Sitalces, the Odrysae offered a squadron of cavalry recruited from the Odrysian elite and Odrysian infantry troops to the Asia campaign of Alexander as I already mentioned.\footnote{Hammond,Walbank 1988,39.} I tend to think, that it would not be illogical if the Odrysae supported the supplementation of the Macedonian army, during the Balkan campaign.

Alexander faced some combined forces of Thracians at Mt. Haemus and successfully prevailed. The Thracians lost their women, children and all their possessions grabbed by Macedonians.\footnote{Droysen 2012,80 (Here Droyse makes a mistake to the number of the dead Thracians. He refers 500 dead while Arrian inform us that 1500 Thracians perished.)} Although there is no report of plundered villages and fields, as it is logical to occur and occurs in every war, i.e. victory in the battle leads to the unprotected countryside and offers the chance to the winner to provide himself with slaves, cattle and other chattels. This was a measure with the aim of enforcing dominance and to ensure the rear for a further march.\footnote{Papazoglou 1978,38.} Until Mt. Haemus there seems no problem with the logistics of the soldiery. Also, the Mt. Haemus is in the logistical range of Philip’s troop according to Gabriel.\footnote{Check image 10.}

After this achievement, Alexander advanced to the land of Triballians. In their region from the details of Arrian we can observe again a river, which is Lyginus and a dense forest that saved the Triballians when they retreated during the battle. Hence, we have water supplies and forage for animals. After the battle, Alexander maybe took some booty from the land of Triballians, who might had left supplies and animals in their abandoned villages and houses. Although, we know that the unarmed population of Triballians sought refuge to Peuce a small island on the Danube.\footnote{See chapter 1.} Therefore, they perhaps took with them every amount of food supply they could carry. Alexander’s army was huge and I tend to think that this was the first time and place that his men were maybe at the limit of their supplies. If the men knew how to fish and had some fishing tools in their kit, then they would be fed,
especially in Nestus, but for the Lyginus, we have no information about a river. During the Asia campaign at a crucial logistic difficulty which created starvation, Curtius informs us that the army was fed by fish rivers and herbs.\textsuperscript{503}

Three days after the second victorious battle against the Triballians, far away from Pella, Alexander reached Danube where he found his fleet. This fleet had come from Byzantium and delivered the provisions that the army required.\textsuperscript{504} Adams in his paper “\textit{Trajan and Macedonian highways}” refers that sea and river communications are extremely significant for the logistic system of vast armies, which were campaigning far away from the sources of supply i.e. the fatherland.\textsuperscript{505} This seems to be the most practical reason for the appearance of the fleet at this crucial point. The two important obstructions to the replenishment of an army were, the restriction of overland transportation and the low level of most agricultural production. Because of these obstacles, the army could not stay self-efficient for long routes, where it was far away from navigable rivers or seaports.\textsuperscript{506} Moreover, for these reasons the army could not remain in one region for long periods, when it was far away from sea or rivers. Engels states that “\textit{The radius from which supplies could be effectively carried overland to the army was only 60 to 80 miles, and the army’s huge consumption rates would have quickly exhausted all the agricultural surplus within this limit.}”\textsuperscript{507} So, the ingenuity of Alexander here is attested, who took advantage of the Danube river. At a serious length route, a horse or mule can carry 200 pounds; a light cart with two animals 1,000 pounds whilst a large merchant ship of that period circa 400 tons.\textsuperscript{508} Although, it is referred that the fleet consisted of warships, that doesn’t change the fact that they transferred provisions for the expedition of the Macedonians.

After the failure of Alexander to conquer Peuce because of natural obstacles, he attacked to Getae who appeared on the opposite shore. Since it was the harvest period, there was a vast crop and Alexander would probably have thought that these

\textsuperscript{503}Curtius, 7,4,24., Karunanithy 2013,290(footnote 76)
\textsuperscript{504}Dodge 2004,194.
\textsuperscript{505}Adams 1993,29.
\textsuperscript{506}Engels 1978,120.
\textsuperscript{507}Engels 1978,121.
\textsuperscript{508}Ashley 1998,81.
men would feed the population of Peuce. Alexander’s force was full of provisions because of the fleet, although with the destruction of the Getic city when the Getae abandoned the field with their families and fled to Steppes, they left a great booty behind, which comprised of the supplies of the Getic army. Alexander again, sent back this booty to his fatherland. We must not forget, that the wealth was sent back, but everything else, useful for the campaign just as food supplies, would be kept along with the army.

Another interesting fact is the vast corps that the Macedonians smoothed down with the sarissae. Although it has been claimed that these corps devastated by Macedonians, it is most plausible that if these corps were not unharvested, they would possibly exploited by the army. We must not forget that there were a few servants that followed the army, i.e. one servant for ten soldiers and one for each cavalryman, these people carried hand mills for grinding grain to the camp and of course other gears. The Macedonian army knew how to survive on the land, whatever the season was. Furthermore, I would offer a paradigm from the Asia campaign, after the successful conquest of Rock of Sogdiana, one more impregnable Rock, the Rock of Chorienes fell to Macedonian domination, after the surrender of the foe to Alexander in a peaceful way. That winter, the army of Alexander had suffered, because of the snow and because of the lack of supplies. However, Chorienes offered supplies to the troops for two months, corn, wine and dried meat. This is an indication that there was stuff to exploit the vast corps. All in all, during that phase, it seems that the Macedonians were sufficiently supplied, where the bread could be produced, during the sojourn of Alexander in these regions, where he made peace with tribe leaders. Besides he was the winner and the conqueror of these wars and every demand of his could be easily fulfilled.

As we know from Arrian and Strabo, after this prosperous campaign in Thrace, many tribe leaders came to find Alexander, willing to seal an alliance with him. After the triumphal crossing of the Danube in June, Arrian again omits to refer some

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509 Worthington 2004,55.
511 Bosworth 1994,795.
513 Arr.An.4.21.
514 Arrian 1.4.6.,Strabo 7.3.8.
details. It is most feasible that Alexander made some deal with the Triballians and Thracians about defensive measures in that region. I.e. the defense of Danube line by north tribes, namely Getae and Scythians, and he would arrange some frontier disputes between Triballians and republican Thracians that lived near the Danube. Moreover, he could rearrange old treaties of his father’s with the Thracians or Scythian tribes. Also, he could arrange the recruitment of the Triballian and Odrysian troops and their preparation. It is plausible that under the sway of Alexander, there was a tithe demanded by the Macedonian authority and the troops we already mentioned. Definitely he put some affairs in order for his Asian campaign. Although there is not a single reference in our sources about any kind of replenishment at this phase, I would strongly support that Alexander arranged to provide his army with supplies from all these tribes that became his new allies for the continuation of the Balkan campaign. I tend to think that the defeated Triballians and every tribe leader reinforced the army with necessary supplies. It makes sense, if that was the price for the favor of Alexander.

Afterwards, Alexander moved to the land of the Agrianians and Paeonians. As we know Agrianians were allies and friends, while Paeonians were not a threat. So here there is again no logistic problem. Of course, the friendly Laggarus, would supply the army of Alexander, while the same with his Hypaspists became members of the army, with provisions from his kingdom. At this phase of the expedition, Alexander was informed about the anticipated Illyrian threat so it is possible, that here he organized his supplementation. For the journey to Illyria, it is possible again that Alexander was supplied also by Paeonia (around Skopje) because Paeonians were incorporated to Macedonia.

Once more we see that a river appears in the journey of Alexander. Arrian refers that Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ παρὰ τὸν Εριγόνα ποταμὸν πορευόμενος ἐς Πέλλιον πόλιν

516 Worthington 2004,56 (The same opinion shares and Hammond at the genius of Alexander the great although in volume III History of Macedonia, Hammond Walbank refused the demanding of a tithe.) I add the phrase of the tithe, because is a mark which indicates the Macedonian authority and reinforces the economy of the kingdom.
518 Arr.An. 1.5.2.
519 Hammond, Walbank 1988,40. (See above p.47-48.)
This movement was serving his logistic plan. During the events of Pellion, we receive the only information of Arrian about the supplementation of Macedonians. Alexander sent Philotas with some cavalry troops and with the ὑποζύγια τὰ ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἐς ἐπιστισμὸν ἐπέμπε.\(^{521}\) Alexander’s soldiery had a greatly organized logistic system under the accountability of a transport officer (skoidos). It is believed that one of the tasks of Parmenio in Asia was to handle this field, and as old and trusted general, he might have twenty or several years of experience as a logistician when Alexander was king.\(^{522}\) At this point at Pellion, Parmenion’s son Philotas seems to be the officer for logistic missions. Finally, in this campaign we have the citation concerning the warfare supplies. At the crossing of the river, during the retreating maneuver of the Macedonian army, Alexander set up ἐπὶ τῇ ὀχθῇ τὰς μηχανὰς.\(^{523}\)

When Alexander reached Pellion, he decided to camp close to the River Eordaicus for logical reasons, i.e. to have some protection and to provide his men and horses with water. He was not so close to Pellion. We can station him at the junction of Devoll with the old river of Ventrok which probably is the Eordaicus. With his camp in this location, he had access to the flatland of Poloske for the pasturing of his horses, and the lines of communication with the fatherland were free.\(^{524}\)

Hammond refers that “It is likely that he (Alexander) came to Pelion late in July or early in August where the harvest was already in and the plain was brown. At this time of the year the sheep were in the highland pastures, and the rivers were low.”\(^{525}\) As we see, the environment was friendly for foraging missions, but the maneuvers and the plans of the enemy were the main obstacles.

The first logistic problem occurred with the incident of blockade of the city. After his initial success of the first battle with the Dardanians, before the arrival of Glaukias, Alexander had the advantage of gathering supplies and obtain pasture from the flatland of Poloske.\(^{526}\) However, it is a truly strange idea that of a

\(^{520}\)Arr. An. 1.5.5.
\(^{521}\)Arr. An. 1.5.9.
\(^{522}\)Karunanithy 2013,172.
\(^{523}\)Arr. An. 1.6.8.
\(^{524}\)Hammond 1974,78-79.
\(^{525}\)Hammond 1974, 80.
\(^{526}\)Hammond, Walbank 2008,43.
circumvallation, since Alexander knew that Glaukias was on his way and he would want to unite forces with Cleitus which would create serious problems for his supplementation as long as the wall was being built. Of course, his supplementation occurred either through the Gryke e Ujkut (Wolf’s pass) which the rival could threaten or over the mountains ridge, which was the watershed between the Devoll and the Haliacmon. As his supply animals left the Poloske plain and entered the highland, they would be attacked by the light-troops of Illyrians. It would seem more logical if Alexander had sacked the city.\footnote{Hammond 1974, 86.}

English supports, that Alexander expected for his Illyrian campaign to be short and that the city would be captured and the local tribesmen would be subjugated without much difficulty. In this vein, Alexander began the expedition with basic supplies believing that he could feed and retain his troops from the land of the Balkans for this short campaign. The appearance of the king of Taulantians creates two important logistic troubles for Alexander. Firstly, Alexander had to send a foraging mission to gather supplies for the troops and secondly the pack animals would need to graze.\footnote{English 2009, 30.}

When Alexander was in desperate position, he ordered Philotas to obtain food. The flatland that Philotas intended to supply food and pasture was not the flatland near Pellion, in fact it was a significant way off, since the position of Philotas troops was an issue of report to Alexander and not of observation. Moreover, the hazard of the night-fall, indicates that there was serious distance between the camp of Alexander and the troops of Philotas. The clear flatland that was selected was the richest in the region, that of Korçë, well-watered and swampy in antiquity. So we may assume that Philotas passed through the Tsangon pass into that flatland which is eight kilometers away from Pellion.\footnote{Hammond 1974, 80-81, English 2009, 30.} The mountains that surrounds the flatland are not the rather distant mountains which enclose the flatland of Poloskë, but the mountains which surrounding the Tsagon Pass, a group of short mountains that the troops of Glaukias, could occupy some positions there.\footnote{Hammond 1974, 80-81.} There is no reference about the level of success of the foraging mission, nevertheless if we judge from the

\footnote{Hammond 1974, 80-81.}
shortness of the expedition it seems implausible that many supplies were concentrated.531

Nevertheless, this was a brief breath for Alexander and his men. Because of the severe situation Alexander started his risqué endeavor with the aim of passing through the Wolf pass. There, in the river Alexander used his siege machine. Here English attests that this artillery was a part of the siege train, which was obviously on its way to Pellion, although it had not arrived in time when Alexander was sieging the city.532 We can suppose that this artillery came from Pella, according to Marsden who claims that the headquarters of Philip’s department of mechanical engineering was likely located in Pella.533 As we saw in Chapter III, during the risky retreat mission, Alexander left his baggage animals to his camp, while the catapults follow the fighting force during the parade drills and later in the fighting where the catapults proved worthy. This was a tactic, although it seemed dangerous because he had left his supplies in a hostile region.534

After the brilliant retreat, Alexander and his army had the opportunity to obtain food from the Ventrok and Prespa basins, and his line of communication with Lyncus were open, furthermore he could withdraw to Lyncus, if he desired.535 So, in this phase, the logistical danger for Alexander was finished. After the unexpected attack against the Dardanians and Taulantians, Alexander took back all the possessions of the army that had been left in the camp and gained the booty of the enemy.536 After this victorious campaign Alexander punished the rebellious Thebe, while his army was sufficiently supplied for the new expedition.

Gabriel estimates that the total efficiency of Macedonian army which was a compromise of velocity, logistical support and combat power, appeared in the Balkan campaign of Alexander. In this furious campaign, Alexander’s troops crossed circa 2000 kilometers from Pella until the appearance of Alexander to Thebes. In all this campaign again, the alterations of Philip were present, who enabled his army to strike with velocity, logistical autarky and combat power against any opponent from

531 English 2009,30.
532 English 2009,32.
533 Marsden 1977,217.
534 Chapter V.
535 Hammond 1974,84.
536 Hammond 1974,86.
the Danube River to the Adriatic Sea.\textsuperscript{537} As Fox adds, for the first time, distance pause to affect the mobility of the army in the Balkan warfare.\textsuperscript{538}

In conclusion, we saw and analyzed the logistical model of Philip. In reality, we know nothing about Alexander’s logistical movements in the Balkan campaign. However, Martin and Blackwell state that Alexander was capable of the logistical challenges of land navigation and victualling, towards a rapid invading warfare.\textsuperscript{539} Something that proved to be the Balkan campaign. Since Alexander struck his enemies before they could create a serious problem for him.\textsuperscript{540} The only logistical incident which appears in the campaign of 335 BC. was at Pellion, which shed light to the action of Alexander in this field.

I tend to think that we cannot know with certainty concerning Alexander’s logistical abilities, let alone, here in the Balkan campaign where Alexander was justified from the lack of experience. We saw that Engels and other scholars support Alexander’s ability and characterize him as a great logistician who always planned his movements very warily before starting the action. Although, here we have an Alexander who was in great risk for the supplementation of the army and we can use the conclusion of Holt in his paper “Impericum Macedonicum and the east: the problem of logistics”, who refers that: “The further implication, of course, is that the king was not always so meticulous or methodical in his planning, and often not able to anticipate staggering supply problems. Yet, when a crisis did arise, Alexander was quick to intervene, ready to lead by example and to show genuine concern for his suffering soldiers. In fact, his heroic response in the Turkestan desert, and his order to slaughter the beasts of burden in the Hindu Kush, are nearly all that we can see of the king’s personal attention to problems of supply.”\textsuperscript{541} A similar action is confirmed in the Illyrian campaign, when we see that Alexander through heroic reaction saved his troops, however because of his high confidence and desire for winning, in combination with his underestimation of the Illyrian troops, had as a result that he

\textsuperscript{537}Gabriel 2010,88.
\textsuperscript{538}Fox 2004,72.
\textsuperscript{539}Martin-Blackwell 2012,44.
\textsuperscript{540}Arr. An.1.1.4.
\textsuperscript{541}Holt 1993,592.
was trapped. All in all, the Illyrian campaign was a great lesson for Alexander’s logistics, although in Asia he faced again similar and worse situations.
Conclusions

At 336 B.C, Alexander inherited a kingdom which was under multiple threats. With a rapid reaction he ceased the unrest and hostility of south Hellenes for some time. Afterwards, the next target were the northwest tribes, who had manifested their enmity towards the Macedonian authority. The Balkan campaign started in 335 B.C.

The main reason for the realization of the Balkan campaign was the security of Macedonia and an infliction of conformance of the Balkan tribes, through total conquest until Danube River. Without the Balkan campaign, there would be no opportunity for the actualization of the Asia campaign, while if there was no success in the northwest fighting, Alexander would not be remembered as being “Great”. However, through the Balkan campaign Alexander exploited other strategic aims. To begin with, the absolute establishment of his authority on the Macedonian throne by winning the trust of his men, the creation of the image of the warrior king, preparation and exercise of the troops for the Asia expedition, the reinforcement of the royal treasure by the booties of the rivals, the recruitment of Balkan troops which strengthened his army, the operation of Antipater as regent, whilst the attitude of Hellenes were tested while Alexander was absent and finally the occupation of Central Thrace with the key position of Hellespont which would be an extremely precious base for Alexander’s lines of communication, and valuable source of replenishment during the Asian campaign.

The warfare in Thrace was very successful and Alexander pushed the frontier until Danube. In this campaign, we have the first signs of the genius of Alexander in the strategic field, where his ruses and tactics, which were combined movements of several military units, against the autonomous Thracians and Triballians are worthy of admiration. Moreover, Alexander exploited the presence of the Danube river for establishing his northern frontier, while his crossing in one day was the incident that provoked fear in the Γέτας τούς ἀπαθανατίζοντας, who fled in humiliation towards
the Steppes and made the Syrmus and his Triballians, who were at Peuce to surrender themselves to the will of the conqueror.

However, Alexander’s enemies proved to be inferior in discipline and armory. This is one of the major reasons why they failed to crash Alexander and why Alexander succeeded. The only enemy who offered an equivalent conflict was the army of the Triballians, who perished when the main Macedonians forces arrived in the heat of the battle.

In the Illyrian campaign, we have an Alexander that divided the spirits regarding charisma on the strategic field. To begin with, besiege of Pellion and the fact that he was trapped by the Illyrian forces, has been expressed as tactical mistakes by the authorities. This carelessness was only justified by his brilliant retreat maneuver and by the fact that there were no casualties from the Illyrian war, as and in the Balkan campaign in general. On the other hand, we should emphasize that the inferiority of the enemies of Alexander, is clearly apparent in the events of Pellion, while Alexander knew very well the superiority of his army.

Of course, the success of Alexander against the Illyrians was due to his courage, brilliance and military commandership, however, the inability of the Dardanians and Taulantians to confront a highly trained army was the main reason for Alexander’s accomplishment. The Illyrians had trapped Alexander into a desperate position with no supplies; they had the advantage of the hills, the fortified city and finally they had larger forces. Nevertheless, in every operation and battle they failed remarkably and retreated many times, without even giving a single fight. As already mentioned above, Alexander faced some serious difficulties and managed to escape, because the Illyrians didn’t offer him a dignified battle as the Triballians did. In fact, the psychological exploitation of tribal contumacy was one of the strongest weapons of Alexander. Something that proved effective against the Getae and, of course the Illyrians.

As long for the intelligence system, again there is strife on its efficiency. We saw an Alexander who was informed about the hostility of the Balkan tribes from the beginning of his reign, while a hetairos Corragos was responsible for notifying Alexander of an Illyrian threat. The efficiency of this intelligence system is reinforced by the arrival of ἄγγελοι, who informed Alexander about the Illyrian revolt of Cleitus,
Glaukias and Autariatae. Moreover, the information that Philotas troops were in danger because of Glaukias is one more indication that the logistic system was effective, while the same incident reveals a strong possibility that Glaukias had established an intelligent system too. Nevertheless, the fact that Alexander set up a besiege and ignored the arrival of Glaukias, maybe was a result of the weakness of the intelligence system according to some scholars, something that seems untenable to me. I tend to think that the intelligence system proved effective during the Balkan expedition, while the blockade of Pellion occurred because Alexander thought that he had time to destroy Cleitus first and then to direct to Glaukias and because he never felt fear for the arrival of Glaukias.

In the logistic field, during the early reign of Alexander, we clearly see the logistic model that Philip established which was successfully designed for military operations on the Balkan terrain. Philip, lightened his logistic baggage by ordering his troops to carry their own provisions and armors while he had a restricted number of animals and attendants to accompany and serve the army. In this way, he created a rapid army with great operational range. In the Balkan campaign of Alexander, the army survived by the land and by the booty of the defeated rivals.

The only citation to the logistic affairs is at the events of Pellion when Philotas was ordered to obtain food, when the position of Macedonians started to become desperate. In this phase, we see again a heroic Alexander who saved his foraging mission but anew we face strong contradiction as to the view, which presents Alexander as a meticulous commander with great abilities in the logistic field.

Alexander was found in this desperate position because he underestimate the foe and he was urged by his strong desire for win. However, in his defense, we must not omit to mention that Alexander was only twenty-one year old and king of Macedon for only a short period of time. So, he wasn't a paradigm of experience, and the incident of Philotas is not enough to allow us to criticize Alexander’s ability in the field of logistics, at least for the Balkan campaign. His enthralling escape from the vast danger through the Wolf Pass, is enough to eliminate every doubt about Alexander’s strategical and tactical skills at the Balkan campaign while presents the strong desire of Alexander for victory. As Fuller marks out, in the Balkan campaign Alexander never lost control and never allowed panic or desperation to affect him.
He was dominant over every situation and always found a way to save himself and his troops from the most difficult occasions. The Balkan campaign taking account of all of Alexander’s “errors”, is generally estimated as symbolizing the unique dynamism of Alexander. In the end, no one can conclude this campaign better than Diodorus.

Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ταραχὰς καταπαύσας ἑστράτευσεν ἐπὶ τὴν Θράκην καὶ πολλὰ μὲν ἐδην Θράκια ταραττόμενα καταπληξάμενος ὑποταγήναι κατηνάγκασεν, ἐπήλθεν δὲ καὶ τὴν Παιονίαν καὶ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα καὶ τὰς ὀμόρους ταύτας χώρας καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν κατοικοῦντων βαρβάρων ἀφεστηκότας χειρωσάμενος ὑπηκόους πάντας τοὺς πλησιοχώρους βαρβάρους ἐπουήσατο.

542 Fuller 1964,226
543 Diod. 17.8.1
Image 1: THE BALKAN AREA
Image 3: Representation of the maneuver.
Source: Sheppard R., (Ed), Alexander the great at war, Oxford 2008. p.73.
Image 4: Representation of the Battle at Mt. Haemus.
Image 5: Representation of the battle at the Lyginus River.
Image 6: Representation of the war operation against the Getae.

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eἰς δὲ τὴν Ἑθοδαί[αν. .......]. τῇ πλησίον Ἑλεμία[ι. .......].


35 τὸ δὲ τὴν ἦν[. ..........]
Image 9: Alexander’s Dispositions at Pellion
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