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dc.contributor.author
Ristovska, Anja
en
dc.date.accessioned
2015-05-29T19:23:17Z
dc.date.available
2015-09-27T05:56:27Z
dc.date.issued
2015-05-29
dc.identifier.uri
https://repository.ihu.edu.gr//xmlui/handle/11544/125
dc.rights
Default License
dc.title
Game theoretic modeling of prosumers
en
heal.type
masterThesis
heal.language
en
heal.access
free
el
heal.license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
heal.recordProvider
School of Science and Technology, MSc in Information & Communication Technology Systems
heal.publicationDate
2014-11
heal.bibliographicCitation
Ristovska Anja , 2014, Game theoretic modeling
of prosumers, Master's Dissertation, International Hellenic University
en
heal.abstract
This dissertation was written as a part of the MSc in ICT Systems at the International
Hellenic University. The topic of this paper is concentrated on the power grid and how it
can be modeled when a small group of prosumers exchange electricity among themselves.
First we elaborate how the smart grid 3.0 works and its evolution from the smart grid.
Here we concentrate on the architecture of the previous versions of the smart grid, as
well as the role of ICT and renewable sources of energy (solar, wind). Next we explain
the architecture of the entities of the contemporary smart grid, such as microgrids, virtual
power plants, prosumers and transactive energy markets. In the last part of this chapter
we explain the energy market, and its evolution from monopolized market to a deregulated
market. The operation of electricity exchange on a wholesale and retail level is
explained at this point.
In chapter 3 we elaborate the prosumer scenario we have developed by first starting with
describing game theory in general. Next we explain the Shapley value and how we can
use that model to allow users in our scenario to collaborate among each other and exchange
electricity for benefits. We propose our solution and explain our findings. Next
we propose a schematic model of distributing the remaining electricity to the grid by
using again the Shapley theorem.
Acknowledgements:
Here I would like to express my gratitude to all the people that helped me to accomplish
this master course and have an amazing year:
First I would like to thank the university course office, who made me feel welcomed and
helped me with all my issues and questions I had during my studies.
I thank our professors, who thought me so much in a short period of time, particularly
my supervisors prof. Meo and prof. Koutitas, for giving me the opportunity to work
with them on this dissertation. Special thanks to prof. Koutitas, for his guidance, patience
and motivation, it made me believe in me much more.
I thank my family, for their patience and support during this whole process.
-iv-
And last but not least, my colleagues, thank you we had amazing times.
Special thanks to Terezia and Pannikos, you made those long study nights much more
fun.
en
heal.tableOfContents
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. III
CONTENTS ....................................................................................................................V
1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1
2 THE SMART GRID 3.0 .......................................................................................... 5
2.1 SMART GRID - INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 5
2.1.1 Smart grid architecture ......................................................................... 7
2.2 EVOLUTION FROM SMART GRID ......................................................................... 8
2.2.1 Smart Grid 1.0 – Smart Meters ............................................................. 9
2.2.2 Smart Grid 2.0 – Real time pricing and Demand response ................ 12
2.2.3 Prosumer electricity production ...................................................... 24
2.3 THE ENTITIES OF SMART GRID 3.0 ................................................................. 26
2.3.1 Microgrids .......................................................................................... 26
2.3.2 Virtual Power Plants (VPP) ............................................................. 29
2.3.3 Prosumers ......................................................................................... 29
2.3.4 Transactive energy ........................................................................... 33
2.4 THE ENERGY MARKET ..................................................................................... 37
2.4.1 Wholesale market operation ........................................................... 44
2.4.2 Retail energy market ........................................................................ 47
3 PROSUMER COOPERATION ............................................................................ 49
3.1 GAME THEORY ................................................................................................. 49
3.1.1 Cooperative games .......................................................................... 50
3.1.2 Fairness (Shapley theorem) ........................................................... 61
3.2 THE EXAMINED SCENARIO ............................................................................... 65
3.2.1 System model ................................................................................... 65
3.2.2 Problem statement ........................................................................... 70
3.2.3 Proposed algorithm .......................................................................... 71
-vi-
4 RESULTS ............................................................................................................... 75
4.1.1 Calculations using the Shapley theorem....................................... 75
4.1.2 Calculation using the Shapley theorem when players change
consumption behavior .................................................................................. 79
4.1.3 Calculations using Shapley theorem when players sell excess
electricity to the grid using different pricing schemes ............................. 89
5 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................... 95
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 97
en
heal.advisorName
Meo, Prof. Michela
en
heal.committeeMemberName
Meo, Prof. Michela
en
heal.committeeMemberName
Koutitas, Assoc. Prof. George
en
heal.committeeMemberName
Tzortzis, C.
en
heal.academicPublisher
School of Science &Technology, Master of Science (MSc) in Information and Communication Systems
en
heal.academicPublisherID
ihu
heal.numberOfPages
105
heal.fullTextAvailability
true
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