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dc.contributor.author
Balta, Ioanna
en
dc.date.accessioned
2015-06-11T10:55:47Z
dc.date.available
2015-09-27T05:57:03Z
dc.date.issued
2015-06-11
dc.identifier.uri
https://repository.ihu.edu.gr//xmlui/handle/11544/266
dc.rights
Default License
dc.title
Criticizing the mandatory bid rule of the takeover bid Directive
en
heal.type
masterThesis
heal.keyword
Tender offers (Securities)--Law and legislation--European Union countries
en
heal.keyword
Corporation law--European Union countries
en
heal.keyword
Consolidation and merger of corporations--Law and legislation--European Union countries
en
heal.keyword
Minority stockholders--Legal status, laws, etc.--Europe
en
heal.keyword
Tender offers (Securities)--Law and legislation--Europe
en
heal.keyword
Dissertations, Academic
en
heal.keywordURI.LCSH
EU Takeover Directive
en
heal.keywordURI.LCSH
Mandatory Bid Rule
en
heal.keywordURI.LCSH
Market Rule
en
heal.keywordURI.LCSH
protection of minority shareholders
en
heal.keywordURI.LCSH
equal treatment principle
en
heal.keywordURI.LCSH
exit right
en
heal.keywordURI.LCSH
Member States’ discretion
en
heal.keywordURI.LCSH
mandatory bid threshold
en
heal.keywordURI.LCSH
mandatory bid price
en
heal.keywordURI.LCSH
concerted parties
en
heal.keywordURI.LCSH
squeeze-out right
en
heal.keywordURI.LCSH
sell-out right
en
heal.keywordURI.LCSH
market integration
en
heal.keywordURI.LCSH
harmonization
en
heal.language
en
heal.access
free
el
heal.license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
heal.recordProvider
School of Economics, Business Administration and Legal Studies, LLM in Transnational and European Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law
heal.publicationDate
2013-11-29
heal.bibliographicCitation
Ioanna Balta, 2013, Criticizing the mandatory bid rule of the takeover bid Directive ,Master's Dissertation, International Hellenic University
en
heal.abstract
This paper analyses the efficiency of the mandatory bid rule under the framework of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids. The rule requires that anyone acquiring control of a listed company is obliged to make an offer to be addressed to all the shareholders of the target company for all their holdings at an equitable price. In the efforts of the EU to promote more efficient capital structures in Europe, the rule is mainly regarded as a protection mechanism for the minority shareholders. Apart from that, the rule offers certain additional advantages. However, the significance of the mandatory bid rule is limited mostly due to the wide discretion the Directive leaves to Member States. In light of cultural, structural and pre-existing regulatory differences among Member States, it is sensible that their flexibility in establishing additional bid measures and exceptions has prevented the purposes of the rule from materialising. Furthermore, the rule itself suffers from vague definitions which further create problems of interpretation and make its proper implementation much more difficult. Many scholars have commented on the rule’s failure to achieve its legislative goals. After nearly a decade since the issuance of the Takeover Directive, it is a real challenge to examine this issue.
en
heal.tableOfContents
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 5 Part I. The Mandatory Bid Rule ................................................................................................ 8 1.1. The European Takeover Directive .................................................................................. 8 1.2. Mandatory Bid Rule vs. Market Rule ............................................................................ 10 1.3. The Mandatory Bid Rule scheme ................................................................................. 12 1.3.1. The principle of equal treatment ................................................................................ 13 1.3.2. The protection of minority shareholders .................................................................... 14 1.3.3. Efficiency and Integration on equity markets ............................................................. 16 Part II. The deficiencies of the Mandatory Bid Rule ............................................................... 18 2.1. The operation of the rule: emerging issues .................................................................. 18 2.2. Issues related to the wording of the rule ....................................................................... 20 2.2.1. The mandatory bid threshold .................................................................................... 20 2.2.2. The mandatory bid price ........................................................................................... 21 2.2.3. Partial Bids ................................................................................................................ 24 2.2.4. Consideration paid .................................................................................................... 25 2.2.5. The definition of ‘’securities’’ ..................................................................................... 26 2.2.6. The concerted parties ............................................................................................... 26 2.3. The relation to other provisions .................................................................................... 28 2.3.1. The breakthrough rule ............................................................................................... 28 2.3.2. The squeeze-out and sell-out rights .......................................................................... 28 Part III. The implementation of the Mandatory Bid Rule ......................................................... 31 3.1. In the European Union ................................................................................................. 31 3.2. In EFTA States ............................................................................................................. 33 3.3. The case of Greece ...................................................................................................... 34 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 37 Anex I ..................................................................................................................................... 38
en
heal.advisorName
Papadopoulos, Thomas
en
heal.committeeMemberName
Keijser, Thomas
en
heal.committeeMemberName
Eleutheriadis, N.
en
heal.committeeMemberName
Papadopoulos, Thomas
en
heal.academicPublisher
School of Economic and Business Administration,LL.M in Transnational and European Commercial Law and Alternative Dispute resolutions
en
heal.academicPublisherID
ihu
heal.numberOfPages
47
heal.fullTextAvailability
true


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