Creative Commons

This dissertation focuses primarily in investment arbitration and the several procedural vehicles through which review of awards is realised. It examines the various procedural options that the parties in investment arbitration may deploy in cases where a frustrated party seeks to annul or set aside an award, which does not satisfy his interests. These procedural review mechanisms have mainly been created to enhance transparency and consistency in the decision – making process. They ultimately provide for a higher level of legitimacy with the arbitration system. However, as you go through this paper, you will observe the specified way prescribed by the various legal instruments, that these mechanisms operate. They are essentially based on a limited and restrained function of the review process, with limited and narrowly – interpreted grounds for review of awards. In this way, finality of awards, as the ultimate purpose of all investment treaties and legal instruments, is fostered and the advantages of investment arbitration are preserved; efficiency and speed of the proceedings. This paper also highlights the importance of consistency and correctness of arbitral decisions, which eventually cannot be absolutely sacrificed for finality. After all, it is legal certainty and accuracy of the decision – making that contribute to an increased legitimacy of the system. In this context, the practice and roles of ad hoc Committees in ICSID annulment procedure will be analysed, especially through past and recent practice, with reference to cases of utmost significance. Reference has also been made to the possibility of reform of the system, by introducing a more substantive review of awards mainly through an appellate mechanism. As interesting and outstanding as it may look, this is quite unlikely for the time being, since investors and States have a keen desire to – as Mr Gaillard has stated - ‘close the books’ of a case instead of giving rise to perpetual proceedings.