This dissertation was written as part of the LL.M. in Transnational and European Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International Hellenic University. The ultimate purpose of this paper is to familiarize scholars and professionals involved in the fields of law and economy with Competition Law issues which may emerge from a conglomerate merger. Hardly any other area of competition law is as controversial among competition economists and competition law experts as this type of merger. Conglomerate mergers may produce pro-competitive effects resulting in the realization of economies of scale, but they can also cause negative effects, harming consumer welfare. This work aims to contribute to this discussion and illustrate the main competition concerns. The market strategies of tying/bundling and the role of the so-called ‘’portfolio’’ or ‘’range’’ effects are analyzed in detailed.
Recent decisions of the European Commission reveal an increased pursuit of conglomerate cases. One of these, Microsoft/LinkedIn, attracted much attention because: a) it was one of the rare conglomerate merger cases which in the recent decisional practice of the Commission was found likely to give rise to competition concerns, b) the relevant market for professional social networking (PSN) services was defined for the first time and, c) different theories of competition harm were considered regarding conglomerate effects. This dissertation looks into the Commission’s decision, as well as into two other noteworthy decisions, GE/ Honeywell and Tetra Laval / Sidel, which are of great significance for the analysis of conglomerate effects.
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